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This report investigates the international law and policy challenges to the determination of the 
international shipping industry’s contribution to climate change mitigation efforts through the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations and the 
competent intergovernmental organization with respect to shipping in international law. The report sets 
out the international legal framework that serves as context for the IMO efforts, the challenge of 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping and the process and issues in 
determining the industry’s ‘fair share’ of mitigation efforts and potential legal pathways. The report 
concludes with general, policy and legal considerations that have a bearing on the current and possible 
future directions of the nascent IMO strategy and potential legal pathways. 
 
General considerations include the observation that the complexity and uncertainty underscoring the 
development of the IMO strategy call for a long-term planning instrument which is integrated, and in 
particular is systemic in scope, flexible in approach and adaptive in application. As other regimes and 
sectors progress in developing and delivering on mitigation efforts, care should be exercised in 
considering lessons and tools from other sectors for application to shipping, given its uniqueness and that 
other sector experiences emanate from different contexts and considerations. Given continuing 
significant differences on GHG issues in the IMO, it would be of concern if the prospective IMO strategy 
is not adopted by the usual culture of consensus that has helped shape the IMO as a successful regulatory 
body. 
 
Among the policy considerations explored are the overall goal, key milestones toward the goal, measures 
and timelines to achieving the goal, and reporting a review. A critical starting point will be the 
determination of the industry’s fair contribution to the goals of the Paris Agreement and the overall 
climate mitigation effort expected from the sector.  Key milestones include the peak year, the rate of 
emission reduction once emissions have peaked and a timeline for full decarbonization, explored in the 
context of short, medium and long-term targets and a combination of measures that work together 
effectively toward the ultimate goal and interim targets.  Among the potential tools considered are 
technical and operational regulations, market-based mechanisms (MBM), and mechanisms to review and 
adjust both the targets and role of the measures to achieve them.  A key consideration was the opportunity 
to synchronize efforts of the IMO with commitments, review cycles, mechanisms and institutions under 
the Paris Agreement. 
 
Legal considerations are underscored by the global nature of maritime regulation, the necessity to 
anticipate the steps needed to secure universal acceptance and uniform application of the measures 
adopted in or under the IMO strategy, and relationship with other global and regional regimes. The 
potential relationship to other treaty regimes needs to be studied. It is likely that traditional maritime 
regulation alone will not be sufficient for the mitigation effort, and that novel measures and possible 
linkages with other global and regional regimes may be needed. While the MARPOL convention, as the 
lead IMO instrument on prevention of pollution from ships, can be expected to continue to play a major 
role, it is likely that a future introduction of an MBM will require a new and separate instrument. It is 
likely that future IMO regulation of GHG emissions will be challenged to be coherent within the 
industry’s regulatory system. While maritime regulation has well-developed principles and procedures, 
it will be important to harmonize mitigation regulation with other maritime regulatory concerns. Also to 
consider is whether States should be encouraged to extend international rules and standards to domestic 
shipping to facilitate consistency across all forms of shipping. Finally, the IMO strategy will need to give 
thought to how it will facilitate compliance with its spirit and letter. 
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The purpose of the report is to investigate the international law and policy challenges to determine 
the international shipping industry’s contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions through the efforts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and to identify 
issues and possible legal pathways.  
 
 In its seminal resolution adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 
(UNSDG), the United Nations General Assembly underscored the need for “urgent action on 
climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations.” 1  In 
recognizing climate change as one of the greatest challenges of our times, the resolution recognized 
the wide range of impacts and that many least developed countries (LDCs) and small island 
developing States (SIDS) will be seriously affected.2 It called for “the widest possible international 
cooperation aimed at accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions.”3 There is a 
commitment to adopt policies to promote sustainable transport systems.4 Several goals address the 
global climate change response directly or indirectly.5 The expectation is for a planetary response 
within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 
(UNFCCC)6 as the primary international and intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global 
response to climate change.7 
 
The legal context of this report is the scope, functions and interactions of a number of major 
global regimes, namely and primarily: the Paris Agreement, 2015, 8  pursuant to the UNFCCC with 
respect to global efforts to address climate change generally; the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS),9 with respect to atmospheric emissions from ships resulting 
in pollution of the marine environment; the IMO system of global maritime regulation and most 
especially the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973/78 
                                                 
1 Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on 25 September 2015, UN Doc Res A/70/L.1 (21 October 2015) [UNSDG], preamble. 
2 Ibid para 14. 
3 Ibid para 31. 
4 Ibid para 27. 
5 For example Goal 7 aims at ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all and, among 
other, calls for doubling the global rate of improvement of energy efficiency and enhancement of international 
cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology by 2030. Also relevant are Goal 12 to ensure 
sustainable consumption and production patterns, and Goal 13 to take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts. Ibid. 
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 
March 1994) [UNFCCC].  We refer to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement collectively in this report as the UN 
Climate Regime. Article 4.1(c) of the UNFCCC requires Parties to promote and cooperate in the development, 
application and diffusion of technologies, practices and process that reduce or prevent greenhouse gas emissions from 
the transport sector. 
7 In addition to the UNFCCC, the UNSDGs expressly recognize this primary role. UNSDG, supra note 1, para 31. 
8 Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (entered into force 4 November 2016) 
[Paris Agreement]. 
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 
November 1994) [UNCLOS]. 
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(MARPOL),10 with respect to the regulation of air emissions from ships on international voyages. 
To a lesser extent, the framework instruments of the World Trade Organization (WTO)11 and the 
European Union (EU) policy and regulation concerning monitoring, reporting and verification of 
carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport are also set out as part of the larger context.12 
While international shipping emissions are not included in any of the current individual State Party 
commitments under the Paris Agreement, they could be included in the future at the discretion of 
individual Parties, and are captured under the collective goals and the Global Stocktake. The 
international expectation is that the IMO will facilitate the determination of the shipping industry’s 
fair contribution consistently with the spirit of the Paris Agreement. 
 
Of special and central significance for this report is the interaction of the Paris Agreement 
and IMO regimes. The Paris Agreement provides the framework for the adoption of national 
contributions determined at the national level,13 establishes the collective goals, and takes stock of 
progress toward the collective goals through five-year review cycles.14 The expectation of the IMO 
is that the shipping industry’s contribution will be determined at the intergovernmental 
organization level because the industry is globalized and transnational. The two regimes are guided 
by different principles that shape how the respective contributions will be made, particularly 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) under the 
UNFCCC and with the addition of ‘in the light of the different national circumstances’ (CBDR-
RCNC) in the Paris Agreement on the one hand,15 and ‘no more favourable treatment’ (NMFT) 
under the IMO conventions16 and related enforcement arrangements on the other hand.17  
 
The IMO has been working on GHG emissions from ships for well over a decade. 
International shipping was the first industry to actually adopt measures with respect to such 
emissions at a global sectoral level, consisting mainly of technical (energy efficiency), operational 
(vessel management) and more recently fuel-related measures. At this time it is unclear whether 
                                                 
10 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340 UNTS 184, as 
amended by the Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973, 
17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 (entered into force 2 October 1983), as amended [MARPOL]. 
11 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154 (entered into 
force 1 January 1995); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 120 (entered into force 
1 January 1995); General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183 (entered into force  1 
January 1995). 
12 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Integrating maritime transport emissions in the 
EU’s greenhouse gas reduction policies, COM (2013) 479 final (28 June 2013); EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon 
dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC, [2015] OJ, L 123/55. 
13 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13. 
14 Ibid art 14.2. 
15 Ibid art 2.2. The principle is discussed in more detail below in this report. See also, Yubing Shi, Climate Change 
and International Shipping: The Regulatory Framework for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Brill 
Nijhoff, 2017) [Shi], at 81. 
16 For example, MARPOL, supra note 10, art 5(4). 
17 NMFT is the basis of regional arrangements for port State control, i.e.: Europe and the North Atlantic (Paris MoU); 
Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West 
and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); 
the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU) and the Persian Gulf (Riyadh MoU). For links to each MoU, see “Port State 
Control”, IMO (2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org>.  See also Shi, supra note 15, at 91. 
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technical and operational measures, although essential, may be insufficient on their own to enable 
the industry achieve the long-term goal of decarbonisation and hence parallel discussions on 
market-based mechanisms (MBM) have been conducted. In 2014 the divisions and controversies 
over the discussion on MBMs prompted suspension from further formal discussion by the IMO’s 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC),18 although the topic was considered again 
by the first two meetings of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions 
from Ships (ISWG-GHG) in June and October 2017 for possible inclusion in the future 
comprehensive IMO strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships, referred to in this report 
as the IMO Strategy.19  At the time of writing, the ISWG-GHG is deliberating on the initial strategy 
for the industry’s share and its delivery, to be further considered at a third intersessional meeting 
and by MEPC 72 in April 2018, in accordance with an agreed roadmap and adoption in 2018.20 
 
This report’s ultimate focus on the legal aspects of the expected contribution of the 
international shipping industry necessitates comparative consideration of initiatives at other levels. 
First, the experience in the determination of contributions of other industries, most especially civil 
aviation as another globalized industry, may be informative. The parallel regime of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provides an opportunity to understand 
analogous opportunities and constraints in determining the international shipping industry’s 
contribution. Second, the EU efforts in regulating GHG emissions at the regional level have 
pressured the IMO to produce an effective strategy, and failing which there is the very real prospect 
of an EU approach to reduce European-related shipping emissions.21 Third, the prospect that the 
UN climate regime will conclude through its Global Stocktake exercise that the international 
shipping sector is not making an adequate contribution to the global effort, potentially warranting 
Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement engaging more actively on this issue, provides 
important context for the work of the IMO.  At the same time, there are significant opportunities 
for cooperation between international regimes, such as with the UN climate regime on 
transparency, technology and MBMs.22 
 
 In exploring the constraints and opportunities in determining the shipping industry’s 
contribution, the report considers the principles and methods of maritime regulation and explores 
the tools and procedures available to the IMO. The IMO’s mandate and traditional approach to 
maritime regulation will be tested to their limits. The report discusses the technical nature of 
maritime regulation and considers legal pathways for adopting an MBM measure, should it be 
needed.  
                                                 
18 Report of the MEPC on its 65th Session, IMO Doc 65/22 (24 May 2014) [MEPC 65 Report], at 44. 
19  Report of the first Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships 
(ISWG-GHG 1), IMO Doc MEPC 71/WP.5, 30 June 2017 [ISWG-GHG 1 Report]; Report of the Second Meeting of 
the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG 2), Note by the 
Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 72/7 (3 November 2017) [ISWG-GHG 2 Report]. 
20 Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18 (11 November 2016) [MEPC 70 Report], at 50–
51; Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18/Add.1 (11 November 2016), annex 11. 
21 For a study exploring possible EU unilateral action on GHG from the maritime sector on the basis of the sovereignty 
enjoyed by Member States in their ports see Aoife O’Leary, David Holyoake and Marta Ballesteros, Legal 
implications of EU action on GHG Emissions from the International Maritime Sector (ClientEarth, 2011), online: 
ClientEarth <https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2011-11-01-legal-implications-of-
eu-action-on-ghg-emissions-from-the-international-maritime-sector-ce-en.pdf>. 
22 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 6 (market-based mechanisms), 10 (Technology Mechanism), 14 (Global 
Stocktake). 
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 The consideration of how the international shipping industry’s fair contribution might be 
achieved also brings into play the relationship between multilateralism and unilateralism, 
including regionalism, in law- making. Maritime regulation aspires to achieve global uniformity 
in State practice, in contrast to the flexibility inherent in national or regional approaches endorsed 
under the Paris Agreement. Historically, maritime regulation has experienced instances of 
unilateralism that at times appeared to undermine global efforts at achieving uniformity and at 
other times actually triggered the eventual adoption of higher global standards. 23  The EU’s 
position, albeit at the regional level, will be important to consider in this respect. 
 
This report starts by setting out the international legal framework with particular focus on 
the UN climate regime, international law of the sea and international maritime law on pollution 
prevention from ships, and also considers legal issues with respect to international trade law and 
EU regulation. The latter two are considered only in general terms as they could potentially 
constitute separate lines of inquiry on their own right and are not the focus of this report. The report 
next addresses the challenge of regulating GHG emissions from international shipping by 
explaining the commercial and operational life of the ship, implications of its mobility, 
consequential global governance of the industry, how maritime regulation works, IMO efforts in 
regulating GHG emissions, and the range of actual and potential measures for GHG regulation 
from ships considered to date. Discussion of lessons from other sectors follows, in part to illustrate 
the efforts undertaken in these sectors, and in part to explore whether there are useful experiences 
for international shipping to draw upon. Thereafter the discussion addresses the core purpose of 
the report, namely the key issues for the determination of the ‘fair share’ and potential legal 
pathways, including the management of uncertainty, prospective vision and timeline, role of 
maritime regulation, potential role of market measures, equity issues, compliance system, inter-
regime consistency and complemenarity, and IMO leadership. The report concludes with 





                                                 
23 See Stuart Hetherington, “The Elusive Panacea of Uniformity: Is It Worth Pursuing?” Paper presented at the 
AMTAC Annual Address 2013 Sydney (18 September 2013), online: AMTAC <https://amtac.org.au/publications-
papers/>. 
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2.  THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Evolution of the UN climate regime 
 
The origins of the international climate change regime can be traced back to a series of United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions adopted in the late 1980s. These resolutions resulted in 
the negotiation of the UNFCCC, which was adopted at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, entered into force 
in 1994 and established the architecture for subsequent climate change agreements. The General 
Assembly resolutions also resulted in the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) to give scientific and technical advice to negotiators and policy 
makers. Since 1990, the IPCC has prepared five comprehensive assessment reports on the state 
of the science on climate change, each at critical junctures of the development of the climate 
change regime as well as, on request, more focused reports on issues ranging from land use 
change and forestry issues to carbon capture and storage.  The most recent synthesis report was 
released in 2014 to inform the negotiation of the Paris Agreement.24 
 
The UNFCCC continues to serve as the foundation and provides important institutions, 
goals, and principles for the climate regime. The overall goal of the UNFCCC, described in Article 
2, is to stabilize GHG concentrations at levels that prevent dangerous human interference with the 
climate system, ensure that the rate of change allows nature to adapt, to not threaten food 
production and to allow sustainable development to take place. This overall goal is refined through 
additional principles set out in Article 3, including equity for present and future generations, 
CBDR-RC, and the need to take precautionary measures to anticipate and mitigate, prevent or 
minimize the effects of climate change. 
 
The UNFCCC is the ultimate source of the mandate of the UN climate regime over the GHG 
emissions from international shipping.  The foundations for this mandate include the goal in Article 
2, the principles in Article 3 and reference to efforts to reduce emissions from transportation in 
Article 4.1(c), in combination with the powers of the COP set out in Article 7.  Key among these 
powers is the general power to implement measures to meet the Article 2 goal and to more broadly 
ensure the effective implementation of the convention.  The need to mobilize finance is specifically 
referenced, providing the basis for carbon levies and other economic measures. A key potential 
limitation of the specific mandates set out in Article 7 is the focus on Parties rather than private 
actors, although measures directed at private actors are not specifically excluded.   
 
The first substantive agreement following the UNFCCC was the Kyoto Protocol, 
negotiated in 1997.25 While the key principles of the international climate change regime were 
accepted in 1997, the rules for implementation took much longer to develop. Most of these 
rules were finalized at the 7th Conference of the Parties (COP) in November 2001 in 
Marrakech. The package of rules required to implement the Kyoto Protocol was then formally 
adopted at the first meeting of the parties to the Protocol in Montreal in 2005.  Upon its entry 
into force in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol became the heart of the international climate change 
                                                 
24 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014).  
25 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 
148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [Kyoto Protocol]. 
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regime. It established the first binding emission reduction targets for each of the ‘developed 
countries’ listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC for 2008 to 2012, the first commitment period.26 
 
At the core of the Kyoto Protocol are the GHG emission reduction targets for developed 
States. Each Annex I country was assigned a negotiated combined emission reduction target for 
the six gases covered in the Protocol. The target was expressed relative to emissions in that State 
in 1990 and presented in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions. This emission 
reduction target was then translated into emissions permits assigned to each Annex I Party for the 
five years of the 2008 to 2012 commitment period. These permits are called assigned amount units 
(AAUs), and are the foundation of the emissions trading system under the Protocol. 
 
The flexibility mechanisms established in the Kyoto Protocol are the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), Emissions Trading (ET) and Joint Implementation. They were included in the 
Kyoto Protocol, at least in part, in recognition that the State-specific targets for Annex I countries 
provided only a crude tool for balancing the relative responsibility, capacity and potential of Parties 
to the Protocol to reduce emissions. In that respect, the mechanisms provide a degree of flexibility 
to ensure that if meeting one Party’s target through reductions turned out to be disproportionately 
expensive or technically difficult to achieve, that Party had the option to delay reductions in its 
own country and instead support reductions in another country by using the flexibility 
mechanisms.  
 
A further objective of one of the flexibility mechanisms, the CDM, was to address capacity 
concerns in developing countries (those not listed in Annex I). Some developing countries were in 
the process of making major capital investments in energy-producing and consuming technologies, 
and the flexibility mechanisms reflected the Parties’ recognition that there would be significant 
long-term benefits to find ways to influence the choices made by developing countries at this stage 
of their development. 
 
The dual purpose of the CDM, therefore, was to offer Annex I Parties a compliance 
alternative where domestic emission reduction has become too expensive, while at the same time 
providing developing countries with assistance in the form of technology transfer to encourage a 
more sustainable lower emissions development path. The parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed that 
if reductions could be achieved more cost effectively in a developing country that has no reduction 
target, that country should be able to join forces with an Annex I Party to achieve those reductions. 
In return for providing this assistance, an Annex I Party would receive CDM credits that it could 
apply towards its emission reduction targets. 
 
The form of assistance was left somewhat open, but in order to receive the credits, the Annex 
I Party had to demonstrate that the emission reductions achieved were additional to those that 
would have been achieved if the assistance had not been granted. The term used to describe this 
requirement is ‘additionality’. It means that the assistance provided in return for the credits must 
enable the reductions. The assistance will usually take the form of financial support through the 
                                                 
26 Joanna Depledge, “Chapter 2A: The Legal and Policy Framework of the United Nations Climate Change Regime” 
in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 2017) [Klein et al] 27; Meinhard Doelle, From Hot Air to Action? Climate Change, Compliance and the Future 
of International Environmental Law (Carswell, 2005). 
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purchase of the CDM credits. It could, however, take the form of providing access to technologies 
in return for CDM credits, or the transfer of expertise needed to implement a CDM project. The 
Kyoto Protocol’s ET system establishes the rules under which the various forms of emission 
credits or units created under the Protocol can be traded, taken out of circulation, used for 
compliance or saved. Through emissions trading, Annex I Parties can make use, in meeting their 
emissions targets, of credits or units held by other Annex I Parties, or generated under the CDM.27 
 
Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol were designed to ensure that decisions about 
compliance and the use of the mechanisms are based on accurate, reliable and consistent 
information from all Parties. To this end, Article 5 requires Annex 1 Parties to put in place a system 
for national emissions estimations on an annual basis in accordance with agreed-upon 
methodologies.  Parties are required under Article 5 to include emissions from domestic shipping 
in their national systems, but not those from international shipping. Article 5 allows for 
adjustments to be made to the emissions estimation if approved methodologies are not followed. 
Article 7 requires Parties to use those national systems to report annually on emissions by source 
and removal by sink, again in accordance with approved methodologies. Article 8 provides for 
review, verification and adjustment of the information provided by expert review teams to ensure 
that Parties’ annual reporting on emissions and sinks is accurate, consistent and complies with the 
agreed upon methodologies. 
 
The Kyoto compliance system is unique among compliance systems for multilateral 
environment agreements (MEAs). On the one hand, it built on a long tradition among MEAs to 
facilitate compliance through capacity-building, dialogue and transparency. On the other hand, it 
recognized the need for strong and consistent enforcement to establish a carbon market and to 
ensure that parties will make the investment needed to meet their emission reduction targets. The 
result was a compliance system that seeks to facilitate and to enforce, using parallel processes 
where required. This meant that compliance issues that are deemed important for the functioning 
of the trading system are subject to enforcement and facilitation, whereas matters not considered 
critical for the carbon market are only subject to facilitation. Facilitation and enforcement are 
carried out by separate branches of the compliance committee. Only the enforcement branch can 
impose penalties.28 
 
Decision 2/CP adopted by the 3rd UNFCCC Conference of the Parties alongside the 
decision adopting the Kyoto Protocol, requests further elaboration on the inclusion of 
emissions from international shipping to individual Parties. However, Parties have not yet 
agreed on this elaboration. In parallel, Article 2.2 the Kyoto Protocol requests Annex I Parties 
to pursue limitation or reduction of emissions from that sector, working through the IMO.  No 
elaboration on the inclusion of emissions from international shipping to individual Parties was 
included in the Kyoto rulebook, nor agreed under in negotiations on the implementation of the 
                                                 
27 There has been much criticism of the environmental integrity of the CDM, with a recent study by the Institute for 
Applied Ecology in Berlin suggesting that most of the credits granted were for projects that would have proceeded 
without the support from the CDM mechanism. See Martin Cames et al, How Additional is the Clean Development 
Mechanism? (Institute for Applied Ecology, 2016), online: IAE 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/docs/clean_dev_mechanism_en.pdf>.   
28  See Meinhard Doelle, “Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons for MEA 
Compliance System Design” (2010) 1 Climate Law 237.  See also, Jutta Brunnee, Meinhard Doelle & Lavanya 
Rajamani, Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Change Regime, (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This resolution followed an effort to include 
international shipping within the emission reduction commitments Parties agreed to take on 
under the Protocol.29   
 
The effort to include international shipping had been initiated with a UNFCCC secretariat 
report that identified eight options, which were then reduced to five options through 
deliberations by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).30  The 
five options selected by the SBSTA included the ‘no allocation’ option, as well as allocation 
to the State where the bunker fuel is sold, allocation to the State of registration or ownership 
of the vessel, allocation to the State of origin or destination of the vessel, and allocation to the 
State of origin or destination of the cargo or passengers.31 No options have been selected from 
these five, and all remain open for adoption in the future. Addressing the emissions from this 
growing sector remained important for the achievement of the ultimate objectives of the 
UNFCCC, and therefore resurfaced once the attention of Parties to the UNFCCC turned to the 
post-2012 negotiations.   
 
Informal efforts to start negotiations on the post-2012 regime commenced once the rulebook 
for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 2001. By 2002 in New Delhi, the 
EU started to focus on post-2012 negotiations. However, the United States (US) was not willing 
to allow a formal negotiating process to be started and the developing world was unwilling to 
discuss emission reductions outside the developed world because in its view North America, 
Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan had failed to lead by example, and insufficient progress 
had been made on adaptation.32  
 
Negotiations for the post-2012 regime did not formally proceed until the Conference of the 
Parties/Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) in December 2005 in Montreal. It took a decade for 
these negotiations to be concluded successfully in Paris in December 2015.  Emissions from 
international shipping and aviation remained on the agenda throughout these negotiations.  Efforts 
to bring international shipping under the UNFCCC initially took place under the Bali Action 
Plan (from 2007 – 2012) and then under the Durban Platform (from 2012 – 2015) that provided 
the basis for negotiating the Paris Climate Agreement.33  It is worth noting that the Bali Action 
Plan specifically provided for international transport under Cooperative Sectoral Approaches, 
the only item under the Bali Action Plan that resulted in no agreed outcome.34 
 
  
                                                 
29 The implication of the reference to the IMO in Article 2.2 has been the subject of considerable debate within the 
climate regime as well as the IMO.  For an overview, see Shi, supra note 15, at 94. 
30  Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Doc 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (7 April 1995), art 1(f), at 16. 
31  See Sebastian Oberthür, “Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International 
Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol” (2003) 3:3 Climate Policy 191, at 193. 
32 Meinhard Doelle, “The Cat Came Back, or the Nine Lives of the Kyoto Protocol” (2006) 16 J. Env. L. & Prac. 261. 
33  Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008) [Bali Action Plan] at para 1b(iv). 
34 Doha Decisions 1-10/CP.18, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (28 February, 2013). 
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2.2 The Paris Agreement 
 
The key elements of the approach to climate mitigation in the Paris Agreement consist of a 
collective long-term goal with a number of elements, nationally determined mitigation efforts, 
five-year review cycles of progress in implementing individual efforts toward the collective goals, 
and a commitment to increase ambition as part of the five-year review cycles to ensure the 
collective long-term goals are met. This section offers a brief overview of these elements. 
 
The first of the key elements of the Paris Agreement is its set of long-term goals. The 
objective of keeping global average temperature increase to ‘well below’ 2° C and the aspiration 
to limit this increase to 1.5° C are at the heart of the Paris Agreement.35 The temperature goal is 
supplemented with a commitment to ensure emissions peak as soon as possible, and to reach a 
balance of emissions removals in the second half of the century. Arguably, 1.5 °C has now become 
the ultimate standard against which the success of collective mitigation efforts under the UNFCCC 
will be measured, and it seems likely that 1.5 scenarios being explored by the IPCC will conclude 
that GHG emission neutrality will have to be reached before 2050.36 This ambitious set of long-
term goals provides an important foundation for each State’s future nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs), their justification on the grounds of equity, and the five-year cycles of NDC 
communication and the Global Stocktake. Over time, as the IPCC completes its scenario work, the 
‘well below 2’ and ‘1.5° C’ goals can be expected to shape further discussions on elements of the 
long-term ambition, such as specific time frames for the expressed need for global emissions to 
peak as soon as possible and for reaching a balance of emissions and removals.37  
 
The long-term temperature goal also provides important context for other key elements of 
the Paris Agreement, particularly adaptation and finance.38 Meeting the long-term goal is an 
essential pre-condition for successful adaptation efforts, and finance in turn is critical for meeting 
both the mitigation and adaptation goals of the Paris Agreement. Important connections are made 
to poverty eradication and sustainable development. Through the process to be designed for the 
Global Stocktake under Article 14, the long-term goal articulated in Article 2 is expected to 
become the ultimate guide for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.39  
 
The starting point for mitigation in the Paris Agreement is the overall mitigation effort, 
largely represented by the individual NDCs measured against the long-term temperature goal, but 
supplemented by efforts outside the UN climate regime, such as efforts of the IMO, ICAO, and 
initiatives under the ozone regime to eliminate the use of HFCs.40 Parties recognized in Paris that 
the initial NDCs would not add up to an adequate collective effort in light of the long-term goal. 
NDCs are therefore to be strengthened every five years starting in 2020, informed by the 2018 
                                                 
35 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 2.1. 
36 Andreas Fischlin, “Chapter 1A: Background and Role of Science” in Klein et al, supra note 26, 3 [Fishlin]. For 
updates on progress on the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5º C, online: IPCC <www.ipcc.ch>. 
37 Halldór Thorgeirsson, “Chapter 7: Objective (Article 2.1)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, at 123. 
38 Irene Suárez Pérez & Angela Churie Kallhauge, “Chapter 12: Adaptation” in ibid at 196; Jorge Gastelumendi & 
Inka Gnittke, “Chapter 14: Climate Finance (Article 9)” in ibid at 239. 
39 Jürgen Friedrich, “Chapter 19: Global Stocktake (Article 14)” in ibid at 319 [Friedrich]. 
40 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Hydro Fluorocarbons, 15 October 2016 (not in force), online: 
Montreal Protocol <http:// conf.montreal- protocol.org/ meeting/ mop/ mop- 28/ crps/ SitePages/ Home.aspx>. 
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Talanoa Dialogue (the facilitative dialogue under the UNFCCC on ways to increase ambition),41 
and then every 5 years starting in 2025, following a global stocktaking exercise carried out two 
years before each updated NDC is due.42 The Paris Agreement offers important guidance on how 
Parties are to determine the adequacy of their NDCs with respect to mitigation.43  
 
Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement provides that Parties will aim to reach global peaking of 
emissions as soon as possible, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter on the basis of science 
and equity. Parties recognize that it will take longer for developing country emissions to peak, 
putting pressure on developed countries to accelerate their emission reductions to achieve a global 
peaking as soon as possible. Parties are to achieve a collective balance between emissions and 
removals of GHG from the atmosphere in the second half of the century, suggesting that GHG 
concentrations should stabilize and start to decline sometime after 2050.44  
 
These provisions offer some clarity on the scale and allocation of mitigation efforts, and 
create a number of procedural obligations, but they neither provide a method for determining 
appropriate NDCs for individual Parties, nor a legal obligation to fully implement NDCs and meet 
targets set. It is noteworthy that the long-term mitigation goals are framed in technology-neutral 
language and thereby leave open how much specific technologies, from renewable energy to 
carbon capture and storage and the enhancement of sinks, should contribute to the effort. The 
additional guidance for Parties on what is expected of them takes on added significance as the 
Paris Outcome explicitly recognizes that there is an ambition gap between commitments made by 
Parties to date and the long-term goal. The ambition gap is quantified in Decision 1/CP.21 to be 
upward of 15 gigatonnes by 2030, based on the 2° C goal.45 
 
The Paris Agreement affirms the importance of the enhancement and conservation of sinks, 
and specifically mentions forests in this context.46 The Agreement confirms that international 
emissions trading and other market mechanisms are acceptable tools for Parties to meet their 
emission reduction goals, as long as they increase the level of ambition.47 The Agreement sets out 
general principles for the use of market mechanisms, such as the avoidance of double-counting, 
environmental integrity, robust accounting and transparency. The Paris Agreement also makes 
provision for non-market approaches to assist Parties with the implementation of their NDCs.  
 
Detailed rules for these various mechanisms will have to be established before a thorough 
assessment of their environmental integrity and their potential to contribute toward the ultimate 
objective of the Paris Agreement can be carried out. These provisions of the Agreement offer 
                                                 
41 Established by COP 23 in November 2017, the Talanoa Dialogue now has an active online platform that enables 
submission of inputs by Parties and stakeholders. Welcome to the Talanoa Dialogue Portal, online: UNFCCC 
<talanoadialogue.com>. 
42 The Paris Agreement, supra note 8 refers to highest ambition and the need for progression (art 4.3), and new NDCs 
every five years (art 4.9) informed by the Global Stocktake (arts 4.9, 14).  
43 Harald Winkler, “Chapter 9: Mitigation (Article 4)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, at 141 [Winkler]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 1/CP.21, Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its Twenty-first Session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, Addendum, Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016) [Decision 1/CP.21] at para 17. 
46 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 5. 
47 Ibid art 6. 
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possible tools for addressing GHG emissions from international shipping, should the results of the 
Talanoa Dialogue or the Global Stocktake under Article 14 lead Parties to conclude that 
insufficient progress on this issue through the efforts of the IMO risks undermining the goals of 
the Paris Agreement. They also offer important avenues for collaboration between the UN climate 
regime and the IMO, such as on transparency, technology, and implementation of a market-based 
mechanism for the sector.48 
 
The transparency rules apply to all Parties, with some modest differentiation, mainly through 
a commitment to flexibility and support for developing countries. For all Parties, the information 
they submit will be subject to a technical expert review and a multilateral, facilitative consideration 
of progress. Importantly, flexibility with respect to transparency is specifically linked to capacity, 
not to the broader concept of CBDR-RC. Special accommodations are included for the LDCs and 
SIDS.49 Transparency is a focus of capacity-building efforts under the Paris Agreement, a signal 
that developed State Parties are motivated to help build capacity in developing countries in order 
to minimize differentiation on transparency.50 This signal to a nuanced approach to differentiation 
should facilitate discussions under the IMO to resolve the relationship between CBDR and 
NMFT.51 
 
The Paris Agreement signals the intention to build on and enhance transparency 
arrangements under the UNFCCC, including national communications, biennial reports and update 
reports, international assessment and review and international consultation and analysis. 52  It 
specifically calls for more regular and comprehensive reporting, a more harmonized verification 
process,53 and common modalities, procedures and guidelines.54 The Paris Agreement offers a 
surprising level of detail on accounting and reporting in the 15 paragraphs of Article 13.  This is 
further supplemented with specific references to transparency in key provisions on mitigation, 
adaptation, finance and capacity-building.55  Detailed rules are currently being negotiated.  It is 
unclear at this point whether the transparency rules will include any obligation to report on 
emissions from the international shipping sector beyond the current guidelines for preparing 
national inventories.  Parties, of course, are free to include international shipping in their NDCs in 
some form, and can report on emissions from the sector. 
 
The establishment of a five-year review and ambition cycle, including the Talanoa Dialogue 
in 2018 and the Global Stocktake process starting in 2023, constitute another core element of the 
overall effort to ensure the goals of the Paris Agreement are met through the collective efforts of 
Parties in cooperation with other regimes. The Global Stocktake set out in Article 14 covers 
mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support. The first Global Stocktake is to take 
place in 2023, in time for the revision of Parties’ NDCs by 2025. The goal of the Global Stocktake 
                                                 
48 Andrew Howard, “Chapter 11: Voluntary Cooperation (Article 6)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, at 178. 
49 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 13.7–13.10; Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45, at paras 89–90. 
50 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 11, 13.15; Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45, at paras 84–88. 
51 Yamide Dagnet & Kelly Levin, “Chapter 18: Transparency (Article 13)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, 301 [Dagnet 
& Levin]. 
52 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 13.4. 
53 Through a technical expert review, see ibid arts 13.11–13.12. 
54 Ibid art 13.13. 
55 Ibid arts 4.8, 4.13, 6.2, 7.5, 9.7, 11.1. Transparency is referenced throughout Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45; 
Dagnet & Levin, supra note 51. 
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is to enhance both national action and international cooperation, a clear signal that international 
shipping will be an area of focus for the Global Stocktake. The Talanoa Dialogue, an initial, 
stocktaking process among Parties, initially called the ‘facilitative dialogue’, is scheduled for 2018 
and will serve as a first experiment with this review and ambition cycle under the Paris 
Agreement.56 
 
The compliance mechanism is to be facilitative, non-adversarial, and non-punitive in nature 
and applies to all Parties.57 The compliance committee is to consist of 12 members with relevant 
technical expertise, with membership determined in a manner similar to the facilitative branch of 
the compliance committee under the Kyoto Protocol.58 The committee is directed to be sensitive 
to national capabilities and circumstances of Parties in carrying out its work.59 
 
The transparency provisions with respect to Parties’ implementation of their NDCs, in 
combination with the Global Stocktake and the compliance system, are at the heart of the process 
put in place under the Paris Agreement to ensure progression of individual and collective ambition 
toward the long-term goal. The basic elements are in place in the form of Articles 13 to 15, and 
they appear sound. However, the detailed rules have yet to be finalized. Furthermore, the success 
of the transparency, review, stocktaking and compliance approach in the Paris Agreement in 
increasing ambition sufficiently to meet the long-term goal will ultimately depend on many factors 
outside the purview of the new climate regime, most notably the economic, political and social 
circumstances in key State Parties.  
 
The Paris Agreement does not repeat the call in the Kyoto Protocol for Parties to work 
through the IMO to address GHG emissions from international shipping.  The legal status of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and with it the status of Article 2.2, are unclear at this time.  This raises interesting 
questions about the potential impact for the mandate of the IMO in case of the formal and complete 
replacement of the Kyoto Protocol with the Paris Agreement.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to point out that the draft negotiating text of the Paris Agreement 
did include proposals from some parties for specific reference to international shipping and 
aviation.  The draft text included the following options: 
 
“23bis. [In meeting the 2˚C objective, Parties agree on the need for global sectoral emission 
reduction targets for international aviation and maritime transport and on the need for all 
Parties to work through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop global policy frameworks to achieve 
these targets].”60 
 
“47.5 Option (a): 
                                                 
56 Decision 1/CP. 21, supra note 45, at para 20.  See also, Friedrich, supra note 39. 
57 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 15. 
58 Decision 1/CP.21, supra note 45, at para 102. Interestingly, there is no reference back to the detailed rules of 
procedure developed for the Compliance Committee under the Kyoto Protocol. 
59 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 15.2.  See also Yamide Dagnet & Eliza Northrop, “Chapter 20: Facilitating 
Implementation and Promoting Compliance (Article 15)” in Klein et al, supra note 26, 301 [Dagnet & Northrop]. 
60 Outcomes of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences held in Lima in December 2014 and in Geneva in 
February 2015, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 68/5 (18 February 2015), at 3.  
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b.  Encourage the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime 
Organization to develop a levy scheme to provide financial support for the Adaptation Fund.  
c.  In establishing the levy scheme, ICAO and IMO are encouraged to take into consideration 
the needs of developing countries, particularly the LDCs, SIDS and countries in Africa heavily 
reliant on tourism and international transport of traded goods.”61 
 
These proposals were not included in the final version of the Paris Agreement. For now, 
international shipping has not been included in the emission reduction commitments of Parties in 
the form of their NDCs. There has also been no change in the emissions that Parties have to account 
for under the Kyoto Protocol. Reporting obligations under the Paris Agreement are still being 
negotiated.  Of course, as indicated above, there is nothing in the Paris Agreement to prevent a 
party from reporting on emissions from international shipping, or from including international 
shipping in some form in its NDC. While the Paris Agreement does not mention emissions from 
international shipping, and the IMO is continuing its efforts to develop a strategy to address them, 
the absence of any reference to this mandate in the Agreement has the potential to strengthen the 
hand of the UN climate regime going forward. If it had made specific reference to the IMO, the 
result may have been to discourage Parties to the UN climate regime, from taking responsibility 
for these emissions. By remaining silent on the efforts of the IMO, it remains somewhat uncertain 
to what extent the UN climate regime can be taken to have endorsed the mandate of the IMO or to 
have delegated the issue to it. It may also affect the relevance of CBDR in the IMO’s efforts to 
regulate emissions from the sector.62 In practice and for practical purposes, the IMO is using its 
treaty mandate to lead the shipping industry’s efforts and it has reported to the UNFCCC process 
and structures. What is clear is that the UN climate regime will continue to monitor progress as 
part of the Talanoa Dialogue in 2018 and the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement 
thereafter, and that the pressure on Parties to the UN climate regime, who are also IMO Member 
States, to act in case of inadequate progress at the IMO will remain. 
 
So what avenues are there in the Paris Agreement to become more actively involved in 
efforts to reduce emissions from international shipping and aviation? Most importantly, perhaps, 
unlike the Kyoto Protocol with its focus on the emissions of developed country (Annex 1) Parties, 
the overall focus of the Paris Agreement is on global emissions and a global temperature goal of 
‘well below 2° C while striving for 1.5° C. Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement refers to all 
emissions, and does not exclude emissions from international shipping. Article 4(4) refers to 
developed countries ‘undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets’.  
 
The expectation is that both the Talanoa Dialogue and the Global Stocktake under Article 
14 (including the science input from the IPCC) will include emissions from international shipping. 
In addition, the issue remains on the agenda of the SBSTA, the subsidiary body of the UN climate 
regime mandated to provide information and advice on scientific and technological matters. This 
provides the possibility, if all else fails, of revisiting, and taking a decision on the five options 
identified by the SBSTA in the lead up to Kyoto, and thereby clarifying and standardizing the 
allocation of emissions from international shipping to Parties.  Finally, Article 6, dealing with 
                                                 
61 Ibid at 4.  
62 See Yubin Shi, supra note 15, at 94 
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market and non-market mechanisms, may provide avenues for measures under the Paris 
Agreement to address emissions from international shipping.63 
 
All this means that, at a minimum, every five years, starting in 2018 with the Talanoa 
Dialogue, and in 2023 in the form of the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement, Parties 
should receive reports on emissions from international shipping as part of the overall exercise to 
determine progress toward the temperature goal. In a scenario where Parties are meeting or 
exceeding their individual mitigation commitments, but the collective effort continues to fall short 
due in part to insufficient efforts to reduce emissions from international shipping, the pressure for 
the UN climate regime, or Parties thereto, to take charge of these emissions will be immense. 
 
A critical element in ensuring the international shipping sector will do its part will be full 
transparency. One option would be for the IMO, or State Parties as part of their NDC submissions, 
to report on emissions from these sectors as part of the Talanoa Dialogue and the Global Stocktake. 
As important will be reporting on efforts and targets going forward, and consistency of 
methodologies for estimating and reporting on emissions from shipping between the IMO and the 
UNFCCC.  For the Talanoa Dialogue, a particularly important question will be the contribution of 
the sector to closing the 2030 emissions gap. Of course, individual Parties can also be asked to 
report on emissions from these sectors in their inventories under Article 13. Either way, it will be 
critical that accurate and consistent information about emission trajectories in the international 
shipping sector is available every five years starting in 2018.  Ideally, this would lead to an 
assessment of what approaches have been implemented, which have been effective and which have 
not. This will allow Parties to the UN climate regime to determine, in the context of the overall 
five-year review and stocktake cycles, whether adequate efforts are being made outside the regime 
(or collaboratively), or whether it is time to take additional measures either within the UN climate 
regime or collaboratively between the UN climate regime and the IMO. In practice, since Parties 
to the climate regime and IMO Member States are the same actors, consistency should be expected. 
In addition, as discussions on sources of funding for climate mitigation, adaptation and loss and 
damage continue under the UN climate regime, the idea of imposing a levy on emissions from 
international transport is likely to continue to surface in the climate negotiations.64  
 
In short, the effort to influence, control and eventually eliminate GHG emissions from 
international shipping and aviation within the climate regime or in coordination with it is far from 
over. Full transparency during the review and stocktake cycles will be critical to ensure these 
sectors contribute their fair share to the global effort.  Since States are Parties to both the climate 
and maritime regimes, they would benefit from exploring opportunities for consistency and 
cooperation, including the possibility to utilize institutions and instruments under the Paris 
Agreement for market mechanisms, finance and technology to help with speedy and effective 
implementation of measures negotiated under the IMO process. In the short- and medium-term, 
until technology breakthroughs point to a clear zero emission path for shipping and aviation, these 
                                                 
63 As discussed in Section 5 below, the potential under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is, of course, not limited to 
situations where the Parties to the UN climate regime conclude that efforts by the IMO are inadequate.  There is every 
opportunity for a cooperative approach, certainly with respect to market-based mechanisms under Article 6, 
technology under Article 10, transparency under Article 13and the Global Stocktake under Article 14. 
64 The sharing of proceeds under Article 6 for international transfers of emissions obligations (ITMOs) provides a 
sound basis for implementing such a levy under Article 6. 
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sectors may need to take further efficiency measures, take measures to accelerate technology 
breakthroughs, or both, to make a fair contribution to the global effort. A more controversial option 
would be to fund emission reductions outside the international shipping sector in some form.   
Aviation has taken tentative steps in the latter direction. In the long-term, the science is clear that 
meeting the temperature goal set in Paris will require a “balance of emissions and removals”, and 
very likely significant net negative emissions, making anything short of a zero emissions solution 
for these sectors untenable.65 
 
2.3 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
With 168 State Parties66 at the time of writing and as the “constitution for the oceans”,67 
UNCLOS has an important role to play in providing the jurisdictional framework applicable to 
international shipping and substantive rules for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. In Part XII of the Convention, Article 192 establishes a generic duty for all States to 
protect and preserve the marine environment.68 In a recent Annex VII arbitration under UNCLOS, 
it was held that the “obligations in Part XII apply to all States with respect to the marine 
environment in all maritime areas, both inside the national jurisdiction of States and beyond it.”69 
Article 192 concerns “the positive obligation to take active measures to protect and preserve the 
marine environment, and by logical implication, entails the negative obligation not to degrade the 
marine environment.”70 The tribunal observed that there is a body of international environmental 
law that informs Article 192 and it is generally to the effect that States should ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control should respect the environment within their jurisdiction and 
beyond. Consequently, States have a positive duty to prevent or at least mitigate environmental 
harm. As an integral part of the corpus of international environmental law, the Paris Agreement 
serves to inform the content of Article 192. The consequence is that the positive duty concerning 
atmospheric emissions is not territorially bound and applies equally to all States with respect to 
the airspace under their sovereignty and to their ships in any location. 
 
More specifically with respect to shipping, UNCLOS stipulates a duty to take measures to 
minimize pollution from vessels.71 It further provides for all States to “adopt laws and regulations 
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the 
atmosphere, applicable to the air space under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their flag or 
vessels” bearing in mind “internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures.”72 This duty extends to taking other necessary measures “to prevent, reduce and 
                                                 
65 IPCC 2014, supra note 24. 
66 UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of Ratifications, Accessions and 
Successions (23 May 2017), online: UN <www.un.org>. 
67 “A Constitution for the Oceans,” Remarks by Tommy B Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, in The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1983), 
at xxxiii. 
68 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art 192. 
69 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v People’s Republic of China), PCA 
Case Nº 2013-19, Award (12 July 2016), para 940. 
70 Ibid, para 941. 
71 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art 194.3(b). 
72 Ibid art 212.1. 
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control such pollution.”73 For these purposes, States are encouraged “to establish global and 
regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control 
such pollution” through the IMO or diplomatic conference. 74  UNCLOS State Parties have 
performed these responsibilities through the IMO with the adoption of MARPOL Annex VI in 
1997 and its numerous amendments (infra). 
 
The extent to which and the manner how State Parties may regulate and enforce atmospheric 
pollution from ships is subject to the jurisdictional provisions in UNCLOS. The flag State has 
primary jurisdiction over its ships irrespective of location and on the high seas that jurisdiction is 
exclusive with very few exceptions.75 The flag State’s jurisdictional rights are subject to the duty 
to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over its ships76 and to ensure compliance by its ships 
with applicable international rules and standards adopted by the IMO for the prevention, reduction 
and control of pollution of the marine environment.77 
 
Coastal States enjoy limited jurisdiction over foreign ships as they exercise their navigation 
rights in accordance with the UNCLOS. In the territorial sea they may adopt laws and regulations 
with respect to the exercise of innocent passage, including for “the preservation of the environment 
of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof”.78 In theory, this 
legislative power could apply to atmospheric emissions from ships. However, “[S]uch laws and 
regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships 
unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.”79 The logical 
consequence is that unilateral rules and standards on atmospheric emissions inconsistent with 
MARPOL Annex VI may not be legislated and enforced. The coastal State has a duty not to hamper 
navigation by imposing requirements on foreign ships “which have the practical effect of denying 
or impairing the right of innocent passage.”80 In turn, foreign ships exercising innocent passage 
have a duty to comply with coastal State laws.81 Passage which involves “any act of wilful and 
serious pollution contrary to this Convention” is not innocent and is “considered to be prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State”,82 potentially entailing enforcement 
consequences.83 An analogous regime applies to passage in archipelagic waters in the absence of 
archipelagic sea lanes.84 Where archipelagic sea lanes are established through the IMO, foreign 
ships are required to observe the sea lanes and routeing measures that are adopted for that 
purpose.85 During transit passage through straits used for international navigation, the coastal State 
enjoys less jurisdiction over foreign ships. The power to legislate is limited to “the prevention, 
                                                 
73 Ibid art 212.2. 
74 Ibid art 212.3. 
75 E.g., the duty to cooperate for the suppression of piracy on the high seas, ibid, art 100. 
76 Ibid art 94.1. Under art 94.5, the flag State also has to act in conformity with “generally accepted international 
regulations, procedures and practices” and it is “to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance.” 
77 Ibid art 217.1. 
78 Ibid arts 21.1(f), 211.4. 
79 Ibid art 21.2. 
80 Ibid art 24.1(a). 
81 Ibid art 21.4. 
82 Ibid arts 19.1, 19.2(h). 
83 “The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.” Ibid, 
art 25.1. 
84 Ibid art 52. 
85 Ibid art 53.11. 
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reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulations 
regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait.” 86 
Atmospheric emissions from ships could be characterized as noxious substances because of their 
environmental and public health impacts.  Foreign ships are expected to comply with such laws.87 
A separate provision requires foreign ships to observe the broader duty to “comply with generally 
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution from ships”.88 
 
 In general, port entry is a privilege, not a right 89 and when a vessel enters into port 
voluntarily it is implicitly submitting itself to local law and jurisdiction. In turn, the port State, 
which enjoys sovereignty over its internal waters (which include port waters), has the sovereign 
right to exercise jurisdiction and enforce its laws and regulations.90 Under the Convention and 
Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 192391 State Parties undertake to grant 
access to the ships of other State Parties to the ports under their sovereign authority on the basis 
of reciprocity and equality of treatment, including dues and charges of all kinds.92 And under the 
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1967,93 State Parties have further 
committed to adopt “all appropriate measures to facilitate and expedite international maritime 
traffic and to prevent unnecessary delays to ships and to persons and property on board.”94 State 
Parties “undertake to co-operate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in 
formalities, documentary requirements and procedures in all matters in which such uniformity will 
facilitate and improve international maritime traffic and keep to a minimum any alterations in 
formalities, documentary requirements and procedures necessary to meet special requirements of 
a domestic nature”95 and for this purpose to cooperate through the IMO.96 As will be seen below, 
port States play an important role in the enforcement of air pollution rules under MARPOL Annex 
VI (infra). A port inspection regime has been designed for this purpose through the IMO. Further, 
under UNCLOS, port States have an important role in assisting a coastal State pursue proceedings 
against a foreign ship within whose jurisdiction she may have discharged pollutants into the marine 
environment, including atmospheric emissions.97  
 
The enforcement of atmospheric pollution from ships is couched as a duty for all States 
“within the air space under their sovereignty” (i.e., internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic 
waters) and for flag States with respect to their ships on the basis of the international rules and 
standards for such pollution adopted through the IMO.98 States have a duty to adopt laws and 
                                                 
86 Ibid art 42.1(b). 
87 Ibid art 42.4. 
88 Ibid art 39.2(b).   
89 A. V. Lowe, “The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law” (1977) 14 San Diego L Rev 597. 
90 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art 2. 
91 Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 9 December 1923, 58 LNTS 285 (entered into 
force 2 December 1926). 
92 Ibid, Statute, art 2. 
93 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 9 April 1965, 591 UNTS 265 (entered into force 5 
March 1967). 
94 Ibid, art I. 
95 Ibid, art III. 
96 Ibid, art IV. 
97 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art 218. 
98 Ibid art 222 with reference to the international rules and standards adopted by the IMO under art 212.3. 
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regulations and take other measures necessary to implement the IMO rules.99 The performance of 
this duty is performed through the implementation and enforcement of MARPOL Annex VI, an 
optional annex. By and large, and considering some textual ambiguities or inconsistencies, the 
jurisdictional and substantive atmospheric pollution provisions described above are 
complementary to the development of the MARPOL Annex VI regime with respect to GHG 
emissions.100 
 
2.4 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended by and 
incorporated in the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL),101 is the most important international maritime 
convention for the prevention of vessel-source pollution. MARPOL consists of a framework 
convention as amended by the protocol of 1978 and six annexes, the first two of which are 
mandatory while the rest are optional. There are 155 State Parties to the convention proper and 
mandatory annexes (oil pollution; noxious liquid substances in bulk) representing 99.14% of global 
tonnage.102 Optional annexes III (harmful substances carried in packaged form), IV (sewage), and 
V (garbage) also enjoy high subscription levels.103 Annex VI was introduced into MARPOL 
through the Protocol of 1997.104 Although optional, Annex VI has 88 State Parties representing 
96.16% of global tonnage. Annex VI is the regulatory vehicle for GHG emissions from 
international shipping. In principle, States that are not Parties to Annex VI are under no legal 
obligation to implement and enforce those rules. 
 
The technical regulation of shipping in MARPOL occurs in the annexes, as well as ancillary 
codes (which may be mandatory or voluntary) and guidelines. The implementation and 
enforcement of MARPOL standards is a responsibility of all State Parties. In addition to the 
jurisdiction of the flag State, port States play an important role in enforcing MARPOL on the basis 
of the NMFT principle which guides inspections of all ships irrespective of flag and irrespective of 
whether the inspected ship is flagged in a MARPOL State Party or not. Thus, although a State may 
not be under a legal Annex VI obligation because it is not a party to that instrument, in practice the 
owners of ships registered under its flag have to consider that Annex VI standards would still be 
applied to their ships while trading in a foreign port where Annex VI is applicable law.  
 
MARPOL is a key convention enforced in regional memoranda of agreement on port State 
control between national maritime administrations. With adoption facilitated by the IMO, these 
regional agreements are potentially vital for the enforcement of GHG regulations under Annex VI. 
Ships voluntarily calling into a MARPOL State Party port or anchorage are inspected regularly for 
compliance with the international rules and standards of selected maritime conventions, including 
                                                 
99 Ibid art 222. 
100 See Yubin Shi, supra note 15, at 288 
101 MARPOL, supra note 10. Annexes I and II entered into force on the same date as the Convention. The other 
Annexes entered into force on different dates as described in Table 2. 
102 IMO, Status of Treaties (13 September 2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org> [IMO, Status of Treaties]. 
103 The number of State Parties and representation of global tonnage are as follows: Annex III – 147/98.54%; Annex 
IV – 141/96.28; Annex V – 152/98.72. Ibid.  
104 Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, 26 September 1997, Can TS 2010 no 14 (entered into force 19 May 
2005) [Protocol of 1997]. 
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MARPOL. 105  Inspectors note and report deficiencies and the ensuing sanction could be a 
reprimand, a requirement to rectify the deficiency and in the case of serious deficiencies can include 
port detention until the deficiency is rectified. Occasionally, a ship may be permitted to embark on 
a restricted voyage to another port to rectify the deficiency. Port detention is a powerful incentive 
for ships to comply with international standards. Port detentions can be very costly for any 
shipowner or charterer, as it could entail loss of charter days, loss of lay time potentially incurring 
demurrage charges (liquidated damages as a penalty), additional berth costs and late delivery of 
cargo in violation of applicable just-in-time delivery terms. 
 
In actuality, MARPOL is not solely focused on the prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment. The definition of “harmful substances” includes “any substance subject to control by 
the present Convention,” 106  and “discharge” includes “emitting”, 107  thus including Annex VI 
emissions. Annex VI addresses air pollution through emissions of ozone depleting substances, 
sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds, particulate matter and 
shipboard incineration.108 Relevant to the reduction of GHG emissions, pertinent measures include 
mandatory technical and operational energy efficiency measures, namely the Energy Efficiency 
Design Index (EEDI) and Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP),109 both discussed 
below in this paper, as well as new fuel reporting requirements. Developing countries are assisted 
with respect to the implementation of these technical rules.110 Annex VI also regulates the sulphur 
content permitted in bunkers.111  
 
                                                 
105 For example the Paris Memorandum on Port State Control, adopted 26 January 1982, 21 ILM 1982 (entered into 
force 1 July 1982), online: Paris MoU <https://www.parismou.org/inspections-risk/library-faq/memorandum>. 
Amended 40 times, with the latest update in 2017, the Paris MoU covers 17 international maritime instruments, 
including MARPOL, with each national authority applying the instruments to which the State is Party. A ship which 
has had multiple detentions may be refused port entry. 
106 MARPOL, supra note 10, art 2(2). 
107 Ibid art 2(3)(a). 
108 Ibid annex VI, Chapter III, regs 12–16, 18.  Of course, some of these substances are also greenhouse gases.  Nitrous 
Oxide, for example is one of the six gases controlled under the UN climate regime, and some ozone depleting 
substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol also contribute to climate change. 
109 Ibid annex VI, Chapter IV. 
110 For example, through the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnerships (GloMEEP) technical assistance project, 
supported by the IMO in cooperation with the Global Environmental Facility and United Nations Development 
Programme to support subscription ad implementation of energy efficiency measures in shipping and thus reduce 
GHG emissions. The participating countries are: Argentina; China; Georgia; India; Jamaica; Malaysia; Morocco; 
Panama; Philippines; and South Africa. Online: GloMEEP <http://glomeep.imo.org/>. Also relevant is the Global 
MTCC Network (GMN): Capacity Building for Climate Mitigation in the Maritime Shipping Industry, funded by the 
EU and executed by the IMO promoting networking of marine technology centres to promote energy efficiency in 
shipping and whose main beneficiaries are developing countries and especially LDC and SIDS States. Online: GMN 
<http://gmn.imo.org/about-gmn/>. Recently, a Memorandum of Understanding to establish the Global Maritime 
Technology Centre Network linking centres in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America and the Pacific was adopted 
at the IMO. See “IMO Rolls Out Global Maritime Technology Cooperation Centre Network” (4 December 2017), 
online: IMO <https://www.marinelink.com/news/cooperation-technology431795?utm_source=MT-ENews-2017-12-
05&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MT-ENews>. 
111 As of 1 January 2020 the global sulphur cap in fuel content will be lowered from 3.5% m/m to 0.50% m/m. See 
IMO, Press Briefing, “IMO sets 2020 date for ships to comply with low sulphur fuel oil requirement” (28 October 
2016), online: IMO <http://www.imo.org>. As of 1 January 2015, this cap had already been lowered to 0.10% for 
emission control areas. 
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Annex VI places restrictions on atmospheric releases in designated emission control areas 
(ECAs) designated by the MEPC on the basis of proposals by State Parties.112 ECAs are areas 
“where the adoption of special mandatory measures for emissions from ships is required to prevent, 
reduce and control air pollution from NOx or SOx and particulate matter or all three types of 
emissions and their attendant adverse impacts on human health and the environment.”113 To date, 
ECAs have not been adopted for the regulation of GHG emissions and it remains to be seen 
whether they could constitute tools for this purpose at the regional level. The above definition of 
ECA appears generic enough to support a proposal of the designation in specific marine regions 
to achieve regional environmental goals, presumptively also for GHG emissions.  
 
The comprehensive approach to vessel-source pollution is a major strength of the MARPOL 
system. However, there appears to be a disconnect between, on the one hand, the optional character 
of most of its annexes, including Annex VI, and on the other hand the general obligations under 
UNCLOS for the protection of the marine environment at the global and regional levels without 
excluding particular sources of pollution. 114  In practice, and for the purposes of this report, 
although not all IMO Member States are parties to Annex VI, the annex applies to State Parties 
representing the bulk of global tonnage. It is conceivable that tonnage may be moved to registers 
of non-State Parties, but as observed earlier those ships will still be subject to port-State inspections 
enforcing Annex VI standards in foreign ports. 
 
2.5  World Trade Organization rules  
 
While it is unclear to what extent the rules of world trade could potentially have a bearing on 
aspects of the discourse on the regulation of GHG in international shipping, it is appropriate to 
brief overview of the topic as some IMO Member States have flagged a potential relationship 
between prospective MBMs in shipping and WTO rules (infra). In responding to a request for 
clarification by the IMO Council the WTO Secretariat identified a number of rules in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947/1994 (GATT 1994), 115  the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, 1994 (TBT)116 and General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1994 (GATS)117 
that may be taken into account in the discourse on MBM.118 
 
 GATT rules that appear to be relevant for MBMs include: general most favoured nation 
treatment (MFN); national treatment on internal taxation and regulation; freedom of transit; non-
discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions (Article XIII); and general exceptions 
                                                 
112 MARPOL, supra note 10, Annex VI, Chapter III and App III; 2013 Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas 
under MARPOL, IMO Doc A28/Res.1087 (21 February 2014), para 3. 
113 MARPOL supra note 10, Annex VI, Chapter I, reg 2(8). 
114 UNCLOS, supra note 9, arts 192, 194, 197. 
115 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (entered into force 1 January 1948), 
followed by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187 (entered into force 1 
January 1995) [GATT 1994]. 
116 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 120 (entered into force 1 January 1995) 
[TBT]. 
117 General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183 (entered into force 1 January 1995) 
[GATS]. 
118 World Trade Organization’s Views on Document MEPC 64/5/4 Submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, Note by the 
Secretary-General, IMO Doc MEPC 65/INF.18 (21 February 2013), annex [MEPC 65/INF.18]. 
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(Article XX). As a key principle in trade law, the MFN principle is not only in the GATT119 but is 
to be found also in the TBT120 and GATS121 agreements. It prescribes non-discrimination between 
like products and services from different trading partners. The GATT national treatment principle 
prohibits tax or charge discrimination between domestic and foreign products, and that foreign 
products should not be provided with less favourable treatment than domestic products (e.g., a 
measure which modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of an imported product).122 
Freedom of transit entails passage through the territory of WTO Members without discrimination 
with respect to flag or origin and including no less favourable treatment in relation to charges, 
regulations and formalities.123 This amounts to identical level of access and equal conditions 
during transit.124 
 
The GATT permits exceptions, which could serve to justify an MBM that might otherwise 
be found in violation of the MFN and national treatment principles.125 These include measures 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”126 and measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”127 If a measure is captured under either 
of those specific exceptions, it can be justified provided that it is not “applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade”.128 
 
 The TBT Agreement has many underlying principles in common with the GATT 1994, but 
it is less stringent, and its Articles contain several built-in exceptions. The three relevant 
obligations under the Agreement are described in brief. They comprise: a non-discrimination 
obligation closely resembling those found in the GATT; a requirement that technical regulations 
“not create unnecessary barriers to trade or be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a 
legitimate objective”; and a requirement that domestic standards mirror international ones 
wherever international standards are present.129 
 
It is noted that unlike significant portions of air transport, maritime transport services are not 
excluded from the scope of GATS. Further, GATS has a broad application covering measures that 
directly govern the supply of services as well as those designed to govern other areas but 
nevertheless affect trade in services peripherally.130 Relevant GATS provisions include MFN 
                                                 
119 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art I. 
120 TBT, supra note 116, art 2. 
121 GATS, supra note 117, art II. 
122 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art III. 
123 Ibid art V. 
124 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 3. 
125 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art XX. 
126 Ibid art XX(b). 
127 Ibid art XX(g). 
128 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 3.  
129 Ibid annex at 5–6; TBT, supra note 116, arts 2.1, 2.2, 2.4. 
130 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 6. 
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treatment, 131  national treatment, 132  market access, 133  and additional commitments. 134  Unlike 
GATT, GATS allows members to unilaterally opt out of certain provisions by attaching a list of 
exemptions as a special schedule to the Agreement. This opt out mechanism applies to the MFN, 
national treatment, and market access provisions in GATS. The additional commitments provision 
allows further customization of the Agreement for Member States.135 It should also be noted that 
GATS includes an exception provision identical to that found in GATT, namely “necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health” and is subject to a similar test.136 
 
 Maritime transport services are temporarily subject to different treatment under GATS given 
that negotiations are still underway. Accordingly, the four relevant provisions of GATS are 
inoperative until negotiations have concluded. Members are free to undertake their own 
commitments in the meantime, but they will be allowed to withdraw or revise these commitments 
up to 60 days before the close of negotiations. They must also finalize their unique exemptions by 
that time. Finally, no members are permitted to adopt any measures affecting trade in maritime 
services while negotiations are ongoing unless those measures are in response to other measures 
adopted by other nations and are adopted with a view to maintaining or improving the freedom of 
maritime services. Further, no measures which would improve a member’s “negotiating position 
and leverage” are permitted.137 
 
A recent study has observed that the regulation of the response to climate change and world 
trade have proceeded predominantly in silos, thus with no consideration of issues of consistency 
between the two regimes.138 Reporting primarily with respect to the WTO rules and dispute 
settlement procedures applicable to international trade in goods and the potential relationship to 
national measures adopted in response to climate change, the study observed that the two regimes 
appear to be headed towards a collision.139 This would occur where a Paris Agreement State Party 
and WTO Member adopts a climate response measure that potentially conflicts with the MFN 
clause. As noted earlier, under the Paris Agreement State Parties will make NDCs and it appears 
that 45% of these could consist of trade measures likely to be based on process and production.140 
It is arguable that a similar concern could arise with respect to services which, while governed by 
the GATS, is subject to analogous principles. The study’s author further comments that in the case 
of inconsistencies between the two regimes, such as where a trade dispute arises, the WTO rules 
and dispute settlement procedure are binding on the WTO Member State. This is to be contrasted 
to the NDCs under the Paris Agreement, which are voluntary, and the absence of a dispute 
settlement system under that agreement. To avoid looming conflicts and in the absence of a carbon 
adjustment measure, the study makes a compelling argument that WTO Member States should 
                                                 
131 GATS, supra note 117, art II. 
132 Ibid art XVII. 
133 Ibid art XVI. 
134 Ibid art XVIII, at 6. 
135 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 6–7. 
136 Ibid annex at 8; GATS, supra note 117, art XIV(b). 
137 MEPC 65/INF.18, supra note 118, annex at 7–8. See also Decision on Maritime Transport Services, GATS Council 
for Trade in Services Decision S/L/24 (3 July 1996). 
138 James Bacchus, The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver, Centre for International Governance Innovation Report 
(CIGI, 2017), at 1. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid at 2. 
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consider adopting a climate waiver to the regime’s rules.141 Clearly this study and others142 call 
for integration, or perhaps better coordination, between the two regimes and that conflict between 
the two regimes with respect to international shipping, if it arises, should not stand in the way of a 
fair contribution of the sector to GHG emissions.  
 
2.6 European Union GHG regulation 
 
A fear of shipping industry operators has long been the prospect of having to cope with a variety 
of different unilateral national or regional mechanisms for GHG reduction in the sector. Such an 
approach, according to an industry view, would fly in the face of the aspiration of uniformity in 
maritime regulation, potentially throwing international shipping into disarray, and distort trade and 
world markets.143 The EU has worked for some time to advance the debate on global regulations 
for the reduction of GHG emissions from shipping. It has also exerted pressure on the IMO to 
progress with its deliberations on GHG reduction in the sector. The progress in the IMO has been 
perceived as being too slow. Being convinced that pressure on the IMO is needed to allow for 
progress, the European Parliament has recently suggested to incorporate shipping into the EU’s 
existing land-based ETS. In turn, this initiative has raised significant concern at the IMO, in 
particular because the concerned parties feared this could undermine global efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions from international shipping at the global level.144 
 
A European Commission (EC) communication issued in 2013 starts out by indicating a 
strong preference for global regulations to address GHG emissions from international shipping.  
The EC then proceeds to propose a systematic and gradual three-step approach for integrating 
maritime GHG emissions into the EU’s existing commitments.145 The first step involved the 
creation of an emissions monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system for ships using EU 
ports. The second step foresaw the creation of reduction targets in the maritime sector. The third 
step contemplated the eventual introduction of some form of MBM.146 At the time same time, and 
on different occasions since then, EU institutions have indicated a preference that the IMO be the 
body to set targets and to adopt measures for the maritime sector.   
 
The purpose of the MRV system is to provide reliable data on vessel emissions that can be 
tracked and used to assess operator contributions. While bunker delivery notes tracking individual 
vessel fuel consumption were already being issued in 2013, there existed at the time no mechanism 
for reporting or verification. This was essential in order to combat fraud and increase accessibility 
of information while not placing an unreasonable burden upon operators. The EC thus sought to 
                                                 
141 Ibid at 20 et seq. 
142 María Pía Carazo & Daniel Klein, “Chapter 23 Implications for Public International Law Initial Considerations,” 
in Daniel Klein et al, supra note 26, at 383. 
143 See the remarks of Simon Bennett, International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) Director of Policy and External 
Relations quoted in Jonathan Saul, “Shipping Faces Threat from EU of Unilateral Levy on Carbon Emissions”, Reuters 
(21 December 2016), online: Reuters <www.reuters.com>. 
144 “IMO Secretary-General Speaks Out against Regional Emission Trading System” IMO Briefing (9 January 2017), 
online: IMO <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/3-SG-emissions.aspx>. 
145 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Integrating maritime transport emissions in the 
EU’s greenhouse gas reduction policies, COM (2013) 479 final (28 June 2013). 
146 Ibid at 4–5. 
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introduce a regional system as a pilot project that could be tweaked and eventually be projected 
onto the global stage.147 In addition, it could facilitate integration into the carbon market, should 
international shipping either be integrated into the EU carbon market or a dedicated MBM be 
developed for the sector.  
 
 The EU MRV system covers all ships over 5,000 GT calling at EU ports, including those in 
Norway and Iceland.148 Operators of such ships are required to submit their own monitoring plans 
for approval before the first year-long emissions reporting period149 beginning in 2018.150 These 
monitoring plans will take into account types of fuel used and must contain a mechanism for 
tracking consumption.151 Data from each reporting period will be published by the Commission in 
June of each year.152 Vessels making fewer than 300 voyages during each reporting period are 
required to submit a single aggregate report with detailed information on each voyage undertaken 
during the year. Vessels making over 300 voyages during a reporting period are permitted to 
submit a simplified report, provided they visit only EU ports.153 All emission reports must be 
approved by an accredited verifier154 before they are submitted to the EC in April of each year, via 
a dedicated online information system that became operational in July of 2017.155 Beginning in 
2019, all participating vessels will be required to carry on board a document of compliance.156  
 
 The MRV implementation appears to be making good progress, which bodes well for the 
eventual adoption of a similar system at the global level and administered by the IMO. Some 
industry players, however, remain skeptical about the feasibility of the MRV, particularly with 
regard to the verification mechanism.157 There are concerns that the EU MRV, which is more 
demanding in terms of data recording and reporting than current IMO requirements, will run 
parallel to the IMO system, thus causing unnecessary duplication. Whether the EU initiatives will 
be embraced in whole or in part by the IMO, and despite the peer pressure exerted on the 
Organization, the MRV system should be seen as a useful pilot project that will aid IMO efforts in 
developing an effective and transparent monitoring system for GHG emissions. The Union 
certainly has expressed readiness to consider the appropriateness of an alignment of the EU MRV 
to the IMO model once the latter is adopted. Since the adoption of the IMO Data Collection System 
for emissions from ships and of the remaining guidelines on functioning of the system in July 
2017, the Commission has started work on the comparison of the two systems with a view of 
alignment, as foreseen in the EU MRV Regulation. The Commission is expected to adopt a 
proposal in 2018 which will then be considered by the European Parliament and the Council. 
  
                                                 
147 Ibid at 5–6. 
148 EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, 
reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC, 
[2015] OJ, L 123/55 [EU MRV], art I.1. 
149 Ibid art 6.1. 
150 Ibid art 8. 
151 Ibid arts 6.3(f), 6.3(g). 
152 Ibid art 21. 
153 Ibid art 9.2. 
154 Ibid arts 13–16. 
155 Ibid arts 11, 12. 
156 Ibid arts 11, 17, 18. 
157 See statement of ICS Chairman Esben Poulsson in ICS, Press Release, “EU Must Align Shipping CO2 Rules with 
International Community, Says ICS” (6 June 2016), online: ICS <www.ics-shipping.org>. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Looking to the second and third steps of its proposed approach depicted in 2013 by the EC, 
and using the opportunity of the revision of the ETS directive, a proposal to the European 
Parliament envisaged the incorporation of shipping to and from EU ports into an arrangement for 
a Maritime Climate Funding (as a modification to the existing ETS Directive) by 2023, if the IMO 
does not adopt a ‘comparable system’ by 2021.158 In its amendment, Parliament recognized that 
the existing ETS is the primary tool for achieving long-term climate and energy targets, but that 
this tool must be “complemented by equivalent additional actions taken in other legal acts and 
instruments dealing with greenhouse gas emissions from sectors not covered [under it]”.159 It was 
implied that the IMO, as a key body responsible for one of those sectors, was expected to adopt 
effective measures in a timely manner. 160   
 
 Assuming no ‘comparable system’ to the ETS is developed by the IMO by 2021, the EU 
proposed to determine an allowance for the maritime sector in line with other land-based 
continental sectors by 1 August of that year. This allowance would then be added to the total EU 
quota, thus gradually integrating shipping trading in EU ports into the emissions allowance 
auctions. Of the revenues generated from such auctions, 20% would be allocated to a Maritime 
Climate Fund, the purpose of which would be enhancement of in-sector technological and 
operational innovation with an eye to reducing CO2 emissions. The EU scheme contemplated the 
eventual adoption of some form of international agreement regulating GHG emissions in the 
maritime sector, at which point “amendments in order to ensure alignment with [such an] 
agreement” will be proposed, considered, and voted upon.161  
 
 It is difficult to assess the substance of the proposed ETS on shipping for a variety of reasons. 
The proposal was cast in general terms and contained no specific emissions allowance for shipping, 
but merely a broad statement that one would be set in accordance with other sectors. Its 20% 
revenue allocation to a Maritime Climate Fund appeared to be borrowed from proposals discussed 
at the MEPC. Thus, the only assessment of including shipping in the ETS would have been a 
comparative assessment with other sectors.  
 
 Unsurprisingly, the IMO’s and shipping industry’s responses have been critical of the EU 
initiative for the reasons already touched upon.162  There was even concern expressed in the 
European Parliament, albeit by a minority, that the proposed measures would encroach upon the 
mandate of the IMO.163 The proposed amendment was not accepted by Council, but the underlying 
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concerns appear to have been taken on board.164 Following tripartite negotiations involving the 
European Parliament, the Council, and the European Commission a compromise text was proposed 
as a recital in the amended ETS Directive providing that action either at the IMO or EU should 
start from 2023, including the preparatory work on adoption and implementation of emission 
reduction measures.  
 
 Effectively, the EU appears to be expressing some degree of deference to continued IMO 
efforts in pursuing its roadmap, but leaves open the possibility of EU regional action if progress at 
the IMO is deemed insufficient in the next few years. In this respect it is relevant to acknowledge 
that the EU, to be able to deliver on its commitments under the UNFCCC, also depends on aviation 
and shipping to deliver. If somehow these sectors would be less involved in the realization of the 
necessary reduction of emissions, other industries within the EU would be faced with a situation 
that they have to compensate and do more. These other industries will pressure the EU institutions 
on taking action, knowing there is much more that can be done cost-effectively to reduce the GHG 
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3.  THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING GHG EMISSIONS FROM 
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 
 
How, why and in what respects is the governance of international shipping different from other 
industries and with what significance for determining mitigation contributions? The answer helps 
to explain why the task of developing the international shipping industry’s contribution to the 
global response to climate change was not directly addressed by the Paris Agreement and deferred 
to the IMO as the competent international organization on the matter. The question further provides 
insights into the problématique of maritime regulation and the issues that will need to be navigated 
by the IMO in developing an appropriate regulatory approach to GHG emissions.  
 
3.1 Commercial and operational life of the ship 
 
The diversity of actors involved in the operational life of a ship poses challenges in distributing 
the load of emissions reductions.  A ship’s energy use and efficiency starts with its construction to 
standards designed to achieve cargo-carrying capacity, optimal fuel use and emissions outcomes. 
Construction of a new ship will be guided by international rules and standards applicable to its 
class, including prospective standards with effectiveness at a later date, as well as market demand 
and finance. 165  The duration of a ship mortgage will vary and will usually have lengthy 
amortization periods followed by a balloon payment. 166  Thus, to meet new energy use and 
efficiency standards a new build will have to consider mortgage costs in addition to crewing, 
operations, maintenance, insurance and other expenditures. Moreover, during her life cycle it is 
likely that a ship may have to implement newer equipment standards requiring retrofitting and 
incur new mortgage costs. A shipowner will tend to take actions to optimise the earning capacity 
of the ship throughout its life, or at least during her ownership, until her withdrawal from service 
and eventual recycling. 
 
The ship is composed of a cluster of technologies relevant for air pollution and GHG 
regulation.167 The hull will have a hydrodynamic design to maximize the use of its propulsion and 
energy savings. The propulsion machinery and propeller will vary and will potentially be operable, 
with modifications, to use different types of fuels. The propeller itself will be engineered to 
overcome resistance and generate adequate thrust. From an operational perspective, the higher the 
speed employed to expedite the movement of the vessel, the greater the fuel consumption. Some 
ships will have scrubbers to help filter particularly harmful emissions, such as particulate matter. 
The master, officers and crew will be trained and certified in accordance with international 
standards in order to navigate the ship in a safe, environmentally responsible and economically 
efficient manner. 
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Ships cannot all be regulated in the same manner. There is a wide variety of classes of ships 
to service a range of general and specialized trades or to perform particular functions or services.168 
Each type of ship has to be classed separately and while there are safety and environmental rules 
of general application, there are also requirements specific to the type of ship and its operations. 
For example, not all ships are able to perform safely and as intended simply by reducing speed or 
changing fuel. A ship needs to maintain a particular minimum speed, depending on its class, 
purpose and navigational conditions, to ensure manoeuvrability, engine considerations and safe 
operation. While low speed results in lower emissions per ton mile,169 the consequence is longer 
voyages and in turn more ships or voyages by the same ship to carry the cargo of the trade route 
concerned. Also, a concern of slow speed in a voyage charterparty is that it might militate against 
early arrival in a congested port to factor potential waiting times for a berth. The carrier will have 
contractual obligations to arrive and discharge cargo in time and failing which lay time (the 
contractual time allocated for unloading cargo) could be exceeded and demurrage (liquidated 
damages for exceeding lay time) consequently incurred. In practice, these risks would likely be 
addressed by industry model clauses (e.g., virtual arrival clause170) or adjustment of contract 
terms.171 
 
 Opportunities to control emissions may not necessarily be in the owner’s control. The ship 
may be operated by a management company or perhaps even chartered. Indeed, a vessel may be 
chartered and further sub-chartered. On a bareboat charter the owner parts with possession and 
control of the ship (without passing title) and the charterer is responsible for hiring the crew, 
operating the vessel, insuring it and securing its necessaries, including bunkers. Thus it is often the 
responsibility of the charterer to operate the vessel in an environmentally efficient manner and the 
charterer will therefore be responsible for securing cargo to earn freight, purchasing fuel, operating 
her at various speeds and ultimately producing emissions. A charterer, whether bareboat or on time 
charter (lease of a ship for a specific period of time), will want to maximise the earning power of 
the ship by contracting as many voyages as possible. Speed is an important consideration and fewer 
cargo runs for a ship may reduce the value of its time charter. 
 
 The typical ship used for international shipping is an instrument of international trade. It 
remains in business as long as it services maritime trade. The extent of the fleet, ship composition 
and size are all factors determined by the current or expected volume of global and regional trade. 
Over the course of the 20 to 25 year average life span of a ship, many market and technological 
factors intervene to determine how that ship is managed. The downturn of various trades in recent 
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years saw many ships, including container vessels, sent to recycling well in advance of the average 
life span. Their operation was no longer commercially viable.172 A ship is able to remain in 
business and recover its costs if her shipowner, operator or charterer secure cargo for carriage on 
a fairly frequent if not continuous basis. Cargo brokerage, another aspect of the international 
shipping industry, plays an important role in supplying business. Often, the carriage of goods by 
sea is simply one leg of a multimodal voyage. Hence the emissions for the ton mile (amount of 
cargo carried by mile) may include other forms of transportation such as road and rail, as well as 
carriage on board of other vessels providing feeder services to regional and smaller ports. The 
contract of carriage integrates the various modes into a unified service. Contemporary transport is 
largely guided by just in time delivery to reduce warehousing costs. The ship itself performs the 
function of a floating warehouse. Indeed, cargo may be sold at sea, perhaps more than once, and 
its delivery may be directed to different ports where the consignees (buyers) are located. Hence, 
the operators of ships will value flexibility to maximise use of their ships in the service of trade 
between States. 
 
 Not all ships are engaged in maritime trade and the carriage of passengers by sea. The wide 
variety of classes of ships mentioned earlier includes other vessels that service shipping generally, 
as well other specialised services to maintain navigation aids, support other ocean uses such as 
aquaculture, offshore oil and gas industry, and wind farms. These vessels may consume more fuel 
per mile than other ships because they are workhorses of the industries they service, such as 
offshore service vessels that depend on high torque power. In general, while ships provide trade 
and specialised services, they also receive a range of other services from supporting vessels and 
ports. Some of these vessels may not be engaged in international shipping. Thus, there is a wide 
range of international and domestic shipping emission sources. 
 
All ships are subject to construction, equipping, crewing and fuel standards and rules. These 
are not only those adopted by the IMO, but may also include requirements adopted at the national 
level and sometimes at the subnational level.173 There are usually requirements at the industry level 
as well. For example, independent classification societies, which play a critical role in ensuring 
that ships are built, equipped and operated according to international standards, also have class 
rules. There are several such societies, the major ones being members of the International 
Association of Classification Societies, and from time to time member associations produce and 
update unified requirements.174 These are vital because they frequently provide the necessary level 
of detail (e.g., harmonised definitions), which the original IMO rule or standard might not possess 
or upon which an IMO rule depends. 
 
All ships currently require bunkers for their operation, although the types of fuel used vary 
substantially according to IMO standards, class rules and expected operations. The bunker industry 
is yet another aspect of the international shipping industry. There is a complex multi-party 
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production chain leading to the availability of bunker fuel. The bunker industry relies on the 
refining industry to produce the wide range of fuels needed, including heavy bunker C (tar like), a 
range of heavy and light diesels, biodiesels, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and so on. In turn, 
refineries rely on oil and gas producers from developed and developing countries. Not all refineries 
are equipped to produce the wide range of fuels needed by the bunker industry. Refineries receive 
heavy to light crudes and process these on the basis of their capacities. It has been reported that 
LNG, modified diesel and biodiesel could cost respectively 20%, 70% and 480% more than regular 
low cost bunker fuel.175 A recent report indicates that the LNG bunkering market, although facing 
infrastructure challenges, is expected to grow exponentially as a low cost alternative to reducing 
shipping’s carbon and air emissions footprint, and in particular to meet Sulphur emission 
requirements by 2020.176 While LNG is an increasingly popular fuel of choice for these reasons, 
there are concerns. First, infrastructural challenges restrict the trade of LNG-powered ships to ports 
where LNG is in supply. Second, there is risk that LNG-powered ships could become stranded 
assets as decarbonization efforts are ratcheted up. Third, LNG is associated with methane leakages 
into the atmosphere as a result of venting, leakage and slippage.177 This is worrisome as methane 
is a far more powerful GHG than CO2, potentially undermining general efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions from international shipping. In any case, LNG should be considered a transitional fuel 
on the road towards decarbonization. 
 
A further point concerning bunkers is that historically the maritime sector (as well as 
aviation) have benefitted from tax-free fuels and frequently also other privileges, such as no excise 
taxes, turnover taxes, value-added tax and low corporate tax rates.178 This privileged fiscal status 
has been explained “in large measure from these sectors’ international status: they do not naturally 
belong to any one particular country. Nor are they part of any international agreements that limit 
taxation in aviation or extreme tax competition in shipping.”179 Further explanation includes the 
high risk undertaking to provide shipping services and their essential role in global logistics and 
supply chains. 
 
3.2 Mobility of the ship 
 
Ships are very mobile property, both as instruments of trade and also as objects of trade themselves. 
Ships have the nationality of the State where they are registered. While there are several States 
that own national shipping companies, the vast majority of commercial ship ownership is private 
and structured in a manner to facilitate its finance and risk distribution. Ownership is divided into 
a number of shares each one of which may have multiple owners. In traditional registers the ship 
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must be beneficially owned in the State of registration. In contrast, in open registers (also known 
as flags of convenience), ownership may be held by foreign interests. The registration of the ship 
may be changed with ease so that over the course of their lives, and until deregistration for 
recycling, most ships will have had different nationalities.180 Registration usually changes because 
of change of ownership, a ship has been chartered, or an owner’s desire to cut down costs. Crewing 
cost savings feature prominently because open registers permit the hiring of international crews, 
however other cost-saving incentives play a role as well, such as expenditures incurred in 
complying with flag state regulations and taxation.  Thus a ship may be owned by interests in one 
or more States, uses as a base or is operated from another State, and services the trade of other 
States around the world without necessarily ever calling into the port of registry.  
 
While servicing international trade a ship will traverse ocean spaces subject to the 
jurisdiction of other States and call into numerous foreign ports. In between she will navigate the 
high seas. The mobility of ships has long been protected as the traditional freedom of navigation, 
which emerged early in the international law of the sea and remains today one of the most protected 
(and regulated) ocean uses. Today the freedom of navigation consists of a cluster of international 
navigation rights depending on the marine space traversed, such as innocent passage through the 
territorial sea 181  and archipelagic waters, 182  archipelagic sea lanes passage in archipelagic 
waters,183 transit passage through straits used for international navigation184 and the freedom of 
navigation in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the high seas.185 Accordingly, in the 
interests not only of unimpeded international regulation, but also maritime trade, it is considered 
essential that the rules and standards for ships and their operations are global in nature and 
application. When desirable, regional rules that find general acceptance tend to concern specific 
considerations to a particular geographical area, such as load line requirements for particular 
trading regions,186 or where the rules for a region are set in an IMO maritime convention.187 If 
individual States or States at the regional level were to adopt rules for emissions from international 
shipping outside of the IMO, there could be adverse consequences for the general expectations of 
universality and uniformity of international maritime regulation, the protection of international 
navigation rights, and potentially the availability of shipping to service maritime trade.188  
 
3.3 Governance of international shipping 
 
In addition to the global and transnational nature of international shipping, a further justification 
for the IMO’s development of the industry’s contribution to climate change response is its 
competence and work record. Based in London, United Kingdom (UK), the Organization was 
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conceived by an international convention in 1948 as an intergovernmental technical consultative 
organization189 and first convened in 1959 a year after that instrument entered into force. Since 
then its mandate has evolved substantially and in particular as an international regulatory body.190 
Although the IMO is not the only international organization with competence in shipping matters, 
it is widely recognised as the leading body for the regulation of international shipping.191 At the 
time of writing, the IMO has 172 Member States and three associate members representing 97.28% 
of global tonnage.192 
 
The UNCLOS designates IMO as the competent international organization with respect to 
international shipping in numerous provisions.193 Its core mandate is more fully set out in its 
constitutive instrument as the provision of “machinery for co-operation among Governments in 
the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting 
shipping engaged in international trade” and “to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of 
the highest practicable standards in matters concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of 
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.”194 The IMO is responsible 
for more than 50 conventions and agreements and the number of subsidiary instruments it adopted 
(codes, recommendations, guidelines and other instructions) exceed 160, 195  easily making 
international shipping the most regulated ocean use.  
 
Although GHG regulation is not expressly mentioned in the IMO’s constitutive instrument, 
the powers of the Assembly (the Organization’s highest decision-making structure) include 
“adoption of regulations and guidelines concerning maritime safety, the prevention and control of 
marine pollution from ships and other matters concerning the effect of shipping on the marine 
environment assigned to the Organization by or under international instruments, or amendments 
to such regulations and guidelines which have been referred to it.”196 These other instruments 
include MARPOL for which the IMO provides, among others, secretariat functions. More broadly, 
the current Strategic Plan of the IMO is couched to pursue sustainable shipping.197 An important 
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focus in Strategic Direction 7 is “contributing to international efforts to reduce atmospheric 
pollution and address climate change.”198  
 
Meeting biennially, the Assembly may recommend to Members the adoption of new 
regulations and guidelines.199 The Secretariat has also provided important support in generating 
and disseminating important information and discussion documents, such as the three studies 
concerning GHG emissions from ships (infra). The IMO Council, the Organization’s executive 
body, has also stepped in on the GHG issue as needed. However, the structure directly responsible 
for the environmental aspects of shipping is the MEPC, established in 1973 as a result of the 
‘Torrey Canyon’ casualty in 1967. Its terms of reference encompass regulatory responsibilities 
assigned by maritime conventions (e.g., MARPOL), consideration of enforcement measures, 
technical assistance and cooperation on marine pollution, and cooperation with other regional and 
international organizations. 200  The MEPC coordinates closely with other IMO structures, 
including the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and Legal Committee. Whenever issues arise 
which require legal interpretation, the MEPC refers such questions to the Legal Committee. The 
MEPC and MSC are assisted by a complex system of sub-committees.201 On air pollution generally 
and the GHG issue the MEPC has conducted much of the in-depth work through working groups 
and expert groups that meet both during and in between committee sessions.  
 
 While IMO rules and standards may be adopted on the basis of majority voting, in practice, 
decisions are generally adopted by consensus, thus frequently achieving a high degree of support. 
There have been instances when consensus was not achieved and instead a proposed resolution 
containing new rules and standards was put to a vote. As will be seen below, this was the case 
during development and adoption of GHG regulations under MARPOL Annex VI. At times, new 
regulatory initiatives have been proposed by such organizations. The regulations are adopted and 
eventually enforced with no more favourable treatment for any particular flag State or industry 
actor. After all, flag States and industry actors are engaged in global competition while deriving 
commercial benefits from international maritime trade.   
 
 Since the establishment of the IMO the process of maritime regulation-making has evolved 
from one characterised by dominant diplomatic processes and under the tight control of Member 
States (and State Parties to conventions) to a more inclusive one. In the contemporary setting, the 
process enables the participation of non-governmental organizations that are granted consultative 
status. On the basis of criteria set out in an Assembly resolution,202 the Council grants consultative 
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status to applicant NGOs that are able to make a substantial contribution to IMO work usually 
through the provision of information and expert advice. 203  Consultative status requires an 
undertaking to support IMO activities and disseminate its work, as well as granting reciprocal 
privileges to the IMO.204 While organizations with consultative status have no voting power, they 
enjoy a broad range of participatory privileges, including the ability to submit documentation for 
consideration in the various structures of the Organization as well as addressing meetings on being 
recognized by the chair.205 The list of NGOs with consultative status is reviewed periodically and 
over the years it has grown to include organizations from all sectors of the shipping industry, 
maritime labour, environmental and other non-governmental organizations.  
 
 A former chair of the Legal Committee observed that “active industry participation in the 
work of the Committee is evidenced by the presence of a large number of observer delegations 
representing every sector of the maritime industry” and “are given wide latitude to intervene and 
contribute to the work of the Committee.” 206  There are numerous examples where shipping 
industry organizations played critical roles in the development of international standards.207 As 
observed elsewhere in this report, the proposal for a roadmap for IMO regulation of GHG 
emissions originated from industry organizations. One view is that “the shipping sector have been 
shown to be more influential in affecting the views of decision-making state delegations than those 
representing environmental interests.”208 This has been evident in the development of the Polar 
Code where the instrument’s environmental provisions were narrowly focused on pollution-
prevention whereas environmental NGOs advocated for a broader environment protection 
approach so as to include anti-fouling systems and ballast water concerns in polar waters.209 
Similar NGO concerns have been expressed in the deliberations on GHG emissions from ships.  
 
 Regulation theory suggests that tripartism in responsive regulation, that is involving a public 
regulating authority, a regulatee and public interest groups, provides for better cooperation and 
checks on regulatory capture. 210  In practice, the degree of influence exerted in the IMO by 
organizations with consultative status may be more nuanced. Delegations of Member States are in 
control and while some may include industry representatives, most do not. Perhaps the degree of 
influence organizations with consultative status exert in any particular IMO structure or process 
depends on issue sensitivity and willingness of Member Delegations, or at least some of them. On 
                                                 
203 Ibid, Rule 1. 
204 Ibid, Rule 4. 
205 Ibid, Rule 6. 
206 Alfred Popp, “The Treaty-Making Work of the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization,” in 
A Chircop et al (eds) The Regulation of International Shipping: International and Comparative Perspectives (Nijhoff 
Leiden, 2012) 209 at 224. 
207 For example, the International Association of Classification Societies ‘Requirements Concerning Polar Class’ 
IACS Req. 2016, online: IACS   < file:///C:/Users/aechirco/Downloads/ur_i_pdf410.pdf > [Requirements Concerning 
Polar Class]. The IACS polar class requirements are a basic standard of the Polar Code.  
208 MN Tsimplis, “Shipping and the Marine Environment in the 21st Century,” in M Clarke (ed) Maritime Law 
Evolving: Thirty Years at Southampton (Hart Publishing, 2013) 95 at 107. 
209 See Environmental Protection in the Polar Code, Submitted by Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Pacific Environment and Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC), IMO Doc MEPC 68/INF.37 
(6 March 2015). 
210 See: Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, “Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment.” (1991) 16(3) Law & 
Social Inquiry 435; Melissa Rorie, “Responsive Regulation,” Oxford Handbooks Online (New York, 2015), online: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.013.109>. 
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some environmental issues, such as particularly sensitive sea areas, the contributions of 
environmental organizations played a key role in informing the development of an international 
standard.211  
 
In general, international rules and standards adopted by the IMO apply to ships on 
international voyages. Indeed, IMO technical regulation generally targets ships rather than States. 
In exercising effective jurisdiction and control States are expected to apply international standards 
developed for ships. The regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping poses the most 
difficult challenge. Ships also operate on purely domestic trades, known as cabotage, where the 
ports of departure and destination are in the same State, or services an offshore activity in waters 
within the jurisdiction of the port State. The distinction is important because NDCs under the Paris 
Agreement capture the latter, but not the former. The consequence is that not all ship emissions 
will necessarily be addressed by IMO regulation. In addition to cabotage, other potentially 
excluded vessels include fishing and recreational vessels. However, in other areas of maritime 
regulation, some States have extended the application of IMO regulation to domestic shipping in 
the interests of consistent safety, security and environmental regulation. This can again be expected 
with respect to GHG regulation of ships on domestic trades and, as observed earlier, their 
emissions can be expected to be captured by NDCs. 
 
3.4 Principles and process of maritime regulation 
 
Maritime regulation involves a highly structured and lengthy deliberative process aimed at 
promoting universality of participation in the maritime conventions and uniform implementation 
of rules and standards. The process is not necessarily always exclusively technical and a degree of 
politicisation of some issues has occurred. As mentioned earlier, in pursuit of global uniformity, 
the basic policy underlying the application and enforcement of IMO conventions is NMFT in 
international shipping, whether the institution concerned is a maritime administration or an 
industry operator. When a particular maritime administration does not possess the technical 
capabilities needed to implement international rules and standards, technical assistance is readily 
available and provided. The usual regulatory process is accompanied by capacity-building 
analysis. 
 
International maritime regulation is also guided by rationales of compelling necessity, 
functionality and pragmatism. Regulation serves the need to have the highest practicable standards 
to ensure and facilitate maritime safety, marine environment protection, security and ultimately 
the flow of trade.  The opening statement of the Organization’s strategic direction 14 provides that 
“IMO will seek to ensure better regulation through a systematic approach and that its instruments 
are free from administrative requirements that are disproportionate, obsolete or unnecessary.”212 
 
In 2015 the IMO Assembly further refined the regulatory process through the adoption of 
six basic principles to guide regulation-making in a systematic manner and to ensure consistency 
                                                 
211 For example, for an insight into WWF’s influence in amending guidelines on particularly sensitive sea areas, see 
Revision of Resolution A.720(17), Report of the Drafting Group, IMO Doc MEPC 43/6 (3 December 1998). Other 
areas where environmental NGOs had substantial influence include anti-fouling systems, underwater noise, and 
individual PSSA designations. 
212 IMO Strategic Plan, supra note 197, SD 14. 
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throughout the Organization.213 First, the regulation must be necessary, i.e., there is an evidenced 
compelling need with respect to the operational, technical and economic impacts and actual 
benefits derived. The proposed regulation is not or cannot be fully or partially addressed in an 
existing instrument or by other means. Second, the regulation must be consistent with other 
existing maritime regulations. For example, the proposed regulation should not contradict or 
undermine an existing rule or standard. Third, the proposed regulation must be proportionate to 
the issue addressed. It must be balanced and take into account its direct and indirect impacts. 
Fourth, the proposed regulation must be fit for the intended purpose so that it produces the expected 
outcome. Fifth, the proposed regulation must be resilient so that it is able to adapt to technological 
change and capacities. Sixth, the proposed regulation must be clear. It is to be drafted in simple 
and unambiguous terms to facilitate its implementation and enforcement. In recent years, the 
general approach taken in maritime regulation is goal-based, that is aimed at achieving a particular 
outcome rather than solely providing prescriptions for specific standards or conduct. This approach 
provides the persons addressed by the regulation a measure of flexibility in the process of 
compliance while meeting the intended regulatory outcome.  
 
Technical regulation on the basis of goal-based standards is further supplemented by 
standards developed by the International Standards Organization (ISO), 214  in particular by 
technical committee ISO/TC8 focusing on ship and marine technology. 215  In addition to the 
establishment of the goal, goal-based regulation includes compliance with functional requirements 
and verification of conformity. These standards directly or indirectly support the development and 
implementation of IMO regulations and assist innovation. Standards developed to date include 
vessel efficiency216 and standards for general GHG emissions.217 The value of ISO standards is 
that they enhance transparency of key processes, such as reporting and verification as well as 
facilitating compliance with IMO regulations. 
  
Each IMO committee has its own guidelines on method of work. For example, the MEPC 
and MSC have a well-defined process.218 Guided by compelling need, the typical process provides 
for three steps, namely data gathering on an issue proposed for regulation, analysis of the data 
gathered, followed by decision-making on an appropriate rule and standard, if needed.  
 
Recent submissions to the Council have proposed further structuring of the rule-making 
process to ensure a higher level of scrutiny of the compelling need and appropriateness of the 
proposed rule and standard.219 While the proposed refinements have not been adopted, they are 
                                                 
213  Principles to be Considered when Drafting IMO Instruments, IMO Assembly Resolution A.1103(29) (26 
November 2015), annex. 
214 International Standards Organization, online: ISO < https://www.iso.org/home.html>. 
215 ISO TC 8: Ships and Marine Technology. Online: ISO < https://www.iso.org/committee/45776.html>. 
216 In particular measurement of changes in hull and propeller performance, which are important for determining vessel 
efficiency and consequences for emissions, resulting to date in ISO 15016:2015 guidelines for the assessment of speed 
and power performance, usually applied during sea trials. Ibid. 
217 For example the ISO 14000 series aim to provide clarity and consistency for quantifying, monitoring, reporting, 
validating or verifying GHG emissions. Ibid. 
218  Guidelines on the Organization and Method of Work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine 
Environment Committee and Their Subsidiary Bodies, IMO Doc MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.4 (10 June 2015). 
219 Principles to Be Considered in the Review of Existing Requirements and the Development of New Requirements, 
Submitted by Jamaica, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Panama, the United Kingdom, BIMCO, IACS, ICS, 
INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1 (20 October 2015) [IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1]; Further 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




expected to receive further consideration in due course. The proposals suggest that it would be 
useful to distinguish between (1) the development of new codes or chapters to an existing 
convention, (2) amendments to existing instruments and (3) amendments requiring minor changes 
to existing instruments. The regulatory process would take into account the following factors: 
 
Step 1 – gathering sources of reliable data and collective experience that could be used in the 
assessment of the compelling need for IMO to address an issue in its regulatory framework, 
including such aspects as availability, consistency and accessibility of data; and consideration on 
how other industries address these issues, capture data and apply risk-based methods in developing 
regulations;  
Step 2 – considering whether IMO action is necessary now, in particular when issues are uncertain 
and the impact of a new regulation is difficult to estimate or when it is known that other measures 
to address the issue have already been agreed or recently implemented in the industry that address 
the issue (e.g. answering the question whether action by IMO is really needed and identifying the 
scale of the problem that the new regulation should solve);  
Step 3 – using cost-effectiveness and impact analyses to estimate short-term and long-term benefits 
due to the implementation of the new regulation (e.g. in terms of enhancement of safety of life at 
sea, or protection of the marine environment) and associated costs (including potential negative 
consequential impacts in other areas, difficulty in practical application, legislative and 
administrative burdens);  
Step 4 – assessing the availability of suitable technologies to be installed on new and/or existing 
ships and estimating a realistic time frame for their implementation to assess whether a system or 
a technology will be available to meet the objectives of a new regulation, and available from a 
commercially competitive market;  
Step 5 – evaluating the transparency and robustness of approval procedures for possible new 
equipment to ensure compliance with both regulatory and operational requirements;  
Step 6 – considering the impact on manufacturers to produce and deliver the required systems (e.g. 
whether suitable facilities are available to install these technologies and a realistic time frame for 
their implementation, to reach the required production volumes) with possible contributions of 
individual manufacturers and/or manufacturer associations;  
Step 7 – assessing the availability of clear and unambiguous criteria for surveying, inspecting and 
testing new technologies on board. The situation should be avoided when properly used and 
maintained type approved systems, in accordance with requirement of the new provisions, are 
found non-compliant when examined against the criteria of other regulatory bodies or authorities, 
including port State control;  
Step 8 – considering an achievable time frame to test and consolidate a technology before deciding 
on the implementation dates; and  
Step 9 – evaluating potential conflicts of benefits and detriments between environmental, economic 
and social issues, assuming safety and security as paramount, by applying risk-based approaches 
(e.g. Formal Safety Assessment, Safety Level Approach), where needed, performance-based 
methods and/or other qualitative or quantitative considerations.220 
 
The proposals suggest that the assessment process would be undertaken at three stages, 
namely when first submitted, at an intermediate stage (where deliberations extend beyond a 
biennium) and final assessment of the proposed regulatory package “to assist the committee in 
making a final decision as to whether or not the regulatory package is ‘fit for purpose’, 
                                                 
Discussion of the Principles and the Development of a Framework, Submitted by Greece, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, BIMCO, IACS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, IMO Doc C 117/14 (4 November 2016). 
220 IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1, supra note 219, annex. 
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proportionate and without excessive burden on industry.”221 In the final assessment, the criteria 
applied include what ships will be subject to the requirement, proposed date of application, 
whether there are suitable technologies, that approval processes and implementation guidelines are 
in place, that impacts on manufacturers and operators are ascertained, and capacity-building needs 
are identified.  
 
3.5 IMO efforts in developing the industry’s contribution to mitigation 
  
The issue of air pollution from ships was first considered in the IMO in the 1980s in connection 
with the review of the quality of fuel oils, but it was not until 1988 that air pollution was added as 
an MEPC agenda item. Subsequent committee discussions on fuel quality led in 1990 to inclusion 
of the issue in the long-term work plan, followed in 1991 by a milestone Assembly resolution on 
prevention of air pollution and pollution from garbage from ships222 which paved the way for the 
future adoption of Annex VI.223 The first regulations appeared with MARPOL Annex VI through 
the Protocol of 1997 adopted at a diplomatic conference on air pollution that year.224 By then a 
number of initiatives in other fora had already addressed various forms of atmospheric 
emissions.225  
 
The Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I States Parties to the UNFCCC to pursue through the 
IMO the reduction of GHG emissions from marine bunker fuels not addressed by the Montreal 
Protocol.226 In 1997 an IMO air pollution conference invited the MEPC to consider what CO2 
strategies might be feasible in light of the relationship of that gas with other atmospheric pollutants, 
citing the IMO’s task under the Kyoto Protocol.227 Since MEPC 42 there has been ongoing 
cooperation between the Secretariats of IMO and UNFCCC, including SBSTA,228 for example 
through the provision of information to the various sessions of the latter.229 
 
                                                 
221 Ibid. 
222 Resolution A.719(17), supra note 199. 
223 The initial Annex VI set a general cap of 4.5% m/m on the sulphur content of fuel (compared to 0.5% at this time!), 
controls of nitrogen oxides, prohibition of deliberate emission of ozone depleting substances (halons and CFCs), and 
prohibition of onboard incineration of products containing contaminated packaging materials and polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs). Annex VI also designated the Baltic Sea as the first emission control area with a higher standard 
for SOx (1.5% m/m, compared to 4.5%). 
224 Protocol of 1997, supra note 104. 
225 For example: Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 13 November 1979, 1302 UNTS 217 
(entered into force 16 March 1983), amended by Protocols to address emissions of sulphur (1985), nitrogen oxides 
(1988), volatile organic compounds (1991), and further reducing sulphur emissions (1994); Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 
1989), amended by the Protocol of 1990 phasing out of halons and ozone-depleting CFCs 2000, and by the Protocol 
of 1992 accelerating phase-outs and adding phase-out dates for HCFCs and methyl bromide. 
226 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art 2(2). 
227 Resolution 8 of the 1997 Air Pollution Conference, referred to in Report of the MEPC on its 45th Session, IMO 
Doc MEPC 45/20 (16 October 2000), at 55. 
228 Following an initial request by MEPC 41. Report of the MEPC on its 42nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 42/22 (16 
November 1998) [MEPC 42 Report], at 32–33. 
229 For example, see Report of the MEPC on its 44th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 44/20 (12 April 2000) [MEPC 44 
Report], at 39–40. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




In 2000 MEPC 45 agreed to discuss GHG emissions after considering a study commissioned 
by MEPC 42230 and prepared by the IMO Secretariat (the first GHG study)231 following further 
submissions by Japan and the UK.232 MEPC 46 considered this issue and, following submissions 
by Norway and the UK on the need to develop an IMO GHG strategy which received broad 
support, it was agreed that a working group would be established at MEPC 47.233 The working 
group was to evaluate emission reduction proposals, receive proposals from Member States, 
identify appropriate IMO sub-committees for the issue and prepare materials for a future 
strategy.234  The focus was on CO2235 although an intersessional correspondence group felt such 
approach should be for the short-term and without limiting the future general strategy.236 To 
facilitate discussion of the proposed Assembly resolution, the correspondence group considered a 
base document exploring possible elements of a future IMO strategy for GHGs.237 It proposed a 
resolution on IMO Policies and Practices related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Ships238 which was subsequently adopted by the Assembly in 2003.239  The resolution urged 
the MEPC to identify and develop the mechanisms needed to enable limitation or reduction of 
GHG emissions from international shipping and to prioritize establishment of a GHG emission 
baseline, development of a methodology to describe the GHG efficiency through an emission 
index, development of guidelines for application and verification of a GHG emission indexing 
scheme, and evaluation of technical, operational and market-based solutions. The MEPC was also 
requested to consider methodological aspects of GHG emission reporting, develop a work plan 
with a timetable, and maintain the item under review. It is important to note that the Assembly 
resolution proposed to address all ships, rather than simply the States listed in Annex I of the Kyoto 
Protocol, although this would become a divisive matter.240 
 
Chaired by Norway, the correspondence group’s work, while important in advancing IMO 
efforts on GHG, was characterised by increasingly diverse views on what a future strategy should 
accomplish. By MEPC 51, a growing minority of developing countries vocalized their concern 
that the Organization’s GHG work should be guided by UNFCCC principles and that Kyoto Annex 
I countries should be taking the lead in reducing emissions.241 These concerns required additional 
work in the correspondence group. At MEPC 52 the Committee divided consideration of the issue 
into two steps, the first was to focus on technical matters and the second would address ‘political 
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235 Report of the MEPC on its 47th session, IMO Doc MEPC 47/20 (18 March 2002), at 24. 
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issues’ including NMFT and CBDR.242 With respect to the former, the Committee instructed the 
correspondence group to continue technical work on guidelines for a CO2 indexing scheme as a 
voluntary mechanism on the basis of interim guidelines. 243  In-depth work on CO2 indexing 
proceeded at a Technical Workshop on GHG Indexing Scheme held at IMO in 2005 on the basis 
of sea trials and studies by a few volunteering flag States, industry actors and the EU.244 The 
conclusion was that technical guidelines worked, but that a number of issues needed to be 
addressed, including the formula for calculation of indexing (specific to fuels with different 
conversion factors), data standardization, and development of a method for the index for new 
builds.245 As to the ‘political issues’, the sharp division of views represented on the one hand by 
Norway246 for NMFT and on the other by China247 for CBDR led the Chair to conclude that “it 
would be advisable to continue the common ground found on technical matters and defer the 
application issue to a later stage when an agreement had been reached elsewhere.”248 
 
The Working Group on Air Pollution was reconstituted at MEPC 54249 and its work led to 
MEPC 55 deciding on an updated plan of work based on three main lines of action.250 First, with 
respect to the CO2 Emission Indexing Scheme, Member States and industry were urged to continue 
to carry out trials with a view to improving the indexing method in the interim guidelines. Second, 
                                                 
242 Report of the MEPC on its 52nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 52/24 (18 October 2004) [MEPC 52 Report], at 26.  
243 MEPC Circular on the Interim Guidelines for Voluntary Ship CO2 Emission Indexing for Use in Trials, IMO Doc 
MEPC/Circ.471 (29 July 2005). 
244 Report of the One-day Technical Workshop on GHG Indexing Scheme held at IMO Headquarters on Friday, 15 
July 2005, IMO Doc MEPC 53/WP.3 (15 July 2005). 
245 Ibid at 8. 
246 Norway’s position was summarized as “… the tradition of IMO was to develop mechanisms, either voluntary or 
mandatory, which apply equally to each Member State. The IMO Convention article 1(b) on the purpose of the 
Organization, the removal of discriminatory action was addressed, and as such, the inclusion of the differentiated 
approach in any IMO GHG mechanism to be developed would be in conflict with the purpose of the Organization. 
Further, Norway referred to the well established principle of ‘no more favourable treatment’ in IMO instruments. In 
conclusion, Norway highlighted that the principle of equal application to IMO Member States should also apply to 
the IMO work on GHG emissions from international shipping.” MEPC 52 Report, supra note 242, at 27. 
247 China’s position was summarised as: “IMO was asked to deal with limitation and reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions by the Kyoto Protocol, which only obliges Annex I countries of UNFCCC to do so. IMO Assembly 
resolution A.963(23) clearly acknowledged the relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. During the deliberation on 
the matter, the recommendation of the MEPC that ‘the Assembly resolution on IMO Policies and Practices related to 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from ships should be based on a common policy applicable to all ships, rather 
than based on the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol which stated that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is 
under the responsibility of the Annex I countries of the Protocol’ was rejected by the IMO Assembly. It proves that 
the above assertion was wrong. If the limitation or reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is equally applied to both 
developed and developing countries, the developing countries will be discriminated for the following reasons: first, 
79% of greenhouse gases were emitted by the developed countries; second, the Kyoto Protocol only obliges Annex I 
countries to pursue reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through IMO; and thirdly, the developing countries are 
technologically lagging behind. China also pointed out that the reason why IMO did not apply the ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ principle when dealing with matters concerning the Montreal Protocol and the Basel 
Convention is that these documents did not provide that the developed countries should pursue limitation or reduction 
of related materials through IMO. In conclusion, China stressed that the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ 
principle should be observed by IMO when addressing greenhouse gas emissions from ships.” Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 To consider, among other things, the development of a draft framework and work plan with timetable, including 
options for technical, operational and/or market-based mechanisms. Report of the MEPC on its 54th Session, IMO 
Doc MEPC 54/21 (27 March 2006), at 25–26. 
250 Report of the MEPC on its 55th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 55/23 (16 October 2006), at 31–32, annex 9. 
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work on the CO2 emission efficiency baseline and methodology would continue work with a view 
to drafting a proposal. Third, technical, operational and market measures would be considered. 
However, by MEPC 56 there was growing concern in the IMO at the protracted negotiations 
without producing tangible outcomes and the concern that lack of progress might encourage 
unilateral national or regional initiatives.251 The need for a new GHG study was agreed as an action 
item.252 At this session Norway fielded a proposal that potentially simplified the development of 
an IMO strategy by proposing a CO2 toll to apply to all international shipping, not dependent on a 
baseline and which would lead to the establishment of an international fund.253 This was the first 
proposal for an MBM and in essence consisted of a uniform carbon tax. Views both for and against 
the proposal were expressed, but the Committee agreed the working group should consider all 
options for technical, operational and market measures that may be submitted.254 
Several Member States submitted technical, operational and MBM ideas to a correspondence 
group and which were reported to MEPC 57.255 The correspondence group undertook an in-depth 
and systematic discussion of proposed measures and their suitability for the short or long-term, 
including pros and cons. The group identified policy issues, including the NMFT and CBDR duet, 
considered if a global approach was not feasible whether regional or national approaches might 
arise, and whether shipping could be considered under the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol.256 A 
collective submission by delegations and industry organizations with consultative status proposed 
that any future regulations should be based on fundamental principles that would inform the future 
IMO framework for GHG regulation.257 This was embraced by MEPC 57, concluding that the 
framework: 
 
(1) must be effective in contributing to the reduction of total global greenhouse gas emissions;  
(2) binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to avoid evasion; 
(3) cost-effective; 
(4) able to limit, or at least, effectively minimize competitive distortion;  
(5) based on sustainable environmental development without penalizing global trade and growth; 
(6) based on a goal-based approach and not prescribe specific methods; 
(7) supportive of promoting and facilitating technical innovation and R&D in the entire shipping 
sector; 
(8) accommodating to leading technologies in the field of energy efficiency; and  
(9) practical, transparent, fraud free and easy to administer.258  
 
The principles were adopted by a majority vote called by the chair after a difficult debate. The vote 
raised a fundamental question as to whether the IMO will be able to adopt new rules and standards 
for GHG regulation on the basis of the usual practice of consensus. Some Member States continued 
                                                 
251 Report of the MEPC on its 56th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 56/23 (30 July 2007) [MEPC 56 Report], at 34–35. 
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253 Elements of a Possible Market-based CO2 Emission Reduction Scheme, Submitted by Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 
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254 MEPC 56 Report, supra note 251, at 36. 
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to be of the view that developed States had a special responsibility under the Kyoto Protocol, while 
the majority placed faith in the culture of IMO regulation as it applies to all ships. The vote 
reflected a deep rift between developed and some developing countries. China and Brazil reserved 
their position on the principles, with Barbados, South Africa and Venezuela sharing their 
concerns.259 India wanted to amend the first principle while rejecting the second and was supported 
by Barbados, Brazil, South Africa and Venezuela.260  
 
There was more unity in the various industry sectors. Discussions in the Tripartite Working 
Group consisting of representatives of shipyards, ship owners and classification societies 
supported a cross-industry-based goal.261 This, as well as other proposals, including technical 
submissions and a Danish proposal for a global levy on bunker fuel as a short-term measure,262 
were referred to the working group. There was growing support for a mandatory CO2 design index 
for new ships which was referred to the working group.263 In turn, during MEPC 57 the working 
group on GHG emissions from Ships discussed the various submissions as guided by the nine 
principles, while with some participating States reiterated their reservations on the application of 
the second principle.264 Drawing on its previous work, the working group focused on a set of short-
term and long-term measures, with the former constituting the basis for new energy efficiency 
regulations. 265  It proceeded to plan its prospective intersessional work for CO2 design and 
operational indices and MBMs.266 
  
The timing of MEPC 57 signified a sense of urgency to progress on the GHG issue because 
of the need to coordinate inputs concerning GHG emissions reduction efforts in the maritime sector 
into the UNFCCC process and the upcoming Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009. 
In essence, the MEPC was tasked with developing the international shipping industry’s 
commitment. The IMO Secretary-General proposed acceleration of work, namely completing 
work on the CO2 Emission Indexing Scheme and the CO2 emission baseline(s) by MEPC 58.267 As 
for deliberations on the technical and operational measures and MBMs, the Secretary-General 
proposed completion of that task by MEPC 59 in 2009. Both suggestions were adopted.268 
 
In June 2008 Norway hosted a major intersessional working group that significantly 
advanced the IMO’s work on GHG emissions and enabled MEPC 58 to make progress.269 The 
MEPC formed a working group to try to finalize work on the CO2 emission design and operational 
indices (now renamed respectively as EEDI and Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) 
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on the basis of a proposal by Brazil) and considered proposals for a ‘Ship Efficiency Management 
Plan’.270 This time the working group was tasked with a GHG-specific mandate, rather than to 
consider all air pollution issues within the MEPC’s purview. A draft interim EEDI for new ships 
was produced for trial purposes, but more work on the operational index and management plan 
was needed. A key issue was what form new mandatory measures should take, i.e., whether they 
should be developed as amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, a new Annex VII, or even a new 
stand-alone instrument, but this was not resolved.271  
 
The MEPC 58 deliberations on MBMs constituted the first in-depth substantive discussion 
on such measures. As such, the discussion was less fruitful than on technical measures, in part 
because of their controversy, and because not all submissions were considered due to time 
constraints. Even so, a range of ideas were acknowledged as interesting and worth further study. 
Although some were argued as reasonably straightforward to introduce, there was considerable 
uncertainty as to how they would work, and that consequently Member States needed more 
information.272 Fundamental differences on principles remained, most especially whether new 
emission requirements should bind UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Annex I States, a view now 
shared by a growing number of developing countries, or whether all States should be making them 
applicable to all ships.273 The reality is that international shipping emissions cannot easily be 
attributed to any particular territory and if ships registered under the flags of developing States 
were to be excluded or given preference, the whole purpose of reducing emissions from 
international shipping would be undermined. At MEPC 58 there was a growing understanding that 
there could be other ways to address CBDR, for example through technology transfer and funds 
generated from a prospective MBM. However the uncertainty around MBMs did not generate 
confidence that the special needs of developing countries would be addressed in a satisfactory 
manner. At this point, who should bear the bulk of the responsibility for GHG emission reductions 
from international shipping highlighted a profound north-south divide. Moreover, there were other 
divisions. For example Greece, a major ship owning State, opposed MBMs until their added value 
to the efficiency of shipping could be demonstrated, and reiterated some views expressed at the 
intersessional meeting hosted by Norway that the Danish proposal for a fuel levy was essentially 
a tax that would impede international trade.274  
 
 On the eve of UNFCCC COP 15 in December 2009 and the inception of its 59th session in 
July, the MEPC had not yet met the Secretary-General’s expedited agenda. COP 15 was expected 
to adopt a new post-2012 agreement to combat climate change. The IMO had already submitted 
ideas for international shipping to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention (AWG-LCA).275 The IMO was under pressure to demonstrate commitment 
to the international community, at least with respect to its work on energy efficiency. There 
remained fundamental differences on principles and concern over insufficient information to 
deliberate on some issues. Environmental NGOs added pressure by indicating their readiness to 
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call upon other fora, such as the UNFCCC or the EU, to take timely and appropriate actions if 
MEPC 59 did not produce agreement. 276  Even so, MEPC 59 produced a number of 
accomplishments. The Committee instructed the working group to finalize work on the EEDI and 
the EEOI.277  Work on the SEMP as a fuel efficiency management tool would continue in view of 
finalization and a guidance document on best practices for fuel-efficient operations was 
finalized.278 
 
MEPC 59 resumed discussion of MBMs and new proposals were submitted in addition to 
Denmark’s earlier submission. These included an emission trading scheme (cap and trade) 
applicable to all ships proposed by France, Germany and Norway, 279  and a leveraged incentive 
scheme proposed by Japan.280 Although not advancing an MBM, the US proposed mandatory 
efficiency standards for new and existing ships using the EEDI which could accompany an 
MBM.281 These and other proposals are further discussed later in this report. Potential emission 
reduction scenarios from MBMs were considered, but there was no agreement on whether targets 
should also be set.282 It was noted that the discussion was still conceptual at this stage and would 
need to be continued through future sessions.283 Earlier concerns regarding their uncertain impact, 
especially on developing countries, were reiterated. 284  A majority of delegations agreed to 
continue consideration of MBMs.285  
 
The second IMO GHG Study, commissioned at MEPC 56, was completed.286 Among others, 
it concluded that shipping emitted 3.3% of global CO2 emissions in 2007, and international 
shipping circa 2.7%, mostly through exhausts, with CO2 being the most important contributor. By 
2050, and in a business as usual scenario, ship emissions could grow by 150% to 250% 
commensurate with growth in world trade. If technical and operational measures to enhance 
efficiency (e.g., EEDI), which were deemed cost-efficient, were to be used, emissions could be 
reduced by 25% to 75% below these projections. The report further “found that market-based 
measures were cost-effective policy instruments with a high environmental effectiveness.”287 
Moreover, MBMs “captured the largest amount of emissions under the scope, allowed both 
technical and operational measures in the shipping sector to be used, and could offset emissions in 
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other sectors.”288 The environmental benefit of EEDI was limited because it only applied to new 
ships and incentivised design improvements without including operations. In a business as usual 
scenario for the industry and an emissions scenario where global temperatures stabilise at 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels by 2100, ship emissions were estimated to constitute 12% to 18% of 
the global total CO2 emissions in 2050.   
 
The 2009 Copenhagen conference failed to produce the expected climate treaty, but this did 
not eliminate pressure on the IMO. The Copenhagen Accord did not expressly mention bunker 
fuels, however the reference to the need to reduce global emissions to maintain global temperature 
to below 2 degrees from pre-industrial levels nevertheless raised the question “What would be a 
fair contribution for the international shipping sector to achieving this long term goal?”289 MEPC 
60 resumed this task and had before it over almost a 100 documents to consider. A significant 
breakthrough was a proposal by Japan, Norway and the US to establish the EEDI for new ships 
and the SEEMP for all ships in operation as a new mandatory part in MARPOL Annex VI.290 
MARPOL was already addressing ozone-depleting substances, some of which contributed to 
climate change, and had a well-established survey and certification system. The convention’s tacit 
acceptance process for amendments provided a fast route to implementation if Annex VI was used 
as the vehicle.291 Not all delegations supported the Annex VI route as it was questioned whether 
CO2 was in fact a pollutant within the meaning and intent of the convention. Some preferred a 
stand-alone instrument similar to the BWM Convention and Hong Kong Ship Recycling 
Convention. The Organization’s Legal Division advised that there were no legal obstacles to using 
Annex VI for GHG regulation and, on the contrary, this regulatory route was consistent with the 
annex’s purposes.292 Others, mostly developing countries, did not support mandatory regulations, 
preferring to see further development and trials first.293 The issue was put to a vote and the majority 
supported using Annex VI as the regulatory vehicle. The Working Group on Energy Efficiency 
Measures for Ships, tasked with the development of mandatory legal text and consideration of 
related guidelines, likewise did not find consensus,294 prompting an intervention by the Secretary-
General.295 The impasse was not only with respect to developing country concerns over mandatory 
measures, but also with regard to convening a further intersessional meeting of the working group 
to complete its tasks. This decision was put to the vote and the majority gave the working group 
the green light to address outstanding tasks. 
 
Consideration of how to move forward the discussion on MBMs led MEPC 60 to establish 
an expert group to undertake a feasibility study and impact assessment of MBMs and report to the 
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Committee296 while focusing on ten specific proposals and other submissions.297 The relevance 
and application of the CBDR principle was underscored, but even so several major developing 
countries reserved their positions on the terms of reference and the Expert Group on Feasibility 
Study and Impact Assessment of possible Market-based Measures (MBM-EG) was established by 
majority vote.298 Also, subject of disagreement was whether the international maritime sector 
should be subject to an express emission cap or reduction target for the world fleet. Norway 
submitted scenarios for caps for 2020 and 2030.299 The industry response preferred an approach 
that was consistent across the entire global transportation sector and aimed at improving efficiency 
of the global fleet rather than imposing a cap.300 The International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) argued for an approach that integrates a proposed rebate mechanism in the design 
of an MBM and that this would help reconcile the principles underscoring the IMO and UNFCCC 
regimes.301 
 
Intersessional work on the details of the regulatory text of the EEDI and SEEMP continued, 
identifying several issues and possible approaches proposed to MEPC 61. MEPC 61 was further 
informed by important scientific documents that explored scenarios of likely reductions in 
emissions by employing technical and operational measures, 302  using excess capacity in the 
shipping industry as an opportunity to employ slow speed regimes,303 and combining energy 
efficiency and a proposed carbon credit trading scheme. 304  Speed controls could potentially 
generate substantial savings depending on the type of ship or voyage segment. It was felt that no 
such new dedicated operational rule was needed as this measure would be captured by the EEDI 
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and SEEMP.305 However, at a minimum, it was important to ensure that sufficient reserve power 
was maintained to retain full vessel manoeuvrability. 306  Proposals for introducing correction 
factors to the EEDI were treated with caution as it was important not to create exceptions, other 
than for weather and polar class.307 A proposal for flexing standards for remotely located and SIDS 
was rejected for several reasons, including that substandard ships would be pushed into the trades 
of those States. 308  Similarly, differentiating between ship construction in developed and 
developing States was rejected.309  If EEDI and SEEMP were to be made mandatory, regional and 
national capacity-building would be needed for implementation and enforcement.310 MEPC 61 
also considered the report of the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of 
Possible Market-based Measures. The report presented an analysis of the ten proposals submitted 
by Member States aimed at targeting GHG reductions through in-sector emission reductions or 
out-of-sector emissions reductions.311 The Committee could not reach consensus on the MBM to 
pursue and left further deliberation of this issue to intersessional work312 with some delegations 
expressing strong reservations.313  
 
At MEPC 62 in 2011 the Drafting Group on Amendments to Mandatory Instruments (Part 
II) completed final revisions for the proposed amendments to MARPOL Annex VI.314 A new 
Chapter 4 made the EEDI mandatory for new ships and the SEEMP for all new and existing ships, 
and with entry into force on 1 January 2013. Breaking with the culture of consensus on the adoption 
of new rules and standards, the amending resolution was forced to a vote and 49 out of the 59 (at 
the time) MARPOL Annex VI State Parties voted in favour, with Brazil, Chile, China, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia voting against. The remaining five States abstained or did not vote.315 Further work 
on capacity-building, technical assistance and transfer of technology, as well as finalization of 
guidelines to accompany the EEDI and SEEMP was left to MEPC 63. The discussion on MBMs 
also remained divisive and did not advance further. 
 
MEPC 63 was similarly divided on the issue of capacity-building and technology transfer 
and failed to adopt a resolution on the topic despite its significance and expectation it would 
accompany the Annex VI amendments. 316  The EEDI and SEEMP guidelines to facilitate 
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implementation were also not completed. There were several issues related to both the EEDI and 
SEEMP that required future MEPC attention. Discussion on MBMs continued with respect to 
assessment of impacts of such measures, possible consolidation of the various proposals, climate 
finance and use of MBM revenue, and relationship between MBMs and world trade rules. A more 
in-depth understanding of the direct and indirect impacts of MBMs on developing countries was 
needed.317 A study conducted by India suggested that fuel price increases as a result of an MBM 
could have substantial impact on that country’s oil, iron ore and coal trades.318 Views differed on 
whether MBMs were needed, whether the various proposals should be consolidated to enable 
focus, and whether the EEDI should be used as a basis for an MBM. A working group had 
identified several possible uses for MBM revenues.319  However, there were widely divergent 
views on how revenues from an MBM in shipping might be used and whether there should be a 
relationship to similar efforts under the UNFCCC, even though international shipping had been 
listed as one of the possible sources for climate finance.320  While some delegations saw no 
incompatibility between an MBM and WTO rules, others expressed caution as they perceived 
inconsistency issues.321 
 
Discussions on a resolution on capacity-building and technology transfer continued, but did 
not conclude at MEPC 64. As a consequence, and at the behest of States that felt further discussion 
on MBMs could not progress before adoption of the resolution, the Committee postponed further 
deliberation to MEPC 65.322 The progress to be observed at MEPC 64 related to the continued 
development of the guidelines for the implementation of the EEDI and SEEMP. 
 
MEPC 65 finally found consensus on the controversial resolution Promotion of Technical 
Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of 
Ships, but only after informal consultations undertaken by the Committee Chair.323 The key issues 
that needed to be addressed were CBDR, transfer of technology and financing. Consensus was 
reached without any mandatory stipulations and essentially providing a framework for the IMO to 
offer technical assistance and for Member States to promote support for other States.324 An Ad 
Hoc Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology for Ships was established 
to assess impacts of the implementation of the new Chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex VI and to 
maintain a list of green technologies and identify ways of access.325 Developed States secured the 
protection of intellectual property rights. Implementation action would start at MEPC 66. This 
consensus should have led to further deliberations on MBMs, but that was not to be. Instead MEPC 
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65 suspended further discussion on MBMs to an undetermined future session.326 Perhaps this 
decision was not a total surprise as the Committee remained divided on MBMs, even though there 
was progress on technical and operational initiatives, albeit not always on the basis of consensus.   
 
In contrast, work on the finer details of the EEDI and SEEMP continued in a productive 
manner at MEPC 65. Through its working groups and in plenary, the Committee resolved 
numerous outstanding technical issues, such as the computation of the EEDI for different classes 
of ships such as cruise ships, cargo ships, LNG carriers, ro-ro cargo ships and ro-ro passenger 
ships, vehicle carriers, and distinguished vessels running dual fuel engines. Accordingly, the 
guidelines to accompany the EEDI and SEEMP were finally completed and readied for adoption 
at MEPC 65 and 66.327 Amendments to Chapter 4 were already needed, in particular to exempt 
polar class vessels with independent icebreaking capability from EEDI because of their 
considerably higher installed power and inability to meet that standard.328  There were other 
proposals for further action to enhance energy efficiency of ships, but the Committee left that 
discussion for the next session. 
 
With debates on MBMs on hold and work on Annex VI Chapter 4 guidelines largely 
completed, the MEPC 66’s attention turned to implementation of the resolution on technology 
transfer and capacity building, continued follow-up work on Chapter 4 guidelines, and 
preparations for a third IMO GHG study and worked on the proposal to set up an EEDI database. 
The Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology for Ships was 
established and its first meeting convened.329 It was further able to report on its initial activities at 
MEPC 67.330 MEPC 67 also continued work on conceptualizing the database and updating and 
reviewing EEDI guidelines.331 There was no progress on the discussion to explore additional 
operational energy efficiency standards for ships accompanied by metrics.332  
 
The Third IMO GHG Study was completed in 2014 and presented at MEPC 67.333 The study 
noted that CO2 emissions from shipping were projected to increase significantly. The business as 
usual scenarios projected an increase by 50% to 250% by 2050, although enhancement of energy 
efficiency and reduced emissions had the potential to mitigate the increase to some extent. 
Efficiency improvements were important, but the study concluded that “even modelled 
improvements with the greatest energy savings could not yield a downward trend. Compared to 
regulatory or market-driven improvements in efficiency, changes in the fuel mix have a limited 
impact on GHG emissions, assuming that fossil fuels remain dominant.”334 
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An ongoing key concern was the absence of reliable ship emissions data to facilitate adoption 
of further technical and operational measures to enhance energy efficiency in international 
shipping. The data issue was first flagged at MEPC 63335 and at MEPC 66 it was agreed that a Ship 
Fuel Consumption Database would assist the IMO in its future reviews of technological 
developments and in determining CO2 emissions. The debate was continued in successive sessions 
because the information required to determine energy efficiency could be detailed with respect to 
the transport work undertaken, rather than simply relate to the fuel consumed. In turn, efficiency 
data potentially raised sensitive issues of commercial competitiveness if the raw data were to be 
made publicly available.336 Other issues included whether reporting should be mandatory, vessel 
size for reporting, impact on different cargoes carried, impact of change of ship ownership or 
registration and responsibility for transferring data to the flag State.337  
 
As observed earlier, the slow pace of work on GHG regulation at the IMO triggered EU 
pressure. The EU welcomed the EEDI and the SEEMP, but considered these measures insufficient 
because they would not lead to an absolute emission reduction of GHGs from international 
shipping. 338 The EU agreed that a CO2 global data collection system for international shipping 
was a necessary step and had in fact proceeded to adopt the EU Regulation on Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification (MRV)339(supra) as an example of what a global system could look 
like. The data included detailed emission and transport efficiency and with an effective 
enforcement date in European ports on 1 January 2018. The EU is currently considering the 
appropriateness of the alignment of its MRV scheme with the IMO data collection system. The 
effect of the MRV initiative was to exert regional pressure for global action, which materialized at 
MEPC 70 by an amendment to Annex VI introducing a mandatory global data collection system 
for reporting data on ships’ annual fuel consumption for ships of 5,000 gross tonnage and over.340  
These ships are thought to account for 85% of all GHG emissions from international shipping.341 
With entry into force in 2018, reporting of data will start in 2020.342  
 
On the eve of the Paris Climate Change Conference, at MEPC 68, the Marshall Islands, both 
a SIDS State and one of the largest open register States, proposed that the IMO commence work 
to establish a GHG emission reduction target consistent with keeping global warming below 1.5°C 
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and to agree on the measures necessary to reach that target.343 The question whether emissions 
from international shipping should have a defined emission reduction target has been an ongoing 
issue in MEPC deliberations across sessions. The ensuing debate reflected the broad diversity of 
views that had characterized past GHG discussions in the IMO.344 It was recognized that more 
could be done at the IMO, because while substantial efforts were invested into enhancing energy 
efficiency to reduce emissions and establishing a database, the Third IMO GHG Report did not 
paint a rosy picture on the sufficiency of such measures. The remaining issues concerning the 
proposed mandatory data collection system for fuel consumption of ships were resolved at MEPC 
69 and amendments to integrate the system into the new Chapter 4 of Annex VI approved, paving 
the way for tacit acceptance. 345  Guidelines to facilitate administration of the database and 
implementation of the regulation were adopted at MEPC 71.346 
 
The Paris Climate Conference in December 2015 may have provided the IMO a breadth of 
relief by tacitly leaving the determination of the international shipping industry’s contribution to 
GHG emissions reductions to the IMO for the time being. But it also renewed debate in the IMO 
as to what was the Organization’s long-term GHG vision and how it should proceed in developing 
the industry’s fair contribution. In a post-conference debate at the IMO, it was clear that although 
the IMO had for years worked on and developed a framework for energy efficiency to reduce CO2 
emissions, much more was expected.347 The IMO would need to develop, and be seen to adopt, 
meaningful measures that would be periodically reviewable. That international trade should not be 
undermined by new measures and the need for developing countries’ (especially SIDS and LDCs) 
to have access to financial resources and technology were underscored. Reconciliation of CBRD 
and NMFT had to be addressed. However, there were those that felt that the IMO should stay its 
course on the database and following its operationalization use its data to proceed with analysis 
and eventual decision-making on a long-term plan. Industry interests felt the IMO approach should 
retain flexibility and consider aspirational rather than legally binding targets. It was felt important 
to ensure the measures adopted to date, such as the EEDI and technology transfer and capacity- 
building measures be implemented first. Past differences of views persisted, but the Organization 
opted for a disciplined approach. The discussion concluded by recognizing that priority should 
continue to be given to the data collection system and for further work to proceed on the three-step 
approach of maritime regulation, namely data collection, analysis and decision-making. 
 
Convened in the wake of the Paris Agreement, MEPC 70 was under particular pressure to 
demonstrate a game plan for the orchestration of the international shipping industry’s contribution 
to the global response to climate change. An industry proposal348 was used as the basis for the 
Committee’s adoption of the Roadmap for Developing a Comprehensive IMO Strategy on 
                                                 
343 Setting a Reduction Target and Agreeing Associated Measures for International Shipping, Submitted by the 
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345 Report of the MEPC on its 69th Session, IMO Doc 69/21 (13 May 2016) [MEPC 69 Report], at 33. 
346 Resolution MEPC.292(71) – 2017 Guidelines for Administration Verification of Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Data, 
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Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships.349 The Roadmap consists of further GHG studies, 
intersessional work subject to timelines, and ongoing Committee work on ship energy efficiency 
improvements. The initial GHG reduction strategy will be adopted in 2018 and will lead to a 
revised strategy in 2023 to include a range of measures and implementation schedules over the 
short, medium and long-terms.350 MEPC 70 also adopted the finalized mandatory data collection 
system for fuel oil consumption of ships, the 2014 Guidelines were amended, and guidelines for 
calculation of the EEDI were updated.  
 
For MEPC 71 the Committee had before it numerous new submissions by Member States 
and organizations with consultative status, submitted to the Committee directly as well as to 
ISWG-GHG 1. The ISWG-GHG 1 met in June 2017 for intensive discussions on the directions for 
the strategy and work plan for consideration at MEPC 71. Following consideration of submissions 
and the ISWG-GHG 1 report, the Committee adopted the latter’s proposals, including the outline 
proposed for the initial strategy developed at a parallel meeting during MEPC 71.351 The outline 
is nothing more than a provisional table of contents, set out as follows:  
 
x Preamble/introduction/context including emission scenarios  
x Vision  
x Levels of ambition  
x Guiding principles  
x List of candidate short-, mid- and long-term further measures with possible timelines and 
their impacts on States  
x Barriers and supportive measures; capacity building and technical cooperation; R&D  
x Follow-up actions towards the development of the revised strategy  
x Periodic review of the Strategy 
 
In using this outline as a basis of work at subsequent intersessional meetings (October 2017 and 
April 2018), the MEPC further instructed the working group to consider the substantive issues set 
out in submissions by various delegations and organizations with consultative status and to submit 
a progress report in 2018.  
 
The ISWG-GHG 2 concluded its meeting in October 2017 and  commenced to populate 
the strategy.352  The importance of the issue was demonstrated by the participation of 59 Member 
State delegations and other associate members and organizations with consultative status. As 
before, the meeting continued to evidence fundamental differences on the core elements of the 
strategy, particularly on vision, levels of ambitions and guiding principles. On vision, there were 
differences on whether the strategy should aim at decarbonization by the end of this century as an 
end goal or as a process, but the term ‘decarbonization’ itself proved to be problematic. The 
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alternatives appeared to be either an IMO commitment to GHG reductions to zero by the end of 
the century or to a ‘best endeavours’ approach to reduce emissions.353  The levels of ambition 
produced even more differences, which the ISWG Chair proposed to group as the following 
approaches, and with each one of which having a number of proposals: “annual total GHG 
emissions from international shipping to be kept below a defined level”; “GHG emissions from 
international shipping to peak and then decline”; “carbon intensity of international shipping to 
decline”; “carbon intensity of the ship to decline”.354 However, there appeared to be agreement 
that 2008 should be used as the base year in determining future emissions reductions, and indeed 
several proposals included targets using that as the base year.355 In comparing data between 2007 
and 2012, the Third IMO GHG Study appeared to suggest that 2008 was the peak year for CO2 
emissions.356 
 
Equally substantial differences continued in regard to the guiding principles, with 
proposals aimed to ensure that strategy principles reflected IMO and UNFCCC principles, as well 
as impacts on States, in particular LDCs and SIDS. Other proposals are potentially more difficult 
to reconcile in crafting a common approach, including: the nine MEPC 57 principles, the second 
principle of which (NMFT) was particularly divisive;357 ten separate principles were submitted by 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey at 
MEPC 71, which included coherence with the UNFCCC regime, alignment with the SDG goals 
and no trade barriers; 358  and eight principles identified in ISWG-GHG 1. 359  Other proposed 
considerations included that the strategy should be ‘in sector’, so that international shipping would 
not become a source for general climate finance outside the sector360 and articulation of the CBDR 
that would include emphasis on developed country lead, geographical considerations, low value 
cargo, transportation costs, routes, phasing-in and readiness.361 There were substantial differences 
with respect to measures, but it appears that there was converge on possible durations of the short, 
medium and long-terms.362 The strategy would include short-term measures finalized in the 2018-
2023 period, followed by mid-term measures in 2023-2030, long-term measures after 2030.  
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Measures are conceived in terms of their direct application to ships as distinct from a 
supportive function they may play. Some measures are based on enhancement of existing 
regulation (e.g., ratcheting up of the EEDI and SEEMP, as well as other technical and operational 
measures in the short-term), thus likely to entail greater potential for support because of their 
familiarity in the industry. Other novel measures for which there is no experience in the industry, 
such “new/innovative emission reduction mechanism(s), possibly including Market-based 
Measures (MBMs), to incentivize GHG emission reduction” in the medium-term, 363  can be 
expected to be accompanied by some reserve and possibly left for future review. Despite the 
concerns that MBMs raise, they are likely to remain an option to achieve significant GHG 
emissions reductions in the event technical and operational measures do not deliver sufficient 
reductions.  
 
Of significance, there was agreement on the need for the strategy to be subject to periodic 
review, possibly every five years to coincide with the Global Stocktake or even every 10 years.364 
Other measures would include addressing impacts on developing countries, barriers and supportive 
measures, capacity-building and technical cooperation, and R & D. While the meeting succeeded 
in progressing the discourse on key aspects of the strategy and explored a range of options, its 
output was largely in square brackets (signifying areas as unsettled) at a high level of generality 
and bereft of details, leaving substantial work to be accomplished before and during ISWG-GHG 
3 in April 2018. There is much that remains to be accomplished by ISWG-GHG 3 to produce the 
next iteration of the draft initial IMO strategy. Its mandate is to finalize the draft and further 
consider how to progress prepare advice for MEPC 72 on how to progress further.365 
 
In summary, the substantive regulatory achievements with respect to GHGs, and specifically 
CO2, to date consist of 2011 amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, introducing a new Chapter 4 
setting out the EEDI for mandatory new ships and the SEEMP for all ships, and accompanied by 
guidelines,366 both of which are discussed further below, as well as a mandatory data collection 
system for oil fuel consumption. These measures are expected to render all new ships 30% more 
energy efficient by 2025 than those built in 2014, and mandatory reporting for vessels of 5,000 
gross tonnage or more of oil fuel use to flag States and thereby to the IMO to commence in 2020.  
 




The categories of GHG emissions reduction measures considered to date by the IMO for the 
maritime sector consist of technological, operational and market-based measures. Technical and 
operational measures provide an incentive for shipowners to comply because of the greater 
operational efficiency likely to be achieved. Enhanced efficiency translates into lower fuel 
consumption and leads in turn to lower operating costs. To some extent, this is the “invisible hand” 
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of the market at work, but it is limited in its utility, as shipowners will only invest voluntarily in 
technical and operational measures to the extent that they expect to realize a beneficial return. 
MBMs are different because they attempt to internalize costs through various tools, including 
levies, trading schemes and offsets to induce shipowners to reduce emissions according to 
prescribed standards.367 By promoting the internalization of costs, they constitute a potentially 
useful tool for the implementation of the “polluter pays” principle. Moreover, some MBMs, such 
as levies, generate revenue, which may be diverted by an administering body to further the goals 
of the strategy.  The work of the IMO with respect to these measures is discussed next. 
 
3.6.2 Technical and operational measures 
  
Technical and operational measures are closely interrelated. Generally, technical measures relate 
to the standards of construction and equipping of a ship and usually entail long-term investments 
in the form of retrofitting and new builds. Examples include new hull designs, new propulsion 
machinery using cleaner fuels and new propeller technology which enhance mobility efficiency. 
Operational measures concern how a vessel is in fact operated while trading or in port and usually 
are capable of implementation in the short-term. Examples include speed optimization, weather 
routing and hull maintenance. MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4 sets out technical and operational 
measures for vessels of 400 GT with an effective date of 1 January 2013. The key regulations 
concern the EEDI as a technical measure for new ships and the SEEMP as an operational measure 
for existing ships. Collectively, these measures seek to increase the operating efficiency of ships 
on international routes, thereby reducing fuel consumption and overall GHG emissions in the 
sector.  
 
In applying to new builds, the EEDI concerns vessels ordered as of 1 January 2017 or those 
to be delivered after 1 July 2019. The EEDI also automatically applies to older ships that have 
undergone major conversions from 2017 onward.368 The EEDI applies differently to the various 
classes of vessels, namely bulk carriers, gas carriers, tankers, container ships, general cargo ships, 
refrigerated cargo carriers, combined carriers, LNG carriers, ro-ro cargo ships (vehicle, general 
carriers, passenger), cruise passenger ships and non-conventional propulsion vessels and in 
accordance with transitional regulatory phasing set out in a regulation.369 Every class of ship is 
assigned an attained EEDI that indicates an estimate of its real performance with regard to its 
required EEDI. The required EEDI for a vessel is based on a “reduction factor” as well as its 
reference line value.370  Reduction factors vary with the type and size of each vessel, becoming 
more stringent over time with each five-year phase leading up to 2025. Reference line values are 
based on ship type and size. Both reduction factors and reference line values are subject to 
amendment based on technological developments. Changes in the market, such as a surge or 
further decline in the price of oil, are not explicitly contemplated by the regulations. It is 
conceivable that market changes might push shipowners to increase operating efficiency beyond 
what is merely required of them. The approach of the EEDI is non-prescriptive and instead it 
                                                 
367 For a more detailed technical discussion of MBMs and their interplay with marginal abatement curves, see Harilaos 
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368 See MARPOL, supra note 10, Annex VI, Chap 4, reg 19.5. 
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embraces a performance-based approach. Effectively, and flexibly, this approach leaves the choice 
of technologies to achieve stated efficiency goals to the shipowner. 
 
The value of the SEEMP is that its scope of application is all ships, therefore including 
existing ships that are likely not as efficient as new builds. The SEEMP requirement is 
accompanied by guidelines to facilitate its implementation.371 All ships are required to have a plan 
to enhance operational efficiency with respect to the particular ship’s capabilities. It is understood 
that ships have different classes and operate under a wide variety of conditions. Through the 
SEEMP, the shipowner, operator or charterer aim to improve a ship’s energy efficiency through 
planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-evaluation and improvement, thus completing a 
feedback cycle.372 
 
In order to facilitate proper functioning of the EEDI and SEEMP models, MARPOL Annex 
VI incorporates a mechanism to facilitate the collection and reporting of fuel consumption data. 
Data is collected yearly by the flag State and transmitted to the IMO, with each ship’s performance 
anonymously catalogued by the IMO and distributed among Member States for their consideration 
and analysis.373  
 
The MARPOL Annex VI Chapter 4 includes provision for promotion of technical co-
operation and transfer of technology relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of ships, 
based on State request. 374  This provision was included to address the concerns raised by 
developing countries with respect to the need for capacity-building. As will be seen below, while 
this provision is built on good intentions, it faces the challenge of intellectual property rights, 
which are not readily transferred by commercial actors seeking to maintain market 
competitiveness. These issues have been the focus of some of the efforts to address the role of 
technology and technology transfer under the UN climate regime.   The technology mechanism 
was first announced under the Copenhagen Accord, but has since been brought under the Paris 
Agreement, and work is continuing on the development and dissemination of climate related 
technologies. 
 
3.6.3 Market-based measures  
 
As discussed above, the decision to consider MBMs as potential mechanisms for curbing GHG 
emissions in international shipping sector, in addition to other measures, was first made in an IMO 
Assembly resolution in 2003.375 Starting with the 54th session, the MEPC gave consideration to 
MBMs through its working groups until discussion of the topic was suspended at MEPC 65. As 
observed in the commentary above, the discussions revealed significant divisions. While the 
majority agreed on the merits of the concept, several delegations expressed concerns with regard 
to uncertain or adverse impact on developing countries, fearing that an MBM could adversely 
affect their trade and development. China, India, Brazil, the Bahamas, Peru, South Africa, and 
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Saudi Arabia, among others, voiced concerns on these issues. Despite the suspension of formal 
discussions, occasional Member State submissions made since MEPC 65 suggest that the concept 
of an MBM in international shipping is still an option for the IMO Strategy. 
 
Following the initial MBM proposal of the UK at MEPC 55, several other submissions that 
directly or indirectly supported MBMs were made at MEPC 59 and 60: 
 
x Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and the International Parcel Tankers 
Association (IPTA) proposed the establishment of an International Fund for GHG 
emissions from ships based on a global reduction target for international shipping.376 
Emissions in excess of the target would need to be offset through purchased and approved 
emission reduction credits that would be based on a contribution paid on every tonne of 
bunker fuel purchased.  
x Japan proposed a ‘Leveraged Incentive Scheme’ based on contributions from bunker fuel 
purchases made to a GHG Fund.377 A ship’s meeting or exceeding efficiency benchmarks, 
would be rewarded through partial refunds.  
x The US proposed mandatory efficiency standards for all ships and an efficiency credit 
trading programme to induce compliance.378  
x Norway proposed a cap and trade system with a sector-wide cap on net emissions and 
establishment of a global emission trading/auctioning system.379  
x Similar to Norway’s, a UK proposal was based on national rather than a global auctioning 
system and with a long-term decreasing cap.380  
x Also similar to Norway’s, France proposed an emissions trading system, but with some 
different elements.381  
x Jamaica proposed a uniform consumed bunker-based levy applied to ships on port calls.382  
x The World Shipping Council (WSC) proposed incremental mandatory efficiency standards 
for all new and existing ships according to their class, and a fee per tonne of fuel consumed 
would be levied from non-compliant ships.383  
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383 Proposal to Establish a Vessel Efficiency System (VES), Submitted by the World Shipping Council, IMO Doc 
MEPC 60/4/39 (15 January 2010) [MEPC 60/4/39]. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




x The IUCN and WWF called for a rebate mechanism for a market-based instrument while 
compensating developing countries for the MBM’s financial impact.384  
x Germany proposed a tool to assess MBM impacts in the form of an ‘Impact Assessment of 
an Emissions Trading Scheme’ paying particular attention to impacts on developing 
countries.385  
 
At MEPC 62, the Third Intersessional Working Group on GHG Emissions organized the 
existing MBM proposals into two groups as: (1) those focusing on in-sector maritime emissions 
reductions; and (2) those opting to focus on out-of-sector reductions, or offsetting.386 The group 
of MBMs focused on in-sector emission reductions will best serve to drive and incentivize 
technological innovation by shipowners in order to increase efficiency within the shipping sector. 
Shipowners who fail to reach gradually increasing standards would be liable to pay a penalty of 
sorts, the proceeds of which would ultimately be used for administrative purposes, research and 
development, or mitigation of ill-effects on developing countries.  
 
The group of MBMs focused on offsetting would to some extent integrate international 
shipping into the broader GHG emissions reduction effort. Shipowners would either purchase or 
be allotted emissions credits which could be subsequently used, traded, or potentially banked for 
later use. Additional credits would be available via out-of-sector offset programs. The many 
detractors of the out-of-sector model point out that while such a scheme, if managed properly, 
would ensure a net global reduction in GHG emissions, it might allow the shipping sector to 
stagnate technologically. Indeed, it gives shipowners greater opportunity to use redirected capital 
in the place of innovation. In principle, integration with or at least derivation from existing land-
based emissions reductions schemes might serve to make a maritime solution easier to adopt 
initially and administer as time goes on. 
 
a. Focus on in-sector reductions 
 
This group of MBM proposals is dominated by reliance on the EEDI. Two proposals that stand 
out are Japan’s and the World Shipping Council’s, working jointly on the first, and the US, on the 
second. The two proposals are strikingly similar. The first is known as the Efficiency Incentive 
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Scheme (EIS);387 the second, Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT).388 A third proposal, the 
Port State Levy, proposed by Jamaica,389 received less attention. The Bahamas, concerned about 
harm to developing countries and adamant that any MBM would represent a penalty on 
international trade, proposed non-intervention in the market, preferring to let natural market forces 
incentivize technological development and efficiency.390  
 
 The EIS imposes a baseline efficiency standard on individual ships of each class and size. 
Japan’s view is that a global industry-wide cap would cause an outflow of money from the sector 
(more on this below in the discussion of the GHG Fund proposal). The baseline would increase in 
stringency over time, and it could be tied to the existing EEDI. Any ship not meeting its respective 
baseline would be charged a flat rate per ton of bunker fuel purchased. Thus, ships with an EEDI 
rating in compliance with the scheme would not be penalized, whereas those that under-performed 
would contribute to a global GHG shipping fund, the proceeds of which would be applied primarily 
to research and development. The SECT proposal from the US is almost identical to the EIS, but 
differs in that it incorporates a credit trading system. In short, vessels that outperform their 
respective baselines would sell emissions credits to vessels that failed to reach theirs.  
 
The US proposal incentivizes not only the achieving of baselines, but also further exceeding 
them. However, a credit trading system will introduce inherent complexities of its own, such as 
the price of credits will not necessarily remain stable or predictable. Further, if credits are not 
available in sufficient quantities, it is unclear what would be the options for under-performing 
ships.  
 
Reliance of an MBM on the EEDI could pose an issue for older vessels, which may be 
disproportionately penalized. A potential approach to alleviate the issue would have to balance the 
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obvious desirability of existing ships serving out their full intended service lives while still being 
pushed to operate as efficiently as possible and perhaps even retrofit to some degree.  A further 
issue is that under the EEDI, underpowered ships often achieve a high rating, whereas vessels that 
rely on substantial power to operate are at a disadvantage. With the EIS and SECT it cannot simply 
be presumed that the penalties for under-performance will not serve to stifle trade with developing 
nations. The reality is that some routes are less profitable than others. Narrow margins coupled 
with a monetary penalty may thus reduce traffic to some regions.  
 
The Jamaican proposal of a Port State Levy appears as a decentralized MBM. It would 
involve a uniform fee charged by individual port States on ships entering their ports. This fee 
would be based on fuel consumed during the inbound voyage and could be structured towards 
global emissions reduction targets, rewarding vessels that exceed targets. The revenues from this 
scheme could be applied to purchase out-of-sector offsets for the shipping industry or may allow 
for keeping revenues within the sector. While such a system would arguably be simpler than a 
credit trading system, it would also burden port States and potentially result in uneven application.  
 
b. Focus on out-of-sector reductions 
 
Proposals in this category included the GHG Fund proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall 
Islands, Nigeria, and the International Parcel Tankers Association,391 supported by South Korea 
and Liberia,392 and the Global Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), proposed by Norway, the UK, 
and France. 393  Germany released a relatively favourable impact assessment of the ETS on 
developing countries and recommended that a portion of revenues be redistributed among them to 
mitigate any negative effects.394 
 
The GHG Fund would impose a levy on each ton of bunker fuel and establish a global 
emissions reduction target for the entire shipping sector. Emissions beyond this cap would be offset 
by a scheme in which ‘emissions reduction credits’ would be issued to shipowners who funded 
                                                 
391 The Feasibility of an International Compensation Fund for GHG Emissions from Ships, Submitted by Denmark, 
IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/22 (14 August 2008); An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, 
Submitted by Denmark, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/5 (9 April 2009); MEPC 60/4/8, supra note 376; Effects on Sea 
Transport Cost Due to an International Fund for GHG Emission for Ships, Submitted by Denmark, IMO Doc MEPC 
60/INF.7 (18 December 2009).  
392 The International Greenhouse Gas Fund – Strengths and Weaknesses, Submitted by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall 
Islands, Liberia, Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and the International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), IMO Doc 
MEPC 62/5/33 (20 May 2011).  
393  The originating document for the ETS was: Comments on the Outcome of GHG-WG 1 Regarding the 
Consideration of an Emission Trading Scheme for International Shipping, Submitted by France, Germany and 
Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/25 (15 August 2008). Norway and France both returned with their own proposals at 
later sessions, with the ultimately joining them: MEPC 60/4/22, supra note 379; MEPC 60/4/41, supra note 381; 
MEPC 60/4/26, supra note 380; Comment on Document MEPC 62/5/15 on the Possible Use of Revenues Generated 
by an Emissions Trading System, Submitted by France, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/35 (20 May 2011). Given their 
similarity, the proposals of Norway, the UK, and France have been consistently lumped together when considered and 
assessed by the Committee. 
394 MEPC 60/4/54, supra note 385; Possible Uses of Revenues Generated by an Emissions Trading System, Submitted 
by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/15 (6 May 2011); Design and Implementation of a Worldwide Maritime Emission 
Trading Scheme: Results of a Scientific Study, Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/9 (23 December 2011); 
Design and Implementation of a Worldwide Maritime Emission Trading Scheme: Full Report, Submitted by Germany, 
IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.14 (23 December 2011). 
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out-of-sector GHG emissions reductions projects. The levy could be adjusted regularly to ensure 
sufficient funding for the payment of emission reduction credits to shipowners. Additional funds 
could be allocated to mitigation of negative effects on the developing world, R & D, adaptation, 
and technical cooperation. While the GHG Fund is preferable to industry investors in that it would 
to some extent ensure stability of fuel and carbon prices, problems emerge when one considers 
how and where to set the industry target. Furthermore, shipowners are encouraged to spend money 
out-of-sector just as readily as they are encouraged to spend it on technological development and 
efficiency in-sector. 
 
 The ETS has received a great deal of attention and enjoys formal support from a large 
number of Member States, all of which are European. A relatively successful land-based ETS is 
in effect in Europe, which has covered all flights between Member States since 2012, without 
discrimination on the basis of nationality.395 In the shipping context, an ETS would impose a global 
cap on emissions and create an international marketplace in which emissions credits would be 
auctioned off. Unlike the SECT proposal, which also involves a credit trading system, the global 
ETS could incorporate credits from other sectors, such as CDM credits, to allow shipowners to 
better offset their emissions. Norway proposed a limited exemption clause for voyages to 
developing countries, while France supported small, controlled side auctions to help facilitate the 
participation of smaller shipowners. The carbon cap would be certain (though perhaps not easy to 
set), but the price of emissions may not be predictable. This might deter investors and create 
unwanted uncertainty in the shipping sector and could interfere with operational planning for 
shipowners. Finally, in comparison to the GHG Fund, the ETS would be very costly and difficult 
to administer and regulate. The potential for fraud and abuse would need to be addressed. 
 
3.6.4 Expressed trade law concerns with MBMs 
 
During MEPC 62 deliberations with respect to MBMs, the delegation of India raised the question 
of possible incompatibility between proposed shipping MBMs then under discussion and WTO 
rules. 396  While noting that other delegations were of the view that proposed MBMs were 
compatible, India felt that such a conclusion was premature, given that the proposals lacked 
sufficient detail to enable such determination. Instead, India proposed that the compatibility of 
MBM proposals with international trade rules should be examined before the MEPC decided on 
the adoption of any such measures.397 Several points of contention were enumerated,398 centering 
on the GATS399 and GATT 1994.400 India reiterated its concerns at MEPC 63, but this time also 
questioning the validity of the mandatory EEDI adopted under MARPOL Annex VI in the face of 
the guiding UNFCCC principle of CBDR.401 In response, the Committee began by recalling the 
                                                 
395 David B Hunter & Nuno Lacasta, “Lessons Learned from the European Union's Climate Policy”, (2009) 27 Wis 
Int L J 575 at 583, 585-89. 
396 Possible Incompatibility between WTO Rules and a Market-based Measure for International Shipping, Submitted 
by India, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/27 (20 May 2011) [MEPC 62/5/27]. 
397 Ibid at 3; MEPC 62 Report, supra note 315, annex 8 at 2. 
398 MEPC 62/5/27, supra note 396, at 2.   
399 GATS, supra note 117. 
400 GATT 1994, supra note 115. 
401 Market Based Measures – Impact on India’s Shipping Trade, Submitted by India, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/8 (23 
December 2011); Report of MEPC on its 63rd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 (14 March 2012), annex 14 at 
2–4 and annex 17 at 1–4. 
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remarks of a WTO representative at GHG-WG 3 to the effect that the WTO could not challenge a 
global agreement facilitated by the IMO and that the WTO Rules should not be invoked as a 
mechanism for stalling progress on climate change action. Because of the contingent of delegations 
that remained concerned about a possible WTO conflict, however, the Committee agreed to 
continue the debate at MEPC 64, inviting further submissions.402 
 
A second document was put forward by India at MEPC 64, this time with Saudi Arabia as 
co-sponsor.403 The two Member States reiterated that, in their view, it was premature for the IMO 
to conclude that all proposed MBMs were theoretically implementable, in part because “most of 
the MBM proposals lack sufficient details and are not mature enough to lend support to any such 
conclusion” and also because none had been satisfactorily assessed vis-à-vis WTO Rules.404 The 
two delegations addressed four key principles of the WTO Rules that they felt had been threatened 
by one or all of the proposed MBMs. 
 
First, the concept of MFN treatment, set out in both GATT and GATS was identified as a 
potential problem, although it was admitted that negotiations on maritime transport services under 
GATS were still ongoing, and thus operation of GATS in this area had been suspended unless 
Members had specifically opted for inclusion.405 In the WTO context, MFN treatment is designed 
to counter discrimination (both de jure and de facto) by ensuring that all like products (or services 
in the case of GATS) are treated equally regardless of their nation of origin.406  
 
Another feature of GATT 1994 addressed by the two delegations was Article V, which 
applies the MFN principle to freedom of transit of goods and vessels. 407 While none of the 
proposed MBMs would affect transit of goods per se, the Indian and Saudi delegations cited this 
provision to emphasize “that the MFN treatment obligation applies to all ships and vessels with 
regard to their entry, exit or departure at ports irrespective of the origin or the flag.”408  
 
Any MBM providing for port State detention of foreign ships (namely, the GHG Fund and 
the ETS), argued India and Saudi Arabia, would amount to product discrimination and thus a 
violation of the MFN principle. Of course, this interpretation requires that ships be viewed as 
‘products’ under GATT 1994.409 Another cited MBM that might run afoul of the MFN principle 
was the Jamaican Port State Levy proposal. The reasons here are difficult to follow, but the crux 
of the reasoning seems to be that “levying a uniform emissions charge on all vessels, on a non-
discriminatory basis, would be administratively cumbersome”.410 
 
                                                 
402 MEPC 63 Report, supra note 316, at 43. 
403  Possible Incompatibility between the WTO rules and Market-Based Measures for International Shipping, 
Submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/3 (29 June 2012) [MEPC 64/5/3].  
404 Ibid at 1. 
405 Ibid at 2. 
406 Ibid at 2. The two delegations pointed to the framing MFN provisions in both GATT 1994 and GATS: GATT 1994, 
supra note 115, art I.1; GATS, supra note 117, art II.1. 
407 GATT 1994, supra note 115, art V.2. 
408 MEPC 64/5/3, supra note 403, at 3. 
409 Ibid at 4–5. 
410 Ibid at 6. 
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The two delegations also addressed a broader issue arising from the MFN principle: the 
expected increase in freight costs resulting from the adoption of any MBM. Such an increase would 
disproportionately affect the competitiveness of exports from the developing world, given that 
developing economies export a substantial share of freight with a low value to weight ratio. This 
would result in destabilization of the world markets, and could lead to “like products being treated 
in an unlike fashion”, which is prohibited under WTO Rules subject to certain exceptions. Finally, 
under any MBM, benefits would be conferred upon any nation able to modernize its shipping fleet. 
Since developing world fleets are less likely to be modernized, this too would result in 
discriminatory treatment under the MFN principle.411 
 
Second, the National Treatment obligation prohibiting discrimination of imported goods in 
favour of domestic ones, enshrined in Article III of GATT 1994,412 was addressed.413 Invoking 
unnamed WTO Appellate Body holdings, the two delegations took the position that such 
provisions are generally afforded a broad interpretation, applying to a broad range of 
discriminatory measures. As in Article I, both de jure and de facto discrimination are covered.414  
 
In addition to an alleged MFN conflict, it was argued that any MBM allowing for the 
detention of non-complying foreign vessels might also run afoul of the National Treatment 
obligation because it would have the potential effect of disadvantaging imports in favour of 
domestic goods.415 Similarly, with regard to the PSL proposal, given that domestic goods would 
not be subject to a levy of any kind, and given the broad interpretation afforded to Article III of 
GATT 1994, a levy on foreign shipping emissions imposed by Port States, India and Saudi Arabia 
have argued, might be seen as undue discrimination favouring domestic goods.416 
 
Third, the two delegations pointed to WTO provisions respecting fees and charges on 
imports and exports.417 Such provisions allow member states to impose fees and charges but 
restrain their amounts to the “approximate cost of services rendered” and explicitly prohibit 
indirect protectionism or taxation of imports for fiscal purposes.418 Given that the Jamaican PSL 
would exact a levy on incoming foreign shipping while failing to render any tangible service, the 
Indian and Saudi delegations argued that this MBM amounts to a taxation of imports for fiscal 
purposes, and thus constitutes a violation of GATT 1994, Article VIII.419 
 
Fourth, India and Saudi Arabia raised the general elimination of quantitative restrictions on 
imports and exports as a potential issue.420 The relevant provisions in GATT 1994 cover any 
quantitative prohibition or restriction “made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or 
                                                 
411 Ibid at 5. 
412 GATT 1994, supra note 115, arts III.2, III.4. See also GATS, supra note 117, art XVII, which extends similar 
protections to service sectors included in each WTO member’s individual schedule. 
413 MEPC 64/5/3, supra note 403, at 3. 
414 Ibid at 2–3. 
415 Ibid at 5. 
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417 Ibid at 4. 
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other measures”.421 Any MBM giving Port States the power to exclude non-complying vessels, 
they argued, could be taken to be in breach of the quantitative provisions of the WTO Rules, given 
that the goods carried aboard excluded vessels would be effectively prohibited from importation. 
Furthermore, the two delegations argued that the requirement for a vessel to carry proof of 
compliance with any MBM could be taken as a requirement to carry a sort of import license, which 
would violate the aforementioned provision in GATT 1994.422 
 
One final MBM characteristic worth noting is a financial penalty imposed on a ship’s 
operator as a result of non-compliance. With specific reference to the UK version of the ETS 
proposal, India and Saudi Arabia argued that “[L]evying a penalty on the ship’s operator is . . . 
equivalent to levying a penalty on the goods carried.”423 Such an interpretation would allow for an 
argument to be advanced that the imposition of penalties violates each of the four enumerated 
WTO principles. 
 
The Indian and Saudi delegations concluded by arguing that “[S]hipping is a servant of world 
trade,” and that “[T]he industry should not and must not introduce measures which would create 
complications for world trade and trigger trade disputes.” Because the participation of the 
developing world in international trade is essential to the continued generation of wealth in those 
nations, and because a continued generation of wealth is required if those nations are to take 
measures to combat global warming, the adoption of any MBM in the shipping sector would only 
prove counterproductive and exclusionary.424 
 
At MEPC 64, the Committee again decided to defer consideration of the potential WTO 
issue to the following session, at which point an impact assessment of the various MBMs would 
be available.425 At MEPC 65, the Secretary-General produced a document outlining the views of 
the WTO Secretariat on the previous session’s submission by India and Saudi Arabia.426 While the 
interpretation of WTO Rules falls within the exclusive purview of WTO members rather than that 
of its Secretariat, it was noted that the document submitted to the MEPC was of a neutral character 
and meant to “flag out what could be some of the main [WTO] disciplines to which IMO Member 
States would need to be alerted.”427 However, the WTO document stopped short of providing 
substantive guidance and assistance to further deliberations on MBMs. Perhaps in light of the 
observation with respect to the likely difficult relationship between the international trade and 
climate regimes noted earlier in this report, it can be reasonably expected that the above issues, 
and perhaps others, may again arise if the event of further consideration of an MBM for 
international shipping.  
 
The above discussion again underscores the value of coordination of the climate change 
regime and WTO rules with respect to GHG emissions. The ideal scenario and least conflict-likely 
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423 Ibid at 7. 
424 Ibid. 
425 MEPC 64 Report, supra note 322, at 38. 
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future for an MBM is one where its adoption is the product of consensus. An MBM adopted on 
the basis of consensus within the framework of an international maritime convention, or an 
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4.  POSSIBLE LESSONS FROM OTHER SECTORS 
 
4.1 International civil aviation sector 
 
Not unlike other key contributors to global GHG emissions, the aviation industry, which according 
to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was responsible for roughly 2% of global 
CO2 emissions in 2010 and various non-CO2 climate effects,428 has its own unique challenges. The 
2% figure requires explanation as international aviation accounts for 1.3% and because the bulk 
of emissions from aircraft are released at cruising altitude and their effects are amplified. Taking 
this effect into account, it has been estimated that aviation generally may actually be responsible 
for as much as 3.5% of global anthropogenic radiative forcing, a more precise measure of climactic 
effects.429 Furthermore, the steady and rapid expansion of the industry coupled with the difficulties 
of introducing technological and operational measures in aircraft to significantly increase 
operating efficiency have created unique challenges for the sector to reduce emissions in the short 
to medium-term. In other words, growth in volume in the international aviation sector will make 
it difficult for efficiency measures to stabilize and reduce GHG emissions in the foreseeable future, 
let alone achieve full decarbonisation of the sector in the long-term.430 The industry has thus so far 
taken a very modest approach to reducing its CO2 footprint by supporting an out-of-sector 
approach of carbon offsetting which enables industry operators to purchase credits from the global 
carbon market. 
 
In 2010 the ICAO adopted two aspirational goals. First, the industry committed to a 2% 
annual improvement in fuel efficiency for commercial aircraft on international flights. This was to 
be achieved via operational and technological measures. According to a report issued in 2015, 
however, the industry is lagging seriously behind with respect to this first goal. Efficiency has 
improved at approximately half the targeted annual rate.431 This is likely due in part to low fuel 
prices and the resulting lack of economic motivation for operators and manufacturers. The 38th 
Meeting of the ICAO Assembly saw the adoption of an Assembly resolution for a ‘basket of 
measures’ to facilitate the transition of the aviation sector, including: (i) aircraft technology CO2 
standards;  (ii) operational measures; (iii) promotion of fuel efficiency and alternative fuels; and 
(iv) establishment of an MBM for emissions reductions of international aviation.432 
 
                                                 
428  ICAO Environmental Report 2010, at 38, online: ICAO <https://www.icao.int/environmental-
protection/Documents/EnvironmentReport-2010/ICAO_EnvReport10-Ch1_en.pdf>. A different and more recent 
estimate reports that international marine and aviation bunkers are together responsible for 3% of global CO2 
emissions. International Energy Agency, Key CO2 Emissions Trends: Excerpt from CO2Emissions from Fuel 
Combustion (2016), at 9, online: 
<http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyCO2EmissionsTrends.pdf> [IEA 2016 Report]. 
429 “Aviation and the Global Atmosphere: Summary for Policymakers” IPCC Special Report (1999) at 6–9. 
430 See Markus Gehring & Freedom Kai-Phillips, “Intersections of the Paris Agreement and Carbon Offsetting: Legal 
and Functional Considerations” (September 2016) 88 CIGI Policy Brief at 6. Emissions increased by a factor of 95% 
between 1990 and 2014. The next two decades are expected to see yet another doubling of emissions in the sector. 
431 Anastasia Kharina & Daniel Rutherford, “Fuel Efficiency Trends for New Commercial Jet Aircraft: 1960 to 2014” 
(August 2015) White Paper, International Council on Clean Transportation. This rate of efficiency improvement puts 
the industry approximately twelve years behind its first target. 
432   ICAO, Resolution A38-18, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices related to 
Environmental Protection — Climate Change,” i-68 to i-77, online: ICAO <http://www.icao.int/environmental-
protection/Documents/A38-17_A38-18.pdf>.  
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The second goal committed the industry to offsetting emissions above 2020 levels from 2020 
onwards (‘carbon-neutral growth’). This differs from the approach to ‘carbon neutrality’ in the 
context of Airport Carbon Accreditation, which means that   “all the emissions under direct control 
of these airports have been offset, on top of the reductions that have been made”. 433 With regard 
to this second goal, it was clear in light of the challenges mentioned at the outset that carbon 
offsetting was the preferred path forward. To that end, ICAO agreed to at the 39th Meeting of the 
ICAO Assembly in fall 2016 to adopt an Assembly resolution to set in place the Carbon Offsetting 
and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), a global MBM scheme.434 Despite 
the industry’s lacklustre performance since 2010 on the technical and operational front, ICAO has 
maintained the original goal of carbon-neutral growth from 2020. 
 
As adopted, CORSIA consists of three distinct phases.  This phased approach recognizes the 
differing capabilities of Member States and also seeks to minimize market distortion. A Pilot Phase 
is set to run from 2021 to 2023 and is completely voluntary. There follows the First Phase (2024–
2026), which is also voluntary, but will automatically include any States that participated in the 
Pilot Phase. Finally, participation in the Second Phase (2027–2035) is intended to be mandatory 
for all States whose 2018 revenue tonne-kilometres (RTKs) will exceed 0.5% of the industry total. 
Further, any State whose cumulative share of RTKs falls into the top 90% in the industry should 
be included.435 The participation of LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs will be entirely voluntary. ICAO 
plans to review CORSIA every three years from 2022 onwards, thus allowing room for 
adjustments.  
 
Although participation in the pilot and first phases is voluntary, the response of Member 
States has been strong. As of 23rd August 2017, 71 nations representing 87.7% of RTKs had opted 
to participate in CORSIA starting with the Pilot Phase.436 This places State participation already 
at a level that is very close to the level mandated for the Second Phase beginning in 2027, and 
appears to bode well for the implementation of the program. It should be noted, however, that 
several States have declined to sign on to the pilot phase. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela objected to CORSIA for various reasons, including their view that 
the measure will not further carbon neutral growth from 2020 and that its implementation will 
disproportionately burden developing countries.437 It will be recalled that some of the developing 
States in this group have taken similar positions at the IMO. 
 
CORSIA has been designed to distort the market as little as possible. To this end, ICAO has 
opted for a route-based approach, which should ensure that all operators are treated in the same 
                                                 
433  See page 4 of the 2016-17 Annual Report, at http://www.airportcarbonaccreditation.org/library/annual-
reports.html. 
434 Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices related to Environmental Protection – Global 
Market-based Measure (MBM) Scheme, ICAO Res A39-3 (October 2016). 
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way on the same route. Only flights between two participating CORSIA States are covered by 
offsetting requirements. Operators are tasked with estimating their annual CO2 emissions (based 
on fuel consumption) on such routes, and reporting them to their respective national authorities.  
 
Every year, ICAO intends to calculate the sectoral growth factor on CORSIA, which it will 
multiply by each operator’s applicable emissions to calculate required offsets. Using overall 
sectoral growth as the key metric was seen as preferable, as it is expected to be more stable than 
that of individual operators, whose fortunes are far more diversified. From 2030 onward, however, 
the emissions growth of individual operators will be taken into account in calculating offsets.438 
By 2033, each operator will be responsible for offsets on a 70/30 basis, where a minimum of 70% 
of its offset will be calculated using its own growth from 2020, and a maximum of 30% of the 
offset will be based on sectoral growth from 2020. This model is particularly beneficial to 
established operators, and harder on new operators and others who expect to see a rapid rate of 
growth in the period before 2030. It reasonably assumes that fourteen years’ warning is sufficient 
for operators that might expect growth higher than the overall industry rate after 2030. 
 
In early 2017, ICAO announced the adoption of an additional emissions reduction measure 
to supplement CORSIA. This measure took the form of an amendment to Annex 16 of the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation.439 The standards vary depending on aircraft size and 
type, and will apply to all new aircraft as of 2020. By 2023, all in-production aircraft in production 
will be expected to conform to the standards, lest they be forced out of production by 2028.  
 
With all this in mind, a pressing question emerges: what can the shipping sector learn from 
the approach taken by ICAO? It is difficult to project the success or failure of a regulatory 
mechanism for international aviation that does not enter its pilot phase until 2021, making it 
difficult to draw lessons for the international shipping industry. At first blush there appears to be 
some similarity in the measures considered in the two industries. International aviation embraced 
a technical measure as well as an MBM, and international shipping has to date used technical and 
operational measures and may yet consider an MBM.  
 
However, there are significant differences between the two industries, potentially limiting 
the utility of the experience of international aviation industry, most notably with respect to the 
issues of nationality (ease of reflagging), jurisdiction and port State control.   The conventional 
wisdom is that shipping has an advantage over aviation in that technical and operational measures 
are more easily adopted in the shipping sector. The practice of slow steaming alone can reduce 
bunker consumption by up to 59%. 440  There are obvious logistical pitfalls inherent in slow 
steaming practices, and the current low cost of fuel makes it far less attractive than it once was, 
but it would appear that commercial aviation has no operational emissions reduction option that 
comes close. Furthermore, at this time shipping enjoys a wide variety of fuel options, many of 
which produce far lower GHG emissions than the traditional bunker ‘C’.  Fuel switching may be 
more difficult to implement for aviation. Thus operational and technical measures appear to be 
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more readily available to the international shipping industry than they are to the international civil 
aviation industry.  As a consequence, the manner in which ICAO and IMO have engaged the GHG 
discourse is different. ICAO has been more willing to consider exemptions for operators from 
LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs, which would be a real issue for international shipping where reflagging 
is an option.  Hence the NMFT principle in the IMO has guided discussions to date on technical, 
operational and market measures.  
 
Given that CORSIA is still a number of years away from full implementation, it is not possible to 
assess its effectiveness with any certainty. Many of its critics, however, have pointed out that there 
is little incentive to reduce emissions in the short term, and that offsetting carbon emissions from 
commercial aviation is a way of externalising costs and therefore merely a license for operators to 
continue polluting.441 The fear is that offsetting is an unreliable non-solution that ignores the 
underlying problem (i.e., the need for all sectors to substantially reduce emissions and set on a path 
towards decarbonisation) and encourages technological and operational stagnation while 
emissions continue to rise within the sector. MBM proposals in the shipping sector that rely heavily 
on offsets have been similarly criticized. Obviously, no matter what sector embraces an offsetting 
scheme, it is essential to ensure the legitimacy and carbon value equivalency of the projects 
receiving funding. As far as technological and operational stagnation is concerned, CORSIA could 
well run into difficulty given its early focus on sectoral rather than individual growth. Not until 
operators begin to be assessed by their own emissions growth or reductions in 2030 will there be 
a genuine incentive to make individual reductions via technological or operational means. 
Arguably, however, the recent amendments to the Chicago Convention should be expected to pick 
up some of the slack left by the first decade of CORSIA. It is difficult to see how the emissions 
path expected from full implementation of the CORSIA would be in line with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement unless there are convincing reasons why the sectors fair share is considerably less than 
the global average emission reductions needed to meet goals of the Paris Agreement. 
 
4.2 Domestic transportation sector 
 
Domestic, land-based transportation has been a particularly challenging sector for jurisdictions 
around the world. GHG emissions in this sector have continued to rise, while other sectors, such 
as the electricity sector discussed below, have been able to achieve significant emission reductions.  
The domestic transportation sector has been particularly challenging for a number of reasons.442 
 
The challenges and potential solutions for domestic transportation are quite diverse.  The 
challenges are different for freight than for personal transportation.  There are important 
differences between urban and rural areas.  Potential solutions will be different for each of these 
transportation sectors and contexts.  They will furthermore depend on regional differences in 
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“Willingness to Pay for Electric Vehicles and their Attributes” (2011) 33:1 Resource & Energy Economics 686 
[Hidrue et al]; Noel Smith, Donald Hirsch & Abigail Davis, “Accessibility and Capability: The Minimum Transport 
Needs and Costs of Rural Households” (2012) 21:1 J Transport Geography 93 [Smith, Hirsch & Davis]; Wolfgang 
Gruel & Frank Piller, “A New Vision for Personal Transportation” (2016) 57:2 MIT Sloan Management Rev 20 [Gruel 
& Piller]. 
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population density, distances between and size of urban centers, existing infrastructure, availability 
of alternatives, and willingness to invest in alternatives, among other factors.443   
 
Personal transportation offers a good illustration of the challenge of selecting appropriate 
long-term solutions for decarbonization in at least three different categories, within urban centers, 
between urban centers, and in rural areas.  Within urban centers, public transit and active 
transportation offer the most sustainable alternatives to the predominance of gasoline-powered 
cars.  Both active and public transportation, however, require significant investment of 
infrastructure, further technological innovation and depend on acceptance by the population.444  At 
the same time, a number of technologies, over the past decade or so, have offered potential 
solutions that might not require the same level of investment in public transit or active 
transportation infrastructure, and would not require the same level of behaviour change, but would 
also be less optimal from a sustainability perspective.  They all focus on reducing emissions from 
private vehicles rather than shifting from private vehicles to other modes of transportation.  
Options pursued have ranged from ethanol and fuel cell vehicles to hybrid and electric vehicles.445   
 
To date, there has not been a clear winner among the technologies to reduce emissions from 
private vehicles, with each potential alternative offering its own advantages and challenges.  
Ethanol vehicles would require the least change in infrastructure or behavior, but there are serious 
questions about the environmental and GHG emissions implications of this option.  Fuel cell 
vehicles would require significant new infrastructure, and have been plagued with delays in the 
development of the technology, but would offer the end user a product similar to their current 
expectations, so would be likely to find broad acceptance.446  Hybrid vehicles are perhaps most 
similar to traditional gasoline vehicles, but do not offer a complete solution.  Finally, electric 
vehicles hold much promise, but concerns over range, availability of charging stations and cost 
remain, and their sustainability depends in large part on the ability to generate electricity 
sustainably, which may differ from region to region.447   
 
Partly as a result of this uncertainty within the private vehicle sector, the relationship 
between private vehicles and public and active transportation in urban centers also remains 
uncertain.  Hesitancy to make infrastructure and technology investment in public and active 
transportation contributes to the uncertainty.  Solutions will vary between jurisdictions, and will 
depend on further technological and economic breakthroughs, which in turn will depend on 
regulatory and other measures taken by national and subnational governments in the respective 
jurisdiction.   
 
                                                 
443 See, for example, Yan Song, Yanping Chen & Xiaohong Pan, “Polycentric Spatial Structure and Travel Mode 
Choice: The Case of Shenzhen, China” (2012) 4:4 Regional Science Policy & Practice 479 [Song, Chen & Pan]. 
444  Maria Vittoria Corazza et al, “A European Vision for More Environmentally Friendly Buses” (2016) 45:4 
Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 48. 
445 Commentators who do not consider the environmental consequences of these choices tend to be inclined to 
advocate for a mix of public, active, and private transportation, see Gruel & Piller, supra note 442.  The challenge 
from a GHG emissions or sustainability perspective is how to influence the path currently dominated by market forces 
and individual preferences. 
446 Thanh Hua et al, “Status of Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Buses Worldwide” (2014) 269:1 J Power Sources 975 at 
980. 
447 Hidrue et al, supra note 442. 
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Personal transportation solutions between urban centers would seem to involve a choice 
between zero emissions personal vehicles, rail, bus services, or air transport.  Electric vehicles 
currently face concerns over range constraints and charging stations.  Rail infrastructure is 
expensive, making it a high-risk choice unless it is clear that it will be the mode of choice and has 
the population density and support to warrant the investment.  Bus service tends to be more 
compatible with existing infrastructure in many parts of the world, but faces acceptance challenges, 
and would still require technological advances to become truly sustainable.  Air transport seems 
the most difficult to transition to sustainability, but is quickly becoming the mode of choice for 
travel between urban centers in many parts of the world. 
 
For personal transportation in rural areas and from rural areas to urban centers, low 
population density and long distances create unique challenges that often eliminate the otherwise 
most promising options, such as active transportation, public transit and often even rail and air.  
This makes personal vehicles the most likely choice for personal transportation in rural areas.448   
 
The result is a situation where there is no one mode of transportation that is the clear choice 
in solving the personal transportation challenge in all categories or subsectors.  Which mode (or 
combination of modes) offers the best hope of moving personal transportation to GHG emission 
neutrality and sustainability will depend on local or regional conditions, on existing infrastructure, 
on personal choices and preferences of the population, and on the willingness of the public and 
private sector to invest in the infrastructure and research and development needed to facilitate the 
transition.  The multitude of options and circumstances make it less likely that private or public 
actors will make the investments needed to facilitate the transition.449 
 
Questions about the role of self-driving vehicles, car-sharing and ‘Uber-like’ services have 
started to raise some doubts about the future dominance of public transportation in urban centers. 
Until recently, it seemed clear that public and active transportation would be essential for low 
GHG emission transportation in urban centers.  There is no doubt both still have an important role 
to play, but it seems more likely with the possible emergence of self-driving electric vehicles that 
they will continue to compete with cars in many urban centers.  Some cities are clearly committed 
to a combination of public transit and active transportation as the solution to congestion and 
pollution, but many others are still primarily designed for road transportation, resulting in difficult 
choices ahead as self-driving electric vehicles, car sharing, and Uber-like services start to dominate 
road transportation.450   
 
There are similar challenges with respect to sustainable transportation between urban 
centers. Does the answer lie in high-speed trains, or can short distance flights become a sustainable 
option? Is the electric car a viable solution with improvements in technology and more sustainable 
sources of electricity? Will electric busses gain the acceptance needed to become an important part 
of the solution?451 
 
                                                 
448 Smith, Hirsch & Davis, supra note 442. 
449 Gruel & Piller, supra note 442. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Song, Chen & Pan, supra note 443. 
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All this matters because some of the most promising options require significant investment 
in infrastructure, in the form of charging stations for electric cars, or in the form of rail 
infrastructure. All require further research and development (R & D) to become truly sustainable, 
but also critical choices about the combination of options that offer the best solutions in each 
context. One of the most challenging questions is when to make the decision which path to 
sustainable transportation to take, and whether this is a decision for governments or for the private 
sector. Until that choice is made, there will be a tendency to continue with the status quo, which 
means minimal emission reductions in the transportation sector. Until there is an investment in the 
infrastructure to offer viable and attractive alternatives, efforts to reduce emissions from 
transportation from vehicles running on combustion engines will likely only yield modest results, 
based on marginal changes in behavior and improved fuel efficiency of combustion engines. 
Making the choice too late delays significant emission reductions in the sector, making the choice 
too early, in turn, risks committing to an alternative that turns out to be sub optimal financially and 
environmentally. Market mechanisms alone will not be sufficient in driving the transition to 
alternatives that require significant infrastructure investment. What is required is either a public 
investment in the infrastructure necessary to make the alternative viable and attractive, or a clear 
and sufficient commitment to the alternative to motivate private investment.452 
 
What lessons does the experience in transportation offer for the challenge of regulating GHG 
emissions from ships and the ultimate decarbonisation of the transportation sector?   It seems clear 
from the experience so far that economic incentives, such as subsidies for electric vehicles or 
public transit only get you so far.  Other key elements include clear signals about the mix of modes 
that are considered to be part of the solution in a particular jurisdiction, investment in 
infrastructure, and incentives for the investment in research and development to improve the 
sustainability performance of key elements of the solution.  The transportation sector illustrates 
the need to find effective ways to encourage research, development, deployment and 
commercialization of technologies that offer meaningful solutions in line with what is needed. 
More generally, transportation may offer lessons on the effectiveness and limitations of MBMs or 
economic instruments more generally.  The experience suggests that economic incentives are 
essential, but that a detailed understanding of the sector is required to be able to assess what can 
and what cannot be achieved with economic instruments, and what complementary measures are 
needed.   
 
Efforts to deal with transportation on a voluntary basis suggest limited effectiveness of 
bottom-up approaches, voluntary measures, or aspirational goals. For example, voluntary efforts 
to encourage improved fuel efficiency of vehicles have largely failed, both at the manufacturing 
level and at the consumer level.453  It is important to be realistic that unless there is a clear 
economic motivation to influence human behaviour, there is little reason to expect voluntary 
measures to work, especially when dealing with corporate actors concerned about short-term 
                                                 
452 There has been considerable discussion in the literature on effective mechanisms to facilitate the development and 
deployment of technologies to achieve environmental and sustainability goals. See, for example, Miranda Schreurs, 
“Breaking the Impasse in the International Climate Negotiations: The Potential of Green Technologies” (2012) 48 
Energy Policy 5 [Schreurs]; David Ockwell & Alexandra Mallett, eds, Low-Carbon Technology Transfer: From 
Rhetoric to Reality (Routledge, 2012); Abbe E L Brown, ed, Environmental Technologies, Intellectual Property and 
Climate Change (Edward Elgar, 2013). 
453 Martin Olszynski et al, “From Smokes to Smokestack: Lessons from Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change 
Liability” Georgetown Env L R (forthcoming). 
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economic returns on investments. Voluntary measures, however, can work in combination with 
economic incentives and binding measures if carefully designed.454 
 
Finally, the transportation sector illustrates the challenge of regulating the transition to GHG 
neutrality when there are multiple possible paths, and where the number of possible paths and their 
relative merits may change over time.  In such circumstances, governments face difficult choices.  
They can rely on market mechanisms to avoid having to choose among the multiple paths, but risk 
private actors reacting to the economic incentive by choosing a sub-optimal path.  The alternative 
is for government to choose among the possible paths, and risk making the choice too early with 
government itself choosing a sub-optimal path.  A mix of tools based on a detailed understanding 
of the current conditions in the sector, the local circumstances and processes that are able to 
identify and adjust to changing circumstances appear to be key ingredients of success. 
 
4.3 Electricity sector 
 
In contrast to the transportation sector, the electricity sector has been among the more successful 
sectors in reducing GHG emissions in many jurisdictions around the world.  This is in part because 
there are both new and well-established low GHG emission sources of electricity that have made 
significant technological and cost breakthroughs over the past two decades, due in large part to 
aggressive policies in European and other countries that have spurred investment in research and 
commercialization.455  Wind and solar energy in particular, along with conservation and efficiency 
programs, have contributed to significant emission reductions in the electricity sector in 
jurisdictions in Europe, Asia and North America.456   
 
The transition has not been without its challenges, and in spite of all the progress to date, the 
path to full decarbonization is far from clear.  The fundamental challenge is that existing electricity 
systems are designed to meet demand rather than to effectively manage demand to meet the supply 
of less dispatchable power sources and their design is based on centralized production of 
electricity.  Fossil fuel based production tends to be more dispatchable than wind, solar, tidal, wave 
and other low GHG emitting sources.  In developed countries, significant capital investments have 
already been made in fossil fuel-based production and in transmission and distribution based on 
centralized production.  This means that even where low GHG-emitting alternatives are 
competitive, a switch to alternatives may require significant infrastructure investment and may 
leave stranded significant assets, such as fossil fuel-based electricity generation systems.457 
 
As is the case with transportation, there are challenges in identifying the most suitable 
pathway to GHG neutrality.  The state of electricity infrastructure will vary from jurisdiction to 
                                                 
454 See, for example, Daniel J Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation (MIT Press, 2006); David M Driesen, The 
Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law (MIT Press, 2003). 
455 Schreurs, supra note 452. 
456 See, e.g., Atle Midttun, “The Greening of European Electricity Industry: A Battle of Modernities” (2012) 48 Energy 
Policy 22; Thilo Grau, Molin Huo & Karsten Neulhoff, “Survey of Photovoltaic Industry and Policy in Germany and 
China” (2012) 51 Energy Policy 20; Uwe Büsgen & Wolfhart Dürrschmidt, “The Expansion of Electricity Generation 
from Renewable Energies in Germany: A Review Based on the Renewable Energy Sources Act Progress Report 2007 
and the New German Feed-in Legislation” (2009) 37:7 Energy Policy 2536. 
457 Melissa Harris, Marisa Beck & Ivetta Gerasimchuk, The End of Coal: Ontario’s coal phase-out (International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015) [Harris, Beck & Gerasimchuk]. 
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jurisdiction, as does the mix of potential sources of electricity.  Population density, climate 
conditions, and differences in electricity demand for heating, cooling and industrial use further 
complicate matters. The potential to store energy in a manner that is easy to access when electricity 
demand exceeds production from low emitting sources is also quite variable from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.   
 
All this adds up to a complex picture, particularly once the penetration of wind and solar 
threatens the ability of current electricity systems to meet electricity demand.  Some jurisdictions 
may find an energy mix that allows them to integrate enough solar and wind to complete the 
transition away from fossil fuels without fundamental changes to their electricity systems.  
Jurisdictions with access to dispatchable hydropower may be able to phase out fossil fuels in this 
manner.   
 
For most, attention to the energy mix will not be enough.  This leaves them with three basic 
choices.   They can invest in better interconnection with other jurisdictions to balance supply and 
demand.  Alternatively, they can shift from a focus on meeting demand to managing demand to 
match the supply of electricity, using some combination of smart grid technology and storage.  
Finally, they can try to implement a combination of these basic approaches to managing supply 
from renewable sources.  As is the case with transportation, the uncertainty around the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of these choices has slowed down progress.  For example, 
jurisdictions may be reluctant to invest in transmission infrastructure to improve the ability to 
integrate wind and solar into their electricity system over concerns that the infrastructure may 
become a stranded asset as smart grid and storage technologies continue to develop and drop in 
price.  Uncertainty surrounding the respective roles of the various levels of government and private 
sector in deciding on the appropriate path and investing in making it work, further adds to the 
complexity in many jurisdictions.458  
 
A key lesson from electricity is that governments struggle to take measures to internalize the 
cost of GHG emissions from traditional sources of electricity (i.e., coal, oil) because access to 
electricity is considered an essential service, so that governments tend to be sensitive to increases 
in electricity prices.  The end result is that electricity generally continues to be subsidized in 
various ways, making it harder for conservation, efficiency and renewable energy initiatives to 
compete. While there are those who would be unduly harmed by increased electricity prices, most 
citizens in developed countries can afford higher electricity prices, and would take measures to 
conserve electricity if the price more accurately reflected the true cost of generating and providing 
it.  So far, the predominant response to this dilemma in developed countries has been to resist 
increases in electricity prices, rather than allow prices to increase to encourage conservation and 
efficiency, and implement measures to ensure those unable to pay the increased cost of electricity 
are treated fairly.459     
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As stated at the outset, advances in technology have been critical to the progress in reducing 
GHG emissions in the electricity sector. Effective regulation of the sector in turn has been critical 
in ensuring the investment in R & D and in the scaling up of key technologies.  Initial leadership 
came from Germany and other European countries.460  More recently, other countries, such as 
China and the US encouraged growth and advancements in these sectors through a combination of 
subsidies and regulations.  Similar efforts are now underway in other key countries, such as 
India.461 Ultimately, and looking back, the leadership of developed countries with the capacity to 
support the emergence of these new industries was key.  Developing countries were then able to 
follow suit, once the price of solar and wind had come down enough to make investment feasible.  
The end result is the penetration of new technologies and new industries in both developed and 
developing countries.462  Of course, all this has not happened without friction.  There have been a 
number of trade disputes over the implementation of measures to encourage renewable energy, 
including WTO challenges of feed-in tariffs and local manufacturing rules in Ontario, and solar 
policies in India and China.463 
 
Another lesson from the electricity sector is that regulatory and economic instruments, such 
as cap and trade systems, carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards, were 
significant contributors to progress, though their relative contribution can be debated.  
Concurrently, more directed measures were often necessary to ensure sustained progress.464  For 
example, the phasing out of coal, where it has happened, has not been achieved through the use of 
economic instruments, but rather through top down regulation requiring the closure of coal 
plants.465  Similarly, investment in R & D and infrastructure has generally been necessary as a 
complement to economic instruments and renewable targets to sustain efforts to transition to GHG 
neutrality.  
 
The experience of the electricity sector suggests that economic incentives are important tools 
in the toolbox, but a detailed understanding of the sector is required to be able to assess what can 
and what cannot be achieved with economic instruments, and what other tools and efforts are 
needed for an effective, efficient and fair transition.  For example, experience has shown that 
                                                 
460 See, for example, Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, Sustainable Energy Policies for Europe: Towards 100% Renewable 
Energy (CRC Press, 2013); Allan Mazur, Energy and Electricity in Industrial Nations: The Sociology and Technology 
of Energy (Routledge, 2013). 
461 For an overview of progress in key developing countries over the past 20 years, see Patrick Bayer, Lindsay Dolan 
& Johannes Urpelainen, “Global Patterns of Renewable Energy Innovation, 1990-2009” (2013) 17:3 Energy for 
Sustainable Development 288. 
462 Zachary D Liscow & Quentin C Karpilow, “Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law” (4 May 2017), Yale Law 
& Economics Research Paper No 571, online: SSRN<ssrn.com/abstract=2927441>. 
463 See, for example, Llewelyn Hughes & Jonas Meckling, “The Politics of Renewable Energy Trade: The US-China 
solar dispute” (2017) 105 Energy Policy 256.  As we have suggested elsewhere in this report, ideally, IMO and WTO 
measures would be mutually supportive in the global effort to encourage fair trade while facilitating the full 
decarbonization of the global economy in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.  A more modest goal would be 
to avoid conflict between the response developed by the IMO and existing WTO rules discussed above.  
464 David M Driesen, “Emissions Trading Versus Pollution Taxes: Playing ‘Nice’ With Other Instruments” (2017) 
Environmental Law [forthcoming]; Nicholas Rivers & Mark Jaccard, “Intensity-Based Climate Change Policies in 
Canada” (2010) 36:4 Can Pub Policy 409 at 411–413; Harris, Beck & Gerasimchuk, supra note 457; David Houle, 
Carbon Pricing in Canadian Provinces: from Early Experiments to Adoption (1995-2014) (PhD Thesis, University 
of Toronto, 2015) at 25, 33. 
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economic incentives alone are unlikely to result in the closure of existing coal plants, or in 
encouraging investment in expensive infrastructure. 
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5.  DETERMINATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING INDUSTRY’S ‘FAIR 
SHARE’ AND POTENTIAL LEGAL PATHWAYS 
 
5.1 The challenge of uncertainty 
 
International maritime regulation has always had to deal with complex issues and relationships 
accompanied by degrees of uncertainty. The regulatory issues have tended to constitute a complex 
mix of commercial, technological and political drivers. The public and private actors in 
international marine transportation have been guided by national interests, commercial 
underpinnings and community concerns. Often, the issues have cut across various international 
regimes, not just the IMO conventions. The vital importance and dynamic nature of these factors 
have produced complex multi-level relationships. The IMO has acted as a funnel of these interests 
in its efforts to develop comprehensive and viable regimes based on regulatory compromise and 
solutions to problems. The IMO itself has undergone institutional evolution to enable it to equip 
itself and adapt to new challenges.  
 
It is likely that never before has the IMO had to consider such a long-term timeline, 
complexity and urgency in the development of regulatory strategy for a particular issue area. The 
Organization’s experience in the long process of understanding GHG emissions from international 
shipping and exploring a path to the determination of the industry’s fair share to GHG emissions 
reduction can be described as a steep learning curve. While it is true that the regulation of air and 
other sources of vessel-source pollution has been a labour of decades, GHG regulation constitutes 
a much more complex mix of dynamic factors and related uncertainties over a much longer time 
frame, indeed spanning across the 21st century. The longer the timeline, the greater the complexity 
of interacting variables and relationships discussed in this paper, the likelihood of less capacity to 
forecast the full economic repercussions, and the consequent heightened uncertainty. As MEPC 
deliberations have amply demonstrated, there is genuine concern that GHG maritime regulation 
may produce uncertain or unexpected direct and indirect impacts, as illustrated in the course of 
discussions on MBMs with respect to impacts on trade and developing countries. Maritime 
regulation in response to climate change can be expected to be shadowed not only by ‘knowns’ 
and ‘known unknowns’, but also by ‘unknown unknowns’. The ‘knowns’ have enabled the IMO 
to adopt important evidence-based amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Chapter 4). The ‘known 
unknowns’ have led to the establishment of the fuel database to build understanding on fuel use 
and energy efficiency for further regulation. The ‘unknown unknowns’ are off the radar screen and 
demand a flexible and adaptive approach with periodic review. 
 
Against this backdrop, the pursuit of maritime regulation requires the Organization (through 
its Member States) to position itself to be ambitious, nimble, manage uncertainty, learn, review 
and respond to or further anticipate changing variables and potentially varying outcomes. Such an 
exercise calls for a complex multi-disciplinary strategy that will provide directions for the 
Organization, its membership and international maritime community to adapt to a new energy and 
consequently novel business environment in search of constant innovation. To do so, the 
Organization will need to conduct its work not only by employing the traditional approach in 
developing technical and operational rules and standards, for which it has a well-established and 
largely successful record. It will need to adopt an ambitious, integrated, systemic and reviewable 
approach to GHG regulation as a long-term learning process, punctuated by periodic review to 
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stocktake (and be part of the global GHG stocktake) and benefit from feedback loops by adjusting 
its ambitions and approach as appropriate. It will need to work within its own treaty regimes as 
well as interact with other international regimes. It will need to use its experience in pursuing 
inclusive processes to produce largely consensus-based and ambitious mandatory rules and 
standards, voluntary standards and recommended practices, in concert with efforts in combating 
climate change under other regimes. Non-maritime regime rules may at times facilitate and at other 
times constrain what the IMO is able to do, hence the importance of a systemic, integrated 
approach to a complex global problem.  
 
The actions needed cut across diverse economic sectors at national, regional and global 
levels and engage regulatory bodies at all those levels, within the respective sector and at times in 
relationship to other sectors and overseeing regulatory bodies. A challenge for the IMO will be to 
define appropriate roles for Member States and for private industry actors in achieving emission 
reductions in the international shipping sector. In the process of transition, it needs to maintain a 
level playing field while sending a clear message to national maritime administrations and the 
shipping industry.  
 
In an emission reduction strategy that is narrowly focused on the shipping sector, it might be 
somewhat easier than in a global climate regime to anticipate links between commitments of States 
and the expected behaviour of industry actors in the shipping sector.  Some of these industry actors 
will be public, but most will be private.  While the actors responsible for meeting emission 
reduction commitments will be predominantly private industry actors, changes within the shipping 
sector will have broader economic consequences, including consequences for the development of 
economically vulnerable States. The international shipping industry will need to work with the 
IMO in lock-step, not only because the IMO is the regulatory body, but also as a matter of corporate 
social responsibility and joining ranks with other non-maritime sectors in the collective response 
to climate change. 
 
5.2 Towards a vision and timeline  
 
5.2.1 The quest for the vision 
 
The action required of the global community to respond to climate change is guided by the long-
term temperature goal adopted in the Paris Agreement.466 The Agreement commits State Parties 
to “strive to formulate . . . long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies” and to 
communicate these to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC.467 The long-term vision entails a range of 
long-term actions, such as the technology development and transfer framework and mechanism.468  
 
At the time of writing, the IMO is working on implementing a roadmap and developing a 
strategy, but has not yet adopted an express vision or goal for the international shipping industry’s 
strategy to respond to climate change. The question what should be the goal of the future IMO 
strategy was raised from time to time at MEPC meetings, but a collective vision has not yet 
                                                 
466 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 2(1). 
467 Ibid, art 4(19). 
468 “Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order 
to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” Ibid art 10(1). 
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emerged. Given the IMO’s commitment to developing the international shipping industry’s fair 
contribution to the global response to climate change as defined in the Paris Agreement, the 
industry’s emission reduction should be a meaningful response to the “global response” in the 
Paris Agreement.469 The road towards producing the industry’s fair share should be principled and 
designed to meet this global goal.  This will require substantial commitment, not only to reducing 
emissions significantly in the short and medium-term, even as global trade may continue to grow, 
but also to pursue R & D and employ technologies that will place the industry on the path to 
eventual complete decarbonisation.  
 
The Paris Agreement’s approach to setting targets, the relationship between collective and 
individual targets, and the process for reviewing progress and ensuring compliance all offer 
potential guidance for the IMO as it seeks to move forward with an effective approach to achieving 
adequate emission reductions in the international shipping sector.470  At the same time, there are 
important differences between the UN climate regime and the IMO that have to be considered 
when drawing lessons from the Paris Agreement.    The Paris Agreement is an agreement between 
States and it creates obligations for States for GHG emission reductions across the economy of 
party States.  The IMO strategy will focus on one sector, shipping, and it will target, much more 
directly than the Paris Agreement, the key industry actors involved in the sector.  Careful thought 
will have to be given to the applicability of lessons from Paris in light of these key differences.  
 
5.2.2 Development of the long-term goal 
 
There is broad support for the proposition that the international shipping sector should make a fair 
contribution to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.  Ultimately, and as described earlier, 
this means making a fair contribution to the following goal set out in Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris 
Agreement: “… holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2° C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C above pre-
industrial levels…”.471 There are a number of challenges for the IMO Member States to turn the 
global goals in the Paris Agreement into a concrete emission reduction target for international 
shipping: 
 
x The IMO will have to resolve whether to use 1.5o C or some other global average 
temperature goal “well below 2 degrees” as the starting point for its analysis. 
x Current analysis, including analysis by the IPCC, is focused on 2o C and therefore does not 
accurately determine the global effort needed to meet the Article 2 goal. The IPCCs work 
on 1.5o C is scheduled to be completed in 2018. 
x Other key elements of the long-term goal in the Paris Agreement, such as the goal to 
achieve a balance of emissions and anthropogenic removals in the second half of the 
century were inevitably based on the IPCC’s analysis on 2o C and will require updating 
once the IPCC concludes its analysis on 1.5o C. 
x A determination will have to be made whether international shipping’s fair contribution 
would be similar to the average reductions needed globally, whether there are reasons to 
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expect the sector to reduce emissions more rapidly, or whether there are reasons to allow 
the sector more time to reduce emissions. 
x The elements that would go into such an analysis have not been agreed upon either within 
the UN climate regime or the IMO, and some likely elements, such as the effort needed, 
the technology options available or expected to be developed, and the costs involved in the 
shipping sector compared to other sectors are currently not all equally well understood. 
The success of States in implementing and improving their NDCs over time may also 
impact on what can be reasonably expected from the international shipping sector. 
x There is significant uncertainty about some of the assumptions underlying the IPCC’s 2o C 
scenario analysis, most notably with respect to the role of future negative emissions in 
keeping temperatures within 2o C.  The same is expected to be the case with the IPCC’s 
pending analysis for 1.5o C, as these uncertainties are not likely to be resolved for some 
time.  This does not mean the IPCC analysis should not form the basis for setting a long-
term goal for the shipping sector, but it does suggest that adjustments may have to be made 
as the IPCC refines and revises its analysis over time.  In other words, any long-term goal 
set by the IMO in the 2018-2023 period while developing the long-term strategy will likely 
have to be adjusted as circumstances warrant.   
 
A potential approach to a long-term goal for international shipping would be to use the 
average global effort as confirmed or clarified by the 1.5o C IPCC analysis to be completed in 2018 
(preferably in terms of emission reductions from current levels or the 2008 peak year) as a starting 
point for the emission reduction efforts of the sector, and to revise it as circumstances warrant. It 
would be important to be clear up-front about the factors that would warrant adjustments to the 
long-term goal, and the process involved. Having set the process for adjustments, the sector would 
then be ready to adopt, as its initial long-term goal, the timeframe identified by the IPCC within 
which global emissions need to equal emission removal, also referred to as the GHG neutrality 
date. For a 1.5o C target, the global GHG neutrality date can be expected to be sometime before 
2050. GHG neutrality, in the context of the Paris Agreement, means net zero emissions. The 
maritime sector would have to decide whether it will focus on the shipping sector in isolation 
(referred to above as an ‘in-sector focus’) and turn the neutrality goal into a decarbonisation goal 
for international shipping, or whether it wants to work collaboratively with other sectors and 
integrate its efforts into the global GHG neutrality goal (referred to above as an ‘out-of-sector 
focus’). Other key elements of a long-term goal for the shipping sector include the rate of reduction 
from peak emissions to full decarbonisation or emission neutrality.  These elements of the initial 
long-term goal could all be based on the IPCC’s analysis, including in particular the 1.5o C scenario 
analysis expected in 2018.  This does, however, raise timing challenges in light of the IMO’s 
timeline for developing its initial strategy.   
 
This ‘approximation’ or initial long-term goals for the shipping industry could then be 
regularly reviewed and updated as agreement is reached on the elements to be considered and as 
more detailed information is available on the chosen elements. Adjustments to the long-term goal 
could be made over time, based on clearly established factors.  Such factors could include changes 
to the way parties to the Paris Agreement approach and define the long-term goal in Article 2, 
changes to the IPCC’s understanding of the potential contribution of negative emissions, and actual 
global progress toward the Paris Article 2 goal.   
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5.2.3 Development of the approach to meeting the goal 
 
Having set out the long-term goal and a process for updating and revising it, the IMO would then 
be in a position to work back from the long-term goal and develop steps toward meeting the 
ultimate goal.  We see two sets of short-term goals and steps in this process, the 2018 initial 
strategy and agreement on the 2023 revised strategy.  We see 2030 as a suitable medium-term 
target, perhaps depending on whether the long-term GHG neutrality goal is closer to 2040 or 2050, 
something that should be better understood once the IPCC releases its 1.5o C scenario analysis in 
2018.   
 
The key elements we see for the 2018 initial strategy are the following: 
 
x A commitment to a clear and fair long-term goal and a credible and transparent process for 
reviewing and updating it. 
x Medium-term goals that offer a credible trajectory toward the long-term goal. 
x A credible and transparent process for reviewing progress toward the long-term and 
medium-term goals, and a commitment and effective processes to implement and adjust 
regulated technical and operational measures necessary to meet the long-term goal. This 
should include commitments and effective processes to regularly review and update 
technical and operational measures to ensure best practices to maximize efficiency at all 
times. 
x Specific binding measures to aggressively promote R & D and to implement and 
continuously improve best available technologies and operational practices to reduce 
emissions in the short and medium-term, with an initial focus on operational measures that 
are ready for immediate implementation. Continuous attention to hull design, propulsion 
systems and fuels will be essential during all phases. 
x Gradual ratcheting of technical and operational measures, particularly through the EEDI 
and fuel measures, but also other measures supported by new technological developments. 
x It is conceivable that with technological development, technical (ship design, propulsion 
technology, etc.), operational and fuel measures could be sufficient in setting international 
shipping on the path to decarbonisation. However, it is too early to dispense with the 
possible need of an MBM. As concluded by the IMO’s Second GHG Study, 472  a 
commitment to adopt an effective MBM as part of the revised strategy in 2023, with a 
commitment to design and implement the mechanism to achieve the long-term and 
medium-term goals, and review its performance periodically remains advisable. 
x A process of review and adjustment of the strategy and its implementation that is 
effectively synchronized with the Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement, so that 
information about progress in this sector can feed into the five-year review cycles under 
Articles 13–15 of the Paris Agreement. 
x Confirmation of 2008 as the appropriate peak year for emissions from the sector. 
 
The approach should recognize that efficiency gains through improved ship design and 
operation have multiple benefits in the short, medium, and long-term, especially if the regulations 
have a built-in mechanism for continuous improvement.  In the short-term, they demonstrate that 
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the sector is taking the issue seriously, and they will be critical to meeting the short-term goals of 
the strategy, such as the goal of 2008 remaining the peak year for emissions from the sector. They 
also help make the medium and long-term goals less daunting and less challenging from a technical 
perspective.  The more the energy consumption of ships can be reduced, the more likely it is that 
solutions using alternative fuels such as electricity, hydrogen fuel cells or biofuels can contribute 
to the full decarbonisation of the sector in the longer term.   At the same time, efficiency measures 
alone are clearly insufficient to achieve full decarbonisation within a timeframe that represents a 
fair contribution from the sector.  This means that progress in ship technology and operation should 
be combined with a clear strategy for achieving the technology breakthroughs needed to fully 
decarbonise the sector as soon as reasonably possible.  This cannot be achieved without effective 
measures to find suitable fuel alternatives to hydrocarbon-based bunkers, most likely through a 
combination of regulated standards and other incentives. 
 
 Ports also have a potential role to play. In addition to performing critical spot inspections 
under MARPOL and regional MoUs to ensure compliance with international standards, ports are 
essential for bunkering and, assuming the necessary infrastructure is in place, are in a position to 
provide key services such as cold ironing (shore-to-ship power). Because they enjoy sovereignty 
over internal waters, port States are in a position to tighten emission control requirements while 
the ship is in port. Effectively, they are in a position to determine whether a ship may trade with 
their ports. However, it is advisable for port State measures to be as consistent as possible with 
international standards, rather than be imposed unilaterally without reference to such standards, 
because uniformity is important for maritime trade. 
 
One way to conceive of the overall challenge for the sector would be in three phases, an 
initial efficiency phase, a decarbonisation phase, and a negative emissions phase.  In each phase, 
the strategy would focus on a combination of achieving the primary goal of the phase, and at the 
same time to prepare in a meaningful way for the following phase.  The first phase would start 
with the initial strategy in 2018 and would retain the 2008 peak year for the industry and strive for 
further emission reductions, hopefully coinciding with the revised strategy in 2023 or following 
shortly thereafter.  The second phase would start with the implementation of the revised strategy 
in 2023, which could include an effective MBM, assuming it is needed to supplement technical 
and operational measures, designed to effect the decarbonisation of the sector within timeframes 
consistent with the long-term goal and with a clear understanding of the rate of reductions needed 
to achieve the goal.  A pilot for the MBM could be implemented toward the end of the initial 
efficiency phase, so that the MBM is fully operational by 2023.  Toward the end of the 
decarbonisation phase, as the sector gets closer to meeting its decarbonisation goal, the sector’s 
role in the negative emissions phase would be clarified and facilitated. 
 
5.3 The role of international maritime regulation 
 
5.3.1 Choice of instruments 
 
The IMO instrument of choice for the initial measures to regulate GHG adopted to date has been 
MARPOL Annex VI. Alternative options included adoption of a new annex or separate 
convention, the principal advantage arguably being the ability to provide dedicated treatment to a 
particularly complex problem that may require more than technical and operational measures 
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usually employed to prevent vessel-source pollution. The prolonged IMO deliberation on GHG 
emissions and the consideration that technical and operational measures were practical steps that 
could be adopted in the short-term likely favoured the use of an existing instrument to the creation 
of a new one. The development of a convention or protocol or a new annex would have been a 
lengthy multi-year process leading to adoption at a diplomatic conference. In contrast, amending 
an existing annex could be undertaken using the much faster tacit acceptance process. Moreover, 
a new annex would have had to be optional and would have necessitated years to secure broad 
support by a sufficient number of State Parties representing the bulk of global tonnage. In 
comparison, although Annex VI does not command the same high level of State Parties as other 
annexes, what really matters is that the subscription rate and tonnage represented are very high. 
Tacit acceptance of amendments has and will again in the future usher in new standards with the 
usual period of a year, unless there is substantial objection to the amendment during the prescribed 
period for objections in accordance with MARPOL’s amendment procedure.473  
 
A further argument in support of Annex VI as the regulatory vehicle is the desirable unity 
and coherence of the pollution prevention system. Characterising GHG emissions as vessel-source 
pollution facilitates coordination of the regulatory requirements of the various types of pollution 
from ships. There is likely to be greater consistency among technical standards, reporting 
expectations and enforcement across the MARPOL annexes. As seen earlier, issues of potential 
consistency across regulations and their purposes have arisen, as in the case of fuel requirements 
for controlling NOx and GHG emissions. Thus with respect to technical and operational measures 
the use of Annex VI facilitates an integrated and systemic approach to pollution prevention. 
 
The adoption of an MBM may raise additional questions, in particular whether placement of 
the measure in MARPOL annex VI, or a new annex, or indeed in MARPOL itself, would be the 
appropriate legal pathway. MARPOL’s strength is its design as an instrument focusing on 
technical and operational measures with an enforcement system to match. It is appropriate to 
enquire whether it would be a suitable vehicle for the adoption, implementation, enforcement and 
periodical review of market measures. The adoption of market measures would of itself be a 
novelty for the IMO, whose work to date, although punctuated by occasional political 
controversies, has been essentially technical. Its focus on technical aspects has generally enabled 
it to avoid or manage differences and achieve regulatory consensus. MBMs are in essence 
economic instruments aimed at market intervention or influence. MARPOL was not designed to 
accommodate a framework for the collection of levies or to enable the Organization to introduce 
market instruments. The IMO’s own constitutive instrument, while clearly broad enough to permit 
consideration of any issue concerning international shipping and the environment, is unclear with 
respect to whether the Organization’s power includes adoption of regulations concerning a carbon 
levy and a related fund or establish a carbon credit system. Its express financial powers are limited 
to budgetary matters and the scale of assessment of membership dues.474  
 
Accordingly, in the event an MBM is a desirable component of the future strategy, the IMO 
will need to consider how its constitutive instrument will support such an initiative and what legal 
pathway would be the most suitable and practical for this purpose.  It is useful to recall that the 
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International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund was established by a separate treaty and has its 
own secretariat and separate legal personality.475  
 
However, on such a complex issue as market measures, the option of developing a new 
maritime convention could be undesirable because of the likely lengthy process of development.  
Much as MARPOL is essentially a technical and operational standards instrument, as a potential 
candidate host for an MBM in Annex VI it carries the advantage of the tacit acceptance procedure, 
which was precisely designed to avoid cumbersome diplomatic processes in maintain the 
instrument up to date, as well as the substantial tonnage subscription already in place.   
 
Should MARPOL not deemed to be the legal pathway, another potential alternative and 
novel approach for an MBM for international shipping is to consider developing it in coordination 
with the UN climate regime and perhaps even under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The 
feasibility of such an option and its significance for the IMO mandate in its constitutive instrument 
would need to be studied.  
 
An additional question is what status should be given to the IMO strategy. One option is to 
consider giving the strategy a legal status by bringing it under MARPOL Annex VI. This has pros 
and cons. On the one hand it could cement its authoritative status and update it on the basis of the 
tacit acceptance procedure. On the hand, it could add an additional layer of complexity to already 
complex deliberations and in any case the GHG regulatory measures already have a home in Annex 
VI. Giving the strategy a legal status might not necessarily carry much advantage. An alternative 
and pragmatic approach is simply to consider the strategy as a ‘policy’ document, perhaps akin to 
the Organization’s own strategy which is updated biennially and adopted by an Assembly 
resolution. This approach has enabled the IMO to operationalize its mandate, set specific 
regulatory targets and deadlines, and update the document as a rolling planning.  
 
5.3.2 Applying the IMO regulatory process  
 
Over the many years of successful regulation, the IMO’s culture of consensus has dominated 
decisions despite the rule on majority decision-making in its constitutive instrument, enabling it to 
find common denominators for a wide suite of decisions and ensuring broad support. The next 
steps in the adoption of the IMO strategy and prospective GHG regulation will test the ability of 
the Organization to rely on consensus to achieve a strategy that ensures a fair contribution from 
this sector. The adoption of Chapter 4 on the basis of a majority decision has now established a 
precedent on this issue and given the continuing divisions on sharing of responsibilities and role 
of market measures, it is conceivable that further use of majority decision-making is possible and 
perhaps necessary to achieve adequacy. The frequent concerns expressed by major developing 
countries, most especially Brazil, China and India, can be expected to resurface and on which 
compromise has to be reached, in particular because they are large GHG emitters, are among the 
largest economies, and have high GDP growth forecast.476 Out-voting major States does not bode 
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well for what is necessarily a complex long-term regulatory process, both in terms of fostering the 
Organization’s culture of consensus and securing the support of all Member States, most especially 
major economies engaged in maritime trade.  The global consensus reached in the Paris Agreement 
climate regime should provide the momentum and the substantive elements to achieve consensus 
on an effective IMO strategy. 
 
As seen earlier, the IMO has a well-defined three-step linear approach to the development 
of maritime regulation. The approach is motivated by compelling necessity, guided by a goal-
oriented approach and employs a mix of mandatory and recommended practices. Given the long-
term goal of IMO’s GHG regulatory efforts and the uncertainties that will serve as context and 
drivers, it will be important for the three-step approach to be complemented by a subsequent step 
of regular review and adjustment to complete the cycle so that GHG regulation will be seen as 
cyclical and iterative rather than linear.  
 
It will be recalled that the IMO Council has considered a proposal from a group of Member 
States and industry bodies to further structure and tighten the three-step approach, in particular to 
address data gathering, consideration of the necessity of a proposed new initiative, use of cost-
effectiveness and impact analysis for short and long-term benefits, availability of suitable 
technologies, transparency and robustness of procedures, consideration of impacts on 
manufacturers, criteria for assessing and surveying and testing technologies, implementation dates 
based on achievable timelines and consolidated technology, and risk-based evaluation of potential 
costs and benefits of environmental, economic and social issues. This proposal could enhance the 
process of future GHG regulation by building on the learning needed to produce functional and 
effective rules and standards. It entails a higher level of structured scrutiny of regulatory proposals 
than is the practice at this time.  
 
Experience shows that the regulatory process in the IMO is not always purely technical and 
on occasions has been politicized, for example with respect to the development of guidelines and 
decisions on the designation of particularly sensitive sea areas477 and, within the context of this 
paper, the divisive debate on the application of the CBDR and NMFT principles in GHG 
regulation. Arguably, a better structured rule-making process would help minimize the degree of 
issue politicization by ensuring an in-depth technical assessment at each stage of the rule-making 
process. It is also possible that the proposed tightened process could make it more challenging to 
adopt measures to combat GHG emissions when the science does not provide sufficient clarity or 
the technology on which they are based is not yet on the market or the long-term impacts of the 
proposed regulatory outcome are not altogether clear. The proposed process could potentially 
constrain adoption of a precautionary approach to regulation in the context of scientific and 
technological uncertainty,478 unless flexibility is maintained. 
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477 Julian Roberts et al, “The Western European PSSA Proposal: A ‘Politically Sensitive Sea Area’” (2005) 29(5) 
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While the IMO’s GHG regulation to date has been largely top-down, the goal-oriented 
approach includes a measure of flexibility to enhance compliance. Annex VI’s Chapter 4 rules and 
standards have been legislated for implementation and enforcement by State Parties with respect 
to ships registered under their flags. Energy efficiency goals provide flexibility for shipowners and 
operators to meet the standards through various means. Goal-oriented regulation has served the 
IMO well, especially with respect to areas where diversity of technologies exist or further 
technological development is expected, such as in ship design, propulsion machinery, energy use 
monitoring and fuel technologies. There is also a role for bottom-up standard development as the 
pioneering of new technologies and practices in industry could potentially serve as the basis for 
new or for scaling up existing GHG rules and standards. The use of industry practices or standards 
developed by industry associations is not unprecedented.479  
 
5.3.3 Applying the principles of maritime regulation 
 
The difficult MEPC discussions identified several issues concerning the principles and practice of 
maritime regulation that will need resolution or adaptation if the international maritime community 
(both IMO Member States and the shipping industry) is to produce a meaningful and realistic long-
term collective response. The NMFT principle has played a key role in the development of all 
international maritime regulation and has played no small role in building the IMO’s profile as a 
successful regulatory body. This principle has helped to raise the standards of shipping around the 
globe and is foundational not only to the international maritime conventions and their subsidiary 
instruments, but is also central to the operation of the global system of memoranda on port State 
control. These regional arrangements are increasingly coordinating practices and sharing data on 
inspected ships to ensure compliance with safety and environmental standards and further 
discourage deviance through flag hopping. 480  Watering down the application of the NMFT 
principle will be counter-productive in maritime regulation because of the unique characteristics 
of the mobility of ships.  
 
The accommodation of the special needs of developing countries will need to be addressed 
in ways that do not undermine the essence of maritime regulation.  The CBDR principle emerged 
as an important equity principle in international environmental law with respect to the performance 
of environmental obligations by States and not with respect to individual industry actors as is the 
case in international shipping.  The legitimate CBDR concerns of developing countries need to be 
addressed in ways that do not create winners and losers within the international shipping sector. 
 
The principles for drafting maritime regulations will play an important role in GHG 
regulation. There is no question that effective GHG regulation is necessary. What could be a 
potential issue, because of the long-term technological uncertainty, is the degree of reliance on the 
evidence-based approach. GHG regulatory work will need to be undertaken in the context of 
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varying degrees of scientific and technological uncertainties and will call for the employment of a 
flexible and yet precautionary approach.481 The precedent has now been set for new GHG technical 
and operational standards to be integrated into MARPOL Annex VI, Chapter 4. The location of 
MBM regulation has options, as mentioned above. New GHG regulation will need to be consistent 
with existing regulation and in particular avoid conflicting prescriptions or rules that produce 
conflicting outcomes. Consistency can be facilitated trough an integrated approach to new 
regulatory initiatives and assessment of direct and indirect regulatory impacts. The pursuit of 
proportionality and fitness for purpose will be challenging, again because of scientific and 
technological uncertainties. A pragmatic and functional approach will be necessary. Periodic 
regulatory reviews (e.g., timed with the Global Stocktake and parallel five-year reviews within the 
IMO proposed in this paper) will be helpful in ascertaining effectiveness of particular rules and 
standards in producing the desired outcomes. While clearly important for maritime GHG 
regulation, in particular because of the need to accommodate technological change, the trepidation 
to adopt standards that will stand the test of the long-term would be significantly alleviated by the 
proposed periodical reviews. Finally, clarity in GHG regulation will be vital, especially given the 
concerns within the industry on how to adapt to a changing regulatory and economic paradigm.  
 
The nine principles for GHG regulation adopted by the MEPC 57 discussed above provide 
further guidance as well as additional challenges. In general, they represent a logical extension of 
the three-step decision-making process and six principles of general maritime regulation, while 
further addressing the particular challenges of GHG regulation. For example, logically principle 1 
proposes that the regulation should be effective in reducing emissions, which after all is the 
purpose of the entire IMO effort. Further, principles concerning the goal-oriented approach (6), 
support for technology innovation and R & D (7) and accommodation of leading technologies in 
energy efficiency (8) strongly buttress the necessary technical means and outcomes to achieve 
emissions reductions for the short, medium and long-terms. Similarly, the principles of cost 
effectiveness (3) and minimization of competitive market distortions (4) are aimed at ensuring the 
economic viability of the proposed regulations. Principle (5) proposes a sustainable approach to 
environmental regulation without penalizing trade, again a desirable goal. In similar spirit, 
principle (9) ensures the adoption of regulation which is practical, transparent and easy to 
administer.  
 
Principle (2) is a reason why this portfolio of guiding concepts was not adopted by 
consensus. The principle restates the NMFT application to all flag States, which as seen earlier is 
central to the international maritime law conventions. The wording of the text is unfortunate and 
perhaps served to fuel dissent. The actual MARPOL wording is that the Convention applies to “(a) 
ships entitled to fly the flag of a Party to the Convention; and (b) ships not entitled to fly the flag 
of a Party but which operate under the authority of a Party.”482 Through consistent text, “[W]ith 
respect to the ships of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the 
present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to 
such ships.”483 The application and enforcement emphasis is on ships rather than State Parties. 
This approach is similar in other maritime conventions. The purpose is to give direct application 
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of a particular rule to all ships engaged in international shipping, no matter where they are flagged 
or reflagged. This principle will be critical for the effectiveness of GHG regulations in international 
shipping.  Of course, adherence to this principle does not suggest that vulnerable States who are 
particularly exposed to negative economic consequences of GHG regulatory efforts should not 
receive assistance.  In other words, we see the NMFT principle of vital importance to ensure a 
level playing field for all ships as private commercial actors. On the other hand, the CBDR-RCNC 
principle addresses the needs of particularly vulnerable States, rather than the commercial actors. 
 
5.3.4 Extent and reach of GHG technical and operational regulation 
 
In order for the shipping industry to maximize the effectiveness of its fair contribution, it will be 
important that GHG regulations will apply to as much of the world’s fleet as is reasonably possible, 
and for domestic regulation to cover ships exempted from those regulation. At this time the IMO’s 
regulation of GHG emissions from ships in MARPOL Annex VI does not address all ships and 
those that are covered are subject to a transition period.  
 
The new Chapter 4 concerning the EEDI and SEEMP rules applies to ships of 400 gross 
tonnage or more.484 This rule immediately eliminates many small vessels, such as numerous 
fishing and recreational vessels, although a national maritime administration retains the discretion 
to adopt measures to ensure compliance by vessels less than 400 gross tonnage with emission 
control requirements of Annex VI requirements.485 In 2012 the number of fishing vessels was 
estimated at 4.72 million, 57% of which were engine-operated.486 Fishing vessels use energy 
intensively and are an obvious and significant source of GHG emissions.487 Moreover, the IMO’s 
regulatory focus in MARPOL and other conventions is on ships engaged in international voyages. 
This limitation excludes vessels engaged in cabotage, unless a particular rule is extended to those 
ships or is expressly extended to apply to domestic shipping by a State Party. Annex VI Chapter 4 
applies the exemption to domestic shipping, but also stipulates that State Parties “should ensure, 
by the adoption of appropriate measures, that such ships are constructed and act in a manner 
consistent with Chapter 4, so far as is reasonable and practicable.”488 Hence, a lower level duty 
(‘should ensure’, compared to the peremptory ‘shall’) applies to promote consistency in cabotage 
to the extent possible.  
 
Also excluded from application are offshore platforms regardless of their propulsion.489 Like 
cabotage and most fishing and recreational vessels, offshore platforms once stationery at the 
operation site, are not engaged in international voyage and rather are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the licensing State. The offshore service vessels supporting them are deemed to be on cabotage. 
Hence, because the excluded vessels will tend to operate within the territorial or resource-related 
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jurisdiction of a State Party, in practice they will be expected to be captured by the NDCs under 
the Paris Agreement.490 
 
In addition to these exclusions, a State Party may waive compliance with the attained and 
required EEDI for ships of 400 gross tonnage and above.491 Only existing ships may be granted 
the waiver and all other vessels are subject to the full EEDI rules as of 1 January 2017.492 The 
intention was to provide State Parties with some flexibility to waive the requirements in an 
exceptional manner, when appropriate. When a waiver is granted or withdrawn, the flag State is 
required to report the action to the IMO for the information of the general membership.493  
 
Also of note is the exclusion of vessels with a tonnage of 5,000 gross tonnage or less from 
reporting fuel consumption to populate the IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database as of 1 
March 2018.494 While, as noted earlier, the adoption of this tonnage threshold was motivated by 
expedience and the fact that it captures 85% of shipping responsible for GHG emissions, the 
reporting omits a substantial amount of small commercial shipping, in addition to the smaller 
vessels not captured by Annex VI.   
 
5.3.5 Regulatory fairness and consistency  
 
Accompanying the reach of IMO regulation is the challenge of achieving regulatory fairness and 
consistency with respect to the wide range of vessels engaged in international shipping and the 
diversity of trades and functions they perform, while minimizing waivers, especially with respect 
to operational measures. As discussed, some ships have particular build and operational 
requirements that demand variable energy use, and this reality has already led to early amendment 
of Annex VI Chapter 4 to exclude the application of EEDI to polar class vessels. This could be a 
potential long-term concern while the fleet of polar class vessels grows to respond to the growing 
transit and destination shipping in the Arctic as summer sea ice recurs to increasingly lesser 
extents. Other types of ships use energy differently and are able to navigate long distances without 
physical constraints such as ice presence and ice-breaking, although when encountering bad 
weather energy consumption will tend to increase.  Yet other vessels carry refrigerated or other 
controlled temperature cargo which will entail additional energy consumption needs, while 
passenger vessels require the additional energy to support hotel operations on board.  
 
                                                 
490  Many of these excluded sectors are covered under the nationally determined contributions under the Paris 
Agreement.  As a result, states should be motivated to extend the application of these rules to their domestic shipping 
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492 The EEDI applies to vessels whose building contract was placed on or after 1 January 2017, or whose keel was 
laid on or after that date, or with a 1 July 2019 delivery date, or in case of a major conversion of a new or existing 
ship, on or after 1 January 2017. Ibid Annex VI, Chap 4, reg 19.5. 
493 Ibid Annex VI, Chap 4, reg 19.6. 
494 Ibid Annex VI, Chap 4, reg 22A.1. 
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These examples highlight the importance for the different approaches in the required EEDI 
to account for the needs of different classes of ships.495  The prescribed rules and standards for 
ships will inevitably entail a mix of common and differentiated rules. The future GHG regulation 
of shipping will need to continue to distinguish between different classes of ships to ensure that 
while they meet increasingly stringent efficiency requirements, they are able to function safely and 
are fit for purpose. 
 
A more technically complex issue of consistency is how to introduce measures meant to help 
prevent GHG emissions without undermining or contradicting rules intended to address other types 
of vessel-source pollution, as in the case of GHG measures that could conflict with air pollution 
measures. Hence the earlier observation in this report that adopting an integrated approach and 
regulating GHG emissions in the same convention facilitates coordination to achieve the desired 
regulatory impact.  
 
Another interesting angle on the invocation of the CBDR principle in GHG regulation in 
shipping raises an issue of potential lack of consistency and fairness.  The various types of vessel-
source pollution addressed by the MARPOL annexes are all subject to the same NMFT principle, 
and the Annex VI rules in particular concern NOx, SOx, PM and ozone depleting substances, some 
of which are related to GHG emissions. The position advanced by some States that the distribution 
of the responsibility for GHG emissions from shipping ought to be made subject to the CBDR 
principle is inconsistent with the general and proven approach to the prevention of vessel-source 
pollution, including atmospheric pollution. As observed elsewhere in this report, the role that the 
CBDR principle, while critical for the effectiveness and fairness of the IMO strategy, needs to be 
approached in a manner that does not limit the scope of application and effectiveness of technical, 
operational and other future rules for ships depending on the socio-economic status of a State.   
The implementation of CBDR-RCNC needs to target assistance to vulnerable States more directly, 
while preserving the principle of NMFT for industry actors irrespective of flag. 
 
5.4 The potential role of market measures  
 
Should the IMO proceed along this path, the design of a suitable MBM will be a complex task that 
will require consideration of many technical, economic and political factors. There are, however, 
some fundamental considerations in the design of the MBM that can help shape the details of the 
instrument.  One is the choice of the tool. The MEPC discussions to date have considered a range 
of possible MBMs, including a carbon levy, a cap and trade system, and variations of both, among 
others.  Another is the need for clarity around the goals of the MBM.   The latter informs the former 
and is connected to the previous discussion about the long-term goal for the sector, so is considered 
first here. 
 
The fundamental issue with respect to the goals of the MBM is whether it is primarily 
intended to internalize the costs of the international shipping sector using up part of the remaining 
global carbon budget, or primarily to incentivize private actors involved in this industry sector to 
facilitate the transition of the sector towards decarbonisation by creating economic incentives for 
such actions.  Earlier in the report we referred to the MEPC discussion on MBMs having 
                                                 
495 Ibid Annex VI, Chap 4, reg 21. 
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progressed to grouping of MBMs between ‘in-sector’ and ‘out-of-sector’ reductions, potentially 
indicating a choice.  This choice may depend in part on whether the decarbonisation of the 
international shipping sector will be technically and economically more feasible than the 
decarbonisation of other sectors, such as electricity, land-based transportation, agriculture, 
manufacturing, and the built environment. This question may be difficult to answer at this time, 
and that may attract different answers as efforts to decarbonise various sectors evolve over time. 
For example, as technological breakthroughs are achieved in various sectors, they may become 
more economically attractive options for decarbonisation than they were before.  The choice 
between internalizing the cost versus decarbonizing the sector as the primary goal of the MBM 
also depends on which approach is more likely to achieve the level of support within the IMO to 
ensure effective global implementation.  Clarity on the goals can ensure that the discussion about 
the choice of instruments and its detailed design is a principled one, and that there is transparency 
and accountability for the design of the MBM. 
 
By way of example of issues for consideration with respect to choice of an MBM, and 
assuming for the purposes of this discussion that there is a choice between a carbon levy and a cap 
and trade system, there are key design elements that are common to these instruments, such as the 
actors captured, the activities captured, and the use of any revenues generated on the other.  The 
relative importance of revenue generation and the selection of actors and activities targeted will 
vary with choice of instrument and detailed design in light of the overall goals of the MBM.   
 
A carbon levy would most likely involve the collection of fees attached either to specific 
fuels or directly to emissions and usually would involve a fixed price that treats all units equally, 
although some differentiation is possible.  A primary benefit of a carbon levy is that the carbon 
price is controlled and predictable, offering certainty to investors considering investments in 
emission reduction solutions and allowing for careful management of the economic impact of the 
MBM on the sector as a whole and on individual actors within the sector and beyond. An effective 
carbon levy would generate substantial, predictable revenues, so decisions would have to be made 
on how to effectively use the revenues generated to further the goals of the MBM and to address 
legitimate equity concerns. The initial levy should be set to an amount to influence energy use, but 
will likely need to be adjusted over time to meet its stated goals. Thus the levy would be phased 
in and adjusted over time.   
 
Options on the allocation of revenues include using revenues to address specified inequities 
associated with the implementation of the carbon levy, to further incentivize research, 
development and dissemination of technologies seen as critical for the decarbonisation of the 
sector, and potentially to support decarbonisation outside the international shipping sector (such 
as through the purchase of credible offsets). At MEPC 63 the GHG-WG 3 had identified a number 
of potential uses for MBM revenues.496 At MEPC 61, it was reported that the High-level Advisory 
                                                 
496 For example:  
.1 incentivizing shipping to achieve improved energy efficiency;  
.2 offsetting – purchase of approved emission reduction credits; 
.3 providing a rebate to developing countries; 
.4 financing adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries; 
.5 financing improvement of maritime transport infrastructure in developing countries (e.g. Africa); 
.6 supporting R&D to improve energy efficiency of international shipping; and 
.7 supporting the Organization's Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme.  
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Group of the United Nations Secretary-General on Climate Change Financing identified 
international shipping and aviation as potential financial sources to aid mitigation efforts and 
adaptation in developing countries497 The contemplated sources included an emission trading 
scheme, a fuel levy and an aviation ticket tax. More recently, the UN Secretary-General's High-
Level Advisory Group on Sustainable Transport recommended increasing international 
development funding and climate funding for sustainable transport.498 The more MBM revenues 
are used to support decarbonisation efforts outside the international shipping sector, the more 
compelling the case for considering the alternative instrument, a cap and trade system, and linking 
it with other existing cap and trade systems.   
 
A cap and trade system is perhaps the most obvious alternative to a carbon levy.   A cap and 
trade system for international shipping could involve setting limits for the GHG emissions from 
the international shipping sector as a whole, allocation of portions of the overall limit to individual 
industry actors or subsectors within the sector (either through auctioning, sale of allowances at a 
fixed price or through free allocations), combined with the right of captured actors to trade 
allocations with other captured actors.499  The most obvious candidates for captured actors would 
be fuel suppliers and vessel operators.  With respect to fuel suppliers, it would need to be 
determined whether they would be captured by the international shipping industry’s commitment 
or by NDCs. The choice among free allocation, sale, or auction of credits depends largely on the 
need to generate revenues to deal either with equity considerations, to achieve emission reductions 
elsewhere, or to incentivize research and development into decarbonisation technologies.  Free 
allocation tends to reduce the short-term economic impact of the MBM, but it does limit options 
to achieve emission reductions, deal with inequities and to incentivize the decarbonisation of the 
industry.  Allocation at a fixed price mirrors the carbon levy in the sense that it permits the 
generation of revenues while carefully controlling the economic impact of the MBM.   
 
A cap and trade system could be implemented just for the international shipping sector (in-
sector, as considered above), or it could be linked to other sectors (through offsetting protocols) or 
to existing cap and trade systems (out of sector, as considered above).  In principle, the cap and 
trade system should be better able to directly control the emission reductions achieved through the 
setting of the cap for the international shipping industry sector. However, in practice, this very 
much depends on the detailed design, as linking and offsetting tend to lessen control over the 
emission reductions achieved and other design features, such as price floors and ceilings. Free or 
fixed price allocations tend to control the economic impact of the MBM on the sector.  
Furthermore, a carbon levy can, of course, be adjusted over time to control the emission reductions 
achieved by changing the amount of the levy. With cap and trade, similar outcome can be achieved 
by adjusting the cap. In short, the differences, in terms of the ability to control emission reductions 
and economic impact are more nuanced than they appear at first glance.  However, carbon levies 
tend to be more transparent about the trade-offs inherent in their design. 
                                                 
MEPC 63 Report, supra note 316, 42. 
497 High-level Advisory Group of the United Nations Secretary-General on Climate Change Financing, Note by the 
Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/18/Rev.1 (13 August 2010). 
498 Mobilizing for Development: Analysis and Policy Recommendations from the United Nations Secretary-General's 
High-Level Advisory Group on Sustainable Transport (United Nations, 2016), at 8, online: United Nations 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2375Mobilizing%20Sustainable%20Transport.pdf>. 
499 Of course, there are alternatives to the focus on GHG emissions, such as the cap and trade proposals put forward 
in the MEPC process for improved vessel energy efficiency. 
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If there is a clear preference within the IMO to do everything possible to achieve the full 
decarbonisation of the international shipping sector and for this purpose adopt the simplest 
approach, a carbon levy would likely be the MBM of choice.  The levy itself would provide an 
incentive for a wide range of actors in the industry, including R & D institutions, naval architects, 
shipbuilders, shipowners, charterers, ship managers, ship financers, cargo owners, etc., to support 
efforts to reduce emissions.  The nature and extent of the incentive would depend on the nature of 
the levy (applied to volume of fuel, a percentage of the cost of the fuel, or to each ton of emission), 
the amount of the levy, and clarity on the long-term trajectory of the levy, among other factors.      
 
If there is a clear preference for letting market forces decide whether it is more cost-effective 
to reduce emissions within the sector or support reductions elsewhere, a cap and trade system is 
more likely to be the MBM of choice.  It is important to recall, however, that the choice between 
a carbon levy and a cap and trade system ultimately is not as obvious as it may appear on the 
surface.  Many of the differences that may appear fundamental are blurred in the detailed design.  
Ultimately, either can be designed to effectively incentivize the decarbonisation of the 
international shipping sector; either can be designed to address identified inequities; and either can 
be designed to minimize the economic impact on the sector. Badly designed, either can be 
ineffective at reducing emissions.  More important than the choice between carbon levy and cap 
and trade system, therefore, is the detailed design, and clarity and transparency with respect to the 
relative priority allocated to encouraging low cost emission reductions, protecting the industry, 
protecting vulnerable States from negative economic impacts, and ensuring the decarbonisation of 
the sector. 
 
In theory and assuming political will, legitimate concerns about the economic impact of the 
decarbonisation of the sector on the economies of vulnerable States can be appropriately addressed 
with either a cap and trade system or a carbon levy. The main function of either MBM can include 
the generation of revenues to address inequities.  In the case of the carbon levy, the generation of 
revenues is a central feature of the MBM, so that the main issue will be the allocation of revenues 
to specified and demonstrated inequities.  In the case of a cap and trade system, the key will be to 
avoid free allocation of allowances so as to ensure sufficient revenues are generated to address any 
specified and demonstrated inequities.  In either case, while the generation of revenues occurs on 
the basis of the NMFT principle among industry actors, the use of revenues generated from the 
MBM allows for their equitable utilization in addressing the needs of developing countries 
adversely affected by the measures adopted. 
 
5.5 Equity and fair sharing of responsibility  
 
The nuanced Paris Agreement approach to differentiation in the form of CBDR-RCNC offers hope 
that the past controversy within the IMO on the respective roles of CBDR and NMFT has been 
largely resolved.  It is important to recall that the concept of CBDR has evolved significantly under 
the UN climate regime. It started in the form of CBDR-RC with a focus on responsibility and 
capacity, and remained in this form from the inception of the UNFCCC essentially until the Paris 
Agreement in 2015.  In this form, it served as an important principle for developing countries to 
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push for leadership from developed countries on a range of issues, from mitigation to adaptation 
and finance.500  
 
For a long time, CBDR-RC served to preserve the binary view of States as either developed 
or developing.  All this changed in the Paris Agreement, resolving a decade long impasse in the 
climate negotiations.  First, the Agreement alters the CBDR-RC principle by adding the concept 
of national circumstances to signal that State Parties differ in a range of relevant respects, not just 
with respect to capacity and responsibility for climate change.  As importantly, the Paris 
Agreement puts this revised version of the principle into practice with a very nuanced and practical 
approach to differentiation. 501   The Paris Agreement applies a variety of approaches to 
differentiation depending on the issue and circumstances.  For monitoring, reporting, review and 
compliance, for example, differentiation is minimal, and largely tied to capacity, encouraging State 
Parties seeking to avoid differentiation to invest in capacity-building to support other Parties 
struggling to meet monitoring and reporting requirements.502 
 
Differentiation with respect to the substantive emission reduction commitments of Parties to 
the Paris Agreement is largely based on self-differentiation, but with some direction to narrow the 
potential scope of differentiation.  For example, there is some explicit differentiation between 
developed and developing States with respect to economy wide emission reduction limits, but this 
differentiation is expected to diminish over time as developing countries are expected to take on 
economy wide targets.  This is done in full recognition that States have different levels of capacity 
and responsibility, and that a range of national circumstances will affect States’ abilities to 
contribute to the global effort.  There is no explicit differentiation, in the Paris Agreement, of 
private actors, though the impact of national efforts may, of course, affect private actors 
differently.503 
 
The main lesson from Paris in this regard is that the answer to the longstanding disagreement 
about differentiation in the IMO’s approach to GHG emission reductions may be found in a 
nuanced and pragmatic approach to harmonizing the application of the CBDR and NMFT 
principles.  The IMO approach that levels the playing field in the treatment of industry actors can 
potentially be accompanied by measures to protect vulnerable developing countries from negative 
economic consequences of efforts to decarbonize the shipping sector. The IMO’s technical 
cooperation programme and the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnerships, GloMEEP offer 
capacity-building on technical and operational measures. The potential impact of a carbon levy 
can be mitigated by channeling the accrued monies to assist developing countries inordinately 
affected by the levy and enable them to gradually transition to decarbonized transportation services 
for their maritime trade. Other ideas for mitigating the impact for a cap and trade system have also 
been suggested (e.g., IUCN, WWF). Such a multi-layered approach is consistent with the spirit of 
the Paris Agreement, and a pragmatic way to avoid unfairness within the shipping sector while 
                                                 
500 Jane Bulmer, Meinhard Doelle & Daniel Klein, “Chapter 3: Negotiating History of the Paris Agreement” in Klein 
et al, supra note 26, at 62.  
501 Lavanya Rajamani & Emmanuel Guérin, “Chapter 4: Central Concepts in the Paris Agreement and How They 
Evolved” in Klein et al, supra note 26, at 81. 
502 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, arts 13, 15; Dagnet & Levin, supra note 51; Dagnet & Northrop, supra note 59. 
503 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 4; Winkler, supra note  43. 
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being sensitive to the economies of vulnerable countries.  A key element of the solution will be to 
make decisions based on evidence of impacts, rather than based on uncertainty or fear.504 
 
The regulation of shipping has relied heavily on technology, both as a driver and as its 
promoter. Indeed, the availability of technology is one of the principles of maritime regulation. 
The promotional dimension has not always produced immediate satisfactory outcomes, as the 
BWM convention demonstrates,505 but it has laid the groundwork for the forcing of technological 
development. A flexible systemic approach to dealing with uncertainty should pay particular 
attention to enhancing the environment for research and development by ‘stretching goals’ and 
through catalytic measures (already proposed by industry actors) to enhance the design, powering 
and operation of all classes of ships.506 Arguably new technologies and know-how are likely to 
provide a greater measure of control over intended regulatory outcomes and better manage 
particular uncertainties.  
 
Enhancing the environment for technological development raises a related difficult issue in 
terms of access to technological breakthroughs. On the one hand open or fair access could 
significantly accelerate dissemination of new technological solutions in the shipping industry and 
among regulators, while on the other hand intellectual property rights and the global competition 
in the industry are factors that may militate against such initiatives. However, there is concern 
marine technology developers may “have limited means available to prevent unauthorised use of 
certain types of inventions” and “this situation may reduce the value of ‘maritime’ patents, leading 
to less incentives to innovate and publish information on new developments.” 507  Efforts at 
levelling the playing field in technology development and transfer have long bedeviled 
international relations. The UNCLOS attempted to address this sensitive matter by developing a 
regime for technology co-development and transfer in Part XIV.508 States “shall cooperate in 
accordance with their capabilities to promote actively the development and transfer of marine 
science and marine technology on fair and reasonable terms and conditions,” either directly or 
through a competent international organization such as the IMO.509  The technology mechanism 
initially established under the Copenhagen Accord and affirmed in Article 10 of the Paris 
Agreement is dealing with these issues in the broader context of climate technologies. It may offer 
avenues for cooperation and coordination that would be valuable for the IMO to explore. 
 
                                                 
504 Shi, supra note 15, at 81 
505 Paul Thomas, “Ballast water treatment, uncertainty and what to learn from it all”, Fairplay (16 November 2017), 
online: Fairplay <https://fairplay.ihs.com/safety-regulation/ballast-water-treatment-uncertainty-and-what-to-learn-
from-it-all_20160705.html>. Rear Admiral Paul Thomas is assistant commandant for prevention policy, US Coast 
Guard. 
506  “Regulation can provide the critical forcing function that drives innovation and encourages technological 
developments to meet the environmental challenges. This occurs when regulations set ‘stretch’ goals and incentivise 
investment to meet those goals. Regulations that embrace the status quo and codify existing commercially-available 
technology only serve to stifle innovation and prevent industry from meeting environmental challenges.” Thomas, 
ibid. 
507 Rikard Mikalsen, Philipp Harlfinger, Anthony P Roskilly, “Patent Protection in the Marine Industry: International 
Legal Framework and Strategic Options,” (2012) 225:3 Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers Part 
M: Journal of Engineering for the Maritime Environment 232. 
508 UNCLOS, supra note 9, Part XIV. 
509 Ibid art 266.1. 
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The UNCLOS technology cooperation duty includes “the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment … and other activities in the marine environment,” thus including emissions 
from ships, and “with a view to accelerating the social and economic development of the 
developing States.”510 Clearly, the duty is not to transfer technology, but rather to cooperate in 
promoting its development and transfer. States have a further ‘best endeavours’ duty “to foster 
favourable economic and legal conditions for the transfer of marine technology for the benefit of 
all parties concerned on an equitable basis.”511 The rights of technology developers are further 
protected by a due regard duty towards “all legitimate interests including, inter alia, the rights and 
duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of marine technology.”512 Other provisions in UNCLOS 
set out structures and processes for this type of cooperation, including the establishment of national 
and regional centres and duties for international organizations, such as the IMO, to “take all 
appropriate measures to ensure, either directly or in close cooperation among themselves, the 
effective discharge of their functions and responsibilities” with respect to the Convention’s 
provisions in this regime.513  
 
From an IMO perspective, this duty buttresses the technical assistance mandate in its 
constitutive instrument514 and provides fiat to the work of the Organization’s Ad Hoc Expert 
Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Technology for Ships. MARPOL Annex VI now 
includes a specific provision promoting technical cooperation and technology transfer concerning 
improving of energy efficiency of ships.515 In similar spirit to UNCLOS Part XIV and Article 10 
of the Paris Agreement, State Parties have a duty to promote and provide support and to cooperate 
in the promotion of development and transfer of technology and exchange of information to States 
that request technical assistance. The caveat that States perform this duty subject to their own laws 
enables them to protect the rights of intellectual property holders. 
 
Should an MBM be introduced in the future strategy, it may provide the resources needed to 
help make future technological developments subject to open access. For example, if a levy were 
to be instituted, some of the funding could be directed towards R & D for the public domain. 
 
5.6 Review, monitoring and compliance  
 
Another interesting question for the IMO is whether the five-year review cycles contemplated 
under the Paris Agreement could have potential application to international shipping.516  Whatever 
the targets and their legal status, there is clearly value in a process of regular reviews of progress 
in key areas, such as overall emission reductions achieved in the sector, progress in research and 
development on long-term solutions, commercialization of key new technologies, efforts to retrofit 
the existing fleet, reductions from improvement in new vessel design, reductions from operational 
measures, etc.  A regular exercise of gathering the latest information on progress in combination 
with the necessary analysis to determine progress against stated goals and pathways would allow 
                                                 
510 Ibid art 266.2. 
511 Ibid art 266.3. 
512 Ibid art 267. 
513 Ibid art 278. 
514 IMO Convention, supra note 189, arts 1(a), 2(e), 11, 15(k), 42–46. 
515 MARPOL, supra note 10, Annex VI, Chap 4, reg 23. 
516 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art 14; Friedrich, supra note 39. 
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for regular adjustments to the overall approach that would offer more certainty that collective goals 
for the sector will be met.  The performance of individual actors, both industry actors and States, 
would also be an important element of an effective review cycle.   
 
Careful thought would have to be given to what information should be gathered, who would 
provide the information, what analysis is required, who would carry out the analysis, and what 
decisions are expected to be made based on the outcome of the review. Important questions include 
under what circumstances would the collective goal or the expectations of individual State or 
industry actors be adjusted, how to link the review to regulatory adjustments, and what would be 
the consequences for individual actors of not living up to their commitments or obligations?  
Consistent methodologies supported by the IMO and the UNFCCC would greatly facilitate this 
level of cooperation and mutual support. 
 
 The recently adopted IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code), effective as of 
2016, is important for enhancing the implementation of air pollution and GHG regulations.517 Its 
significance lies in the introduction of a mandatory audit scheme for flag States, as well as port 
and coastal States. MARPOL is one of the international conventions that has been amended to 
provide a legal basis for the conduct of mandatory audits.518 The IMO has a dedicated sub-
committee (III Sub-committee) that assesses, monitors and reviews implementation of IMO 
conventions on the basis of PSC reports and other data. While it spotlights issues that a Member 
State may need to address, it also serves to inform the IMO committees regarding the need for new 
mandatory or voluntary measures. This arrangement is supported by the IMO’s Integrated 
Technical Cooperation Programme aimed at building capacity to facilitate compliance with the 
maritime conventions and can be expected to potentially play a key role in capacity-building in 
furtherance of GHG emission reduction goals.519  
 
 At the company level, there are other instruments that could be strengthened to encourage 
vessel operations to minimize GHG emissions, such as the International Management Code for the 
Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code).520 Operating under SOLAS, the 
ISM Code aims at the promotion of safety culture in international shipping and includes an 
international standard for pollution prevention as well as for maritime safety. However, at this 
time, and apart from generic statements concerning prevention of pollution of the environment, 
the ISM Code and its implementation guidelines do not contain express provision specific to air 
pollution, let alone energy use and operations to reduce GHG emissions, although it is conceivable 
to interpret appropriate measures in this regard as implicit.521 This is an appropriate instrument to 
include express terms to promote a ‘GHG-reduction culture’ in international shipping.  
 
                                                 
517 IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code), Resolution A.1070(28), Adopted on 4 December 2013 (Agenda 
item 10), IMO Doc A 28/Res.1070 (10 December 2013). 
518 IMO, “IMO Member State Audit Scheme” (2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org>. 
519 IMO, “Technical Cooperation” (2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org >. 
520 International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention: International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code, Resolution A.741(18), Adopted on 4 November 1993, IMO Doc Res A 18/Res.741 (17 
November 1993). 
521 A company should establish procedures, plans and instructions for key shipboard operations concerning the 
environment. Ibid reg 7. Under this regulation, a company could include slow steaming as an operational measure to 
reduce GHG emissions on a voyage.  
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At the ship level, as in the case of other MARPOL regulations, the Annex VI air pollution 
regulations are subject to the convention’s port State inspection regime and regional MOU system 
described earlier. In 2018 the Paris MoU, which is the oldest PSC and possibly the most active 
regional arrangement, will launch a Concerted Inspection Campaign (CIC) for Annex VI and will 
provide insights into levels of compliance with the Annex.522 In 2016 inspectors found 41,857 
deficiencies, 3,769 of which were detainable, amounting to 3.83% of all inspected ships.523 These 
deficiencies were serious enough that the vessels concerned were detained in port until the 
deficiencies were rectified. In the same year, 428 ships had Annex VI deficiencies.524 These reports 
are potentially important for a vessel’s insurance cover. Deficiencies with respect to emissions 
could affect a vessel’s seaworthiness.525 In addition to the implications for port State inspection, 
the vessel’s insurance contract invariably includes express and implied seaworthiness warranties, 
as well as warranties of legality, that is the assured undertakes to operate the insured subject-matter 
in compliance with legal requirements.526 
 
Finally, compliance could be further strengthened by providing incentives for additional 
industry initiatives that take early pioneering steps to retrofit the existing fleet to enhance low 
carbon operations, to the extent this is technologically and economically possible, or pioneer new 
technologies that promise neutral or zero emissions, such as electrical propulsion and wind energy.  
 
5.7 Inter-regime consistency and complementarity 
 
Consistency and complementarity between international regimes is an important consideration in 
any global response to a planetary challenge such as climate change. UNCLOS anticipates a 
complementary relationship with other conventions. UNCLOS does “not alter the rights and 
obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention 
and which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of 
their obligations under this Convention.”527 More specifically on the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, Article 237 states that the provisions on marine environment protection  
 
… are without prejudice to the specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions 
and agreements concluded previously which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment and to agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles 
set forth in this Convention.528   
 
For example, MARPOL, as a specialised instrument on vessel-source pollution adopted prior to, 
and the Paris Agreement, as an instrument which expands on the UNCLOS’ provisions on 
atmospheric emissions adopted after UNCLOS are captured by this provision. The article 
                                                 
522  Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, 2016 Annual Report, online: Paris MOU < 
https://www.parismou.org/>, at 10. 
523 Ibid at 23–24. 
524 Ibid at 48. 
525 For instance this is the position taken by the IMO with respect to sulphur emissions. See “Ships ‘Unseaworthy’ if 
they Don't Meet Emissions Rules – IMO”, Marine Link (16 November 2017), online: Marine Link 
<https://www.marinelink.com/news/unseaworthy-emissions431318>. 
526 On warranties see Baris Soyer, Warranties in Marine Insurance 3d (Routledge, 2016). 
527 UNCLOS, supra note 9, art 311(2). 
528 Ibid, art 237(1). 
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continues that specific obligations under special conventions on the marine environment “should 
be carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives” of UNCLOS.529 
One practical consequence of this provision is that the obligations of States to mitigate climate 
change impacts ought to be pursued consistently with the principles of UNCLOS.  
 
Although pursued primarily by the MEPC and within the framework of MARPOL, the 
IMO’s current and prospective regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping interacts 
with other international regimes. The IMO’s constitutive instrument equips it to coordinate with 
other agreements and international organizations as needed and the Organization has entered into 
cooperation agreements.530 The actual or potential interactions are frequently complementary and 
facilitative of IMO work.  Examples of facilitative interactions are the UNCLOS provisions with 
respect to global and regional protection and preservation of the marine environment, atmospheric 
emissions from ships, technology transfer and the role of the IMO. In particular, UNCLOS 
establishes a duty for State Parties to prevent and enforce atmospheric pollution from ships and 
promotes technology transfer, as does the UN climate regime. These provisions provide context 
for IMO’s efforts in developing the GHG strategy. 
 
In other instances, the tasks assigned to the IMO require active efforts at ensuring 
consistency and coordination with other regimes. At the level of overall goals, it is important for  
the IMO strategy to be consistent with the overall goal and governance processes of the Paris 
Agreement, such as increasing levels of ambition, transparency in reporting, five-year review cycle 
for the shipping industry’s reported contribution aligned with the Global Stocktake, and so on. The 
IPCC report on 1.5 C expected this year and the Talanoa Dialogue will provide further 
opportunities for the IMO strategy to align with the climate regime. 
 
Consistency between international regimes is also important at the level of operating 
principles and processes. Division in and protraction of the GHG debate in the IMO was in part 
due to  the interpretation and weight given to the NMFT in MARPOL and CBDR in the climate 
regime, even though the approach to CBDR in the Paris Agreement evolved from a list-based 
approach (as in the Kyoto Protocol) to a more nuanced approach.  As observed earlier, a consensus-
based harmonized interpretation and application of the two principles is possible and could assist 
harmonization between international legal regimes without weakening either regime. Similarly, 
the perceptions expressed and concerns raised by some delegations about potential conflict of 
MBMs with the WTO regime will need to be better understood so that the development of a future 
market instrument, if feasible and desirable, will be undertaken with a view to ensuring 
complementarity, thus reassuring all IMO Member States. The special needs of developing 
countries could thus be addressed by using the structures and processes available in the regimes 
concerned, including the UNCLOS provisions facilitating cooperation in technology co-
development and transfer,  IMO’s technical cooperation programme and revenues from a future 
MBM, the climate regime structures and provisions in WTO agreements designed to assist 
developing countries. 
                                                 
529 Ibid, art 237(2). 
530  IMO Convention, supra note 189, art 25. An example of a cooperative agreement is the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Cooperation between the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) (23 July 2002), online: WCO <http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-
us/partners/~/media/887D44574CB0487582155BDE5E42388E.ashx>. 
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A potential interaction between the IMO and UNCTAD may arise in the event MBMs are 
adopted. The monitoring of MBM consequences for international shipping could involve the 
efforts of UNCTAD in its annual reporting on international shipping and seaborne trade. If 
UNCTAD’s mandate is engaged in this respect, it would provide a valuable information service 
for IMO Member States.  
 
If serious inter-regime issues of inconsistency or conflict remain unresolved, there is a 
danger that some IMO Member States that are important for the IMO collective effort at GHG 
reduction may object to future amendments to MARPOL Annex VI. Past experience with the 
Organization’s policy and practice in its various conventions on ensuring consistency with the 
UNCLOS, both when the latter was still under development and subsequently following its 
adoption, indicate that the IMO is conscious of and well-prepared to ensure inter-regime 
consistency.531 
 
5.8 Multilateralism and IMO leadership  
 
Finally, the development of the IMO strategy to respond to climate change presents both 
opportunities and risks for the Organization and the maritime community it services. On the one 
hand, the adoption of a credible and effective strategy will significantly fortify faith in the 
Organization’s competence and effectiveness as an international leader and global regulator. It is 
further conceivable that its mandate, which to date has largely focused on the regulation of 
international shipping from technical and operational safety, environmental and security 
perspectives, including accompanying private and public law regimes, could evolve to include the 
regulation of market measures. If the latter occurs, GHG regulation potentially promises to be a 
major milestone in the Organization’s institutional evolution. On the other hand, if it fails to 
produce a strategy that represents a fair and acceptable contribution to the global response to 
climate change, there is danger that the Organization’s credibility as an effective regulator could 
suffer. It is imperative that the Organization develops a defensible principled approach to its 
strategy to respond to climate change.  
 
As mentioned earlier, some NGOs expressed their frustration with the slow process by 
suggesting that the UNFCCC or the EU could be called upon to take appropriate action. If this 
occurred, it would be preferable to avoid a confrontational approach and to always stress support 
for the IMO as the leading global regulator and to continue to seek effective regulation of the GHG 
emissions from a global industry. Moreover, in addition to the fundamental duty of good faith in 
UNCLOS, the legal reality under UNCLOS and the IMO Convention is that the IMO is the 
competent international organization in the Convention.  The EU and IMO have at times had 
convergent views with respect to accelerating maritime regulation, as was the case with phasing 
                                                 
531 The IMO Secretariat participated actively in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea from its 
inception in 1973 and until the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982. Its contributions ensured avoidance of overlaps, 
inconsistencies and incompatibilities between UNCLOS and the IMO conventions. This practice continued with newer 
conventions through the inclusion of a provision that interpretation should be without prejudice to the codification and 
development of the law of the sea. See, for example, MARPOL, supra note 10,  art 9(2);  Implications of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, Study by the Secretariat of 
the IMO, IMO Doc LEG/MISC.7 (19 January 2012) at 11. 
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out of single hulls, and usually, despite the tension, matters were resolved with the EU supporting 
global regulation of shipping and the IMO’s lead role in that regard. Even when the US launched 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, it always stressed its support for the IMO as the leading global 
regulator and has tended to participate in its work in a manner to reinforce that position. Thus the 
major maritime nations have, despite periodical hiccups, supported the key role of the IMO, even 
if they are not parties to all of its instruments. The hope is that pressure and leadership from outside 
the IMO will assist the IMO in its efforts to develop and implement an effective strategy that is 
well integrated globally, regionally and nationally and that ensures a fair contribution from 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
In investigating the international law and policy challenges to the determination of the international 
shipping industry’s contribution to climate change mitigation efforts through the IMO, we offer 
concluding observations on general, policy and legal considerations that we believe have a bearing 
on the current and possible future directions of the nascent IMO strategy and its legal pathways.   
 
6.1 General considerations for the strategy 
 
As will have become apparent in this report, the development of the international shipping 
industry’s fair share of GHG emission reductions through the IMO is an urgent matter. It is not a 
simple regulatory matter that can be exclusively addressed through maritime technical and 
operational rules and standards. The task is characterized by urgency, complexity and uncertainty. 
Urgency because the current global response to climate change may be significantly 
underestimating the process of change and that decarbonization likely has to occur at a much faster 
pace. Complexity because of the global and transnational nature of the industry, ship technology 
and operations, and financing structures. Uncertainty because the reduction of GHG emissions 
must necessarily be a long-term process spread across the rest of the century and with highly 
dynamic climatic, technological and economic variables.  
 
This calls for an IMO strategy which is integrated: systemic in scope, flexible in approach 
and adaptive in application. Systemic in the sense of employing traditional mandatory IMO 
regulatory tools, supported with voluntary measures as appropriate, while also considering new 
mechanisms that could be created or which are already available under other international regimes. 
The Paris Agreement includes elements that offer important opportunities for collaboration among 
the regimes (e.g., Articles 6, 10, and 13-15). The approach will need to be flexible in the sense that 
the strategy is not considered a static structure, but rather a dynamic tool whose objectives and 
measures will be periodically reviewed to respond to the long-term learning curve. It will need to 
be adaptive in the sense that, and in consequence to flexibility, the strategy must not be rigid, but 
should rather be considered a ‘rolling-strategy’ and regularly ratcheting up ambitions to match 
newer understandings of the climate change challenge, future technological possibilities and 
achieving effective long-term outcomes. 
 
While it may be tempting to consider the measures and progress achieved in the collective 
response to climate change by other regimes and sectors as potential models for international 
shipping, the reality is that shipping is unique because of its context, diversity and complex drivers. 
While the experiences of others may inform, it is unreasonable to expect transposition of solutions 
from one sector to another. Each sector has its own characteristics and what really matters is not 
replication of any class of measures, but rather that each sector is ambitious and bears its fair share 
of the collective responsibility and within the context, culture, principles and processes of the 
industry concerned. 
 
While progress has been achieved on GHG issues in the IMO, a major concern in the 
discourse to date has been the visible lack of consensus. While the Organization’s majority 
decision-making rule ensures resolution of major controversies, this procedure tends to leave 
winners and losers in its wake. One of the IMO’s traditional strengths is its culture of consensus, 
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which while not always present in all forms of decision-making and has its own concerns (e.g., 
producing the lowest common denominator), in great measure helps to guide the discharge of the 
Organization’s functions and secures a high degree of support and respect for its work and its 
regulatory outcomes. Some of the most difficult substantive and procedural decisions in the GHG 
discourse to date have been taken by a majority vote. Given its role as a long-term blue print for 
IMO mitigation efforts, we argue that if the strategy is not backed by consensus, but adopted by a 
vote, that this will not bode well for the long-term commitments by Member States needed to make 
it effective.  
 
6.2 Policy considerations for the strategy 
 
It seems clear that a global strategy under the umbrella of the IMO is the preferred approach to 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping. The IMO has primary competency 
over the sector, and the global nature and complexity of the sector clearly warrants a global 
approach.  It also seems that there are significant benefits of a cooperative approach between the 
IMO and the UN climate regime.  There is much to be said for a synchronized approach of State 
efforts in the IMO and under the Paris Agreement, in particular with regard to the vision of the 
IMO strategy, the level of ambition, guiding principles, timelines, as well as the review of and 
adjustments to the strategy over time. 
 
An essential element of a synchronized approach to the issue between the IMO and the UN 
climate regime is a common vision.  This means that the IMO strategy should clearly articulate its 
intention to ensure the international shipping sector makes a fair contribution to the goals of the 
Paris Agreement, and that the strategy is generally in line and, where appropriate, coordinated with 
the Paris Agreement. While a global and consensus-based approach under the IMO is preferable, 
it needs to be adequately ambitious to ensure that the sector makes a fair contribution to the climate 
problem. IMO Member States, who at the same time are Parties to the Paris Agreement, have a 
responsibility to ensure an effective industry contribution.  
 
Working out the details of a fair contribution from the sector is complex. The answer to what 
is a fair contribution can be expected to change over time. Further work is needed to clarify an 
appropriate contribution from the international shipping sector based on its unique circumstances, 
the likelihood and timing of technological breakthroughs, and how the circumstances compare to 
those in other key sectors.  However, debates over the details on what would amount to a fair 
contribution cannot delay action, as the basic message from the Paris Agreement is that all sectors 
must decarbonize as rapidly as reasonably possible, and that ultimately, all sectors need to make 
all reasonable efforts to achieve full decarbonization.   
 
Until the details of a fair contribution from this sector are worked out, we are of the view 
that the strategy should be designed on the assumption that the international shipping sector needs 
to decarbonize at the same rate as other sectors.  In other words, the initial strategy should be 
designed on the assumption that the sector is neither required to do more nor less than other sectors.  
This means the rate of emission reduction should be the same as the rate of emission reductions 
needed globally, and that the dates for key milestones such as peak emissions, GHG neutrality and 
full decarbonization are the same as what is needed globally.  These starting assumptions can then 
be refined over time, as the unique circumstances of the sector, and how they compare to the unique 
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circumstances of other sectors, are better understood. 
 
The ultimate measure of what is needed globally is the long-term goal of the Paris 
Agreement.  Unfortunately, much of the analysis currently available on the global effort needed is 
based on the pre-Paris goal of 2o C, not on the Paris goal of ‘well below 2o C’, with efforts to ‘limit 
increases to 1.5o C.’  The IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report provides key parameters on what is needed 
globally to stay within 2o C, and the Paris Agreement itself sets a long-term objective of reaching 
GHG emission neutrality in the second half of the century that appears to be based on the 2o C 
analysis of the IPCC.   
 
Until the IPCC releases its report on 1.5o C, a pragmatic approach would be to rely on the 
IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report, but with a clear understanding that the long-term goals will have 
to be updated in light of the 2018 IPCC report on 1.5o C. Key elements of a long-term vision and 
interim objectives and targets based on Paris and the IPPC’s 4th Assessment Report will be a peak 
year for the sector as soon as possible, rapid decline of emissions thereafter, leading to GHG 
emission neutrality by or before 2050, with the details depending on the results of the IPCC’s 
expected report on 1.5o C.  The ultimate goal would be the full decarbonization of the sector. 
 
It is also clear that innovative solutions are needed to deal with the longstanding rift within 
the IMO process over the respective roles of NMFT and CBDR in the approach to GHG emission 
reductions from the international shipping sector. Valid viewpoints have been expressed over the 
years both by developing countries, concerned over the economic impact of GHG emission 
reduction efforts and by others, concerned about the differential treatment of private actors within 
the industry. The separation of the treatment of industry actors in the strategy from the treatment 
of State parties offers an opportunity to resolve this longstanding challenge to an effective IMO 
strategy.   
 
Solutions should aim to preserve the principle of NMFT for industry actors within the 
international shipping sector while finding ways to address legitimate concerns about economic 
impacts on vulnerable developing countries.  Their concerns, and in particular the LDCs’ and 
SIDS’, must be taken seriously and measures in support must be properly resourced. Such an 
approach would be in line with the aspirations of the UNSDGs and the nuanced and pragmatic 
approach to CBDR adopted in the Paris Agreement, and may be key to overcoming the impasse 
over the application of these two principles.  Cooperation between the UN climate regime 
generally in this spirit of the Paris Agreement, and utilization of the institutions and mechanisms 
under the Paris Agreement in particular, offer promising opportunities to move forward 
constructively in this regard.   
 
Key among the efforts needed, either within the IMO or through the Paris Agreement, relate 
to capacity-building, technical cooperation and technology access. Cooperation between the IMO 
and the technology, capacity and funding mechanisms under the Paris Agreement have the 
potential to overcome barriers to effective implementation of GHG reduction technologies in key 
developing countries through proactive and supportive measures. If an MBM is introduced, 
consideration should be given to channeling some of the funds generated to support R & D that 
will produce innovations in the public domain. Ultimately, a critical ingredient of any solution is 
the commitment to ensure the international shipping sector contributes its fair share to addressing 
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the climate crises in a manner that is fair to vulnerable developing countries and fair to the private 
actors involved in the industry. The application of NMFT and CBDR needs to serve this ultimate 
goal of a fair contribution. 
 
The report has considered the efforts of the IMO in three phases, short, medium and long- 
term, following the approach taken in the Organization’s discussions to date.  The emerging 
consensus in the IMO deliberations of the short-term referring to the time period between now and 
2023, the medium-term from 2023 to 2030, and the long-term from 2030 to full decarbonization, 
while appropriate at this time, might need to be reconsidered as the need for more ambitious 
climate action becomes increasingly urgent. What is needed in terms of specific measures to guide 
Parties through the three stages is the appropriate combination of ambition, flexibility, adaptability, 
and transparency to meet the goals of the strategy in a timely, efficient, effective and fair manner.   
 
A combination of technical and operational standards, market-based instruments, other 
measures and effective compliance and enforcement will likely be needed to address the challenge, 
carefully designed to motivate all key actors to take effective and adequate measures to 
decarbonize the international shipping sector.  The current technical measures offer an important 
starting point, and will require effective and timely mechanisms to keep pushing for the 
development and implementation of best available technology, to update the requirements on a 
regular basis as technological breakthroughs are achieved. The EEDI, in particular, designed to be 
scaled-up every five years, will play a vital long-term role. Market mechanisms or other novel 
effective measures are needed primarily to motivate and enable the technological breakthroughs 
that can then be implemented either through upgraded technical standards or through the market 
mechanism itself to achieve the full decarbonization of the sector. 
 
For any market mechanisms utilized as part of the strategy, the detailed design matters more 
than the choice of instrument, such as the choice between a carbon levy or a cap and trade system.  
The most fundamental question is whether the mechanism will focus on ‘in sector’ emission 
reductions or offer (limited or broad) access to credible ‘out of sector’ emission reduction 
opportunities.  It is important to recognize that there are pros & cons to both, and that the choice 
will have implications for how the long-term goals are framed and for the timelines.  One 
implication of this choice, for example, is the need and importance of the technical and operational 
regulations.  An in-sector approach to a market mechanism may serve to achieve full 
decarbonization of international shipping, whereas an out-of-sector approach is more likely to need 
an evolving and carefully designed technology mechanism to ensure the sector ultimately achieves 
full decarbonization.  
 
There are a number of elements of the IMO strategy and its implementation that will require 
regular review and adjustment to ensure the goals are met, including the fair contribution from the 
sector, the technical standards of vessels and their operation, and any market-based or regulatory 
mechanisms designed to motivate technological innovations and their adoption.  The five-year 
review cycles under Articles 13-15 of the Paris Agreement, built around the Global Stocktake, 
offer a valuable structure and timetable for reviews of progress and effectiveness of the elements 
of the overall approach.  A well-synchronized review that both takes advantage of the information 
gathered and feeds appropriate information into the five-year review cycles under the Paris 
Agreement would improve efficiency and effectiveness of the IMO strategy.   
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Other elements to consider include existing efforts on transparency and review within the 
shipping sector, including current efforts under the IMO, but also efforts outside the IMO, such as 
the EU MRV.  Ultimately, for transparency and effectiveness, regular reporting, review, and 
enhancement of the approach in sync with reporting and review under the Paris Agreement and 
elsewhere will be critical for the effective implementation of the IMO strategy. 
 
6.3 Legal considerations for the strategy 
 
While we are of the view that the general approach to GHG emissions reductions from ships in the 
IMO strategy should be integrated, the backbone of the strategy will need to be a combination of 
global maritime regulation and other legal and policy measures. While regulatory tools to assist 
emissions reductions are obviously available to the IMO, there will be need to consider a basket 
of mechanisms (maritime and other), in particular with respect to a prospective MBM. An MBM, 
if adopted to complement technical and operational measures, will require legal support. To date, 
IMO regulation has concerned technical rules and standards for maritime safety, environment 
protection and security concerns in shipping. The IMO convention most directly relevant to the 
regulation emissions from ships is MARPOL, focused on technical standards for technology and 
operations, may need a novel addition, preferably through the tacit acceptance procedure, to enable 
the introduction of a market measure in a reasonably timely manner. An MBM will require clear, 
consistent and predictable requirements and conditions for trading emission credits, and upon 
which private legal transactions will be based.   
 
Alternatively, the MBM could perhaps be housed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.   
At a minimum, consistency between any MBM developed under the IMO and the market 
mechanisms developed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement would be welcome. If IMO parties 
decide to explore an MBM that includes access to out-of-sector reductions or offsets, it would be 
helpful to seek consistency with the emerging new Sustainable Development Mechanism under 
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement.  
 
The IMO has a long history of a successful principled and structured approach to global 
maritime regulation. This approach has usually been evidence-based, pragmatic, has employed 
both mandatory and voluntary approaches, and has aspired to universalize its instruments and 
facilitate uniformity in their implementation. While the GHG strategy is expected to be guided by 
a vision at a high level of generality and accompanied by aspirational goals, the fulfilment of those 
goals will require a mixture of mandatory (possibly concerning the EEDI and fuel requirements) 
and voluntary rules and standards, and which would need to be periodically reviewed and scaled-
up to enhance their continued relevance and effectiveness. As an instrument with a high degree of 
universal support, MARPOL’s tacit acceptance procedure will be important to enable the gradual 
scaling-up of the EEDI (in addition to the current five-year ratcheting cycle) and other standards.  
 
A challenge for GHG regulation will be coherency in maritime regulation. As observed in 
this report, the pursuit of ship operation regulations in various domains may potentially raise issues 
for the regulation of GHG emissions, such as other atmospheric emissions from ships (e.g., to 
control NOx, SOx and PM emissions), particular technical and operational requirements for 
environmental reasons (e.g., ballast water exchange operations), energy-use by particular ships 
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(e.g., polar class vessels) and safety concerns (e.g., safe vessel speed). It is possible that efforts to 
address GHG emissions may conflict with other regulatory efforts. While potentially adding more 
complexity to GHG regulation, this concern calls for an integrated approach to GHG regulation 
where regulatory impact on other regulated matters will need to be addressed. 
 
The integrated approach to maritime regulation also calls for regulatory coherency and 
fairness across the industry. Careful thought will have to be given in the detailed design and 
implementation of the strategy to the public and private law impacts on the roles of the many actors 
in the industry, from regulators and enforcers (flag States/maritime administrations, port States), 
to ship operations (shipowners, charterers, operators, managers), to providers of services to ships 
(port services, bunker suppliers, insurers). Ways of facilitating universal acceptance and uniform 
implementation need to be anticipated at the design stage. 
 
Coherency in GHG regulation should also be pursued across international and national 
standards to maximize GHG emission reduction from all forms of shipping. As observed in this 
report, the IMO efforts have focused on international shipping. Typically, the regulation of 
cabotage, fishing vessels, small recreational craft and generally small tonnage is undertaken at the 
national level and the regulating State may choose to extend international standards to domestic 
shipping or regulate it separately.  With respect to emissions of domestic shipping, we expect 
overlap between the international regime and domestic regimes. There is much to be gained by 
encouraging IMO Member States to coordinate the regulation of GHG emissions from all forms 
of shipping in a consistent manner to enhance mitigation from this sector as a whole. 
 
An interesting factor in the development and future implementation of the IMO strategy is 
the relationship between the IMO conventions and the UNFCCC, its subsidiary agreements 
(Kyoto, Paris), as well as other treaty regimes (e.g., WTO). The IMO has a legal mandate as the 
competent international organization with respect to international shipping matters, and this has 
been recognized by the expectation that the Organization will orchestrate the industry’s fair share 
of emission reductions. The IMO has gone to great lengths in developing and maintaining a 
constructive relationship with the UNFCCC process (including the UNFCCC Secretariat and 
SBSTA) and has provided regular reports. A potential concern we have is the possibility that the 
IMO strategy does not display sufficient ambition and does not deliver a substantial and effective 
contribution, especially in comparison to NDC commitments and other industries. If this scenario, 
however unlikely, arises, there could be an issue between, on the one hand the UNFCCC/Paris 
Agreement mandate that includes all GHG emissions (including shipping), and the IMO mandate 
as a UN special agency and competent organization under the IMO Convention and UNCLOS. If 
a future Paris Agreement COP were to engage more closely with international shipping, they 
would likely be able to do so only by establishing a target, while the IMO would retain the maritime 
regulatory capacity (technical and operational as expected because of its competence under its 
constitutive instrument and UNCLOS) to facilitate the achievement of that target. In any event, 
IMO leadership at a high level of ambition on this issue is critical. 
 
We see opportunities for coordination of and cooperation under different international 
regimes to meet GHG emission reductions. UNCLOS has a complementary relationship to the 
Paris Agreement and IMO maritime conventions. While it is conceivable to view the concerns of 
some IMO Member States with respect to the potential conflict between MBMs and the WTO 
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rules, we view the potential interaction between GHG emission regulation from international 
shipping, or for that matter the formulation and implementation of NDCs, and the WTO regime as 
less clear and deserving of further study. The idea proposed in a recent CIGI special report to 
creating a ‘climate change exception’ to the WTO rules is likely worth studying further. In the 
meantime, measures should be taken to avoid any perceived or real conflict with the WTO rules, 
but that such measures cannot delay or undermine the implementation of an effective approach to 
GHG emission reductions from international shipping. From another perspective, bearing in mind 
that State Parties to the IMO conventions are also Member States of the WTO, an MBM developed 
and adopted on the basis of consensus in the IMO might also render the matter a non-issue. 
 
Finally, the IMO strategy will need to consider the approach to promoting compliance. At 
this time the current version of the strategy is crafted at a high level of generality and with much 
of the text in square brackets. The assumption is that any goals adopted will be aspirational and 
non-binding. At this time the strategy does not contemplate provisions on compliance. This is a 
weakness and can be expected to pose a challenge for promoting conduct which is consistent with 
the spirit and letter of the strategy, itself a legally unenforceable instrument. Rather, the regulatory 
teeth of the strategy will be any technical and operational rules, standards and codes adopted under 
MARPOL Annex VI, especially if mandatory. Flag States will continue to have primary 
responsibilities for ensuring effective jurisdiction and control with respect to GHG regulation of 
their ships. Port State enforcement will continue to play an important role and likely instrumental 
for the future success of the strategy. 
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Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, 9 December 1923, 58 
LNTS 285 (entered into force 2 December 1926). 
 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295 (entered into force 
14 April 1947). 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (entered into force 1 
January 1948). 
 
 1947 Protocol of Application, 55 UNTS 308.  
 
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 6 March 1948, 289 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 17 March 1958). 
 
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 9 April 1965, 591 UNTS 265 (entered 
into force 5 March 1967) 
 
International Convention on Load Lines, 5 April 1966, 640 UNTS 133 (entered into force 21 July 
1968). 
 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 UNTS 57 (entered into force 16 October 1978). 
 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340 
UNTS 184 (not in force). 
 
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 (entered into force 2 October 1983). 
 
Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, 26 September 1997, 
Can TS 2010 no 14 (entered into force 19 May 2005). 
 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 13 November 1979, 1302 UNTS 217 
(entered into force 16 March 1983). 
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994). 
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Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted 16 September 1987, 1522 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1989) 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994). 
 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 
December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005). 
 
Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (entered into 
force 4 November 2016). 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 
154 (entered into force 1 January 1995). 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995). 
 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 120 (entered into 
force 1 January 1995). 
 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183 (entered into 
force 1 January 1995). 
 
Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Hydro Fluorocarbons, 15 October 2016 (not in 
force), online: Montreal Protocol <http:// conf.montreal- protocol.org/ meeting/ mop/ mop- 28/ 
crps/ SitePages/ Home.aspx>. 
 
 
1.2 Other instruments and documents 
 
1.2.1 United Nations General Assembly 
 
Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution adopted by 
the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, UN Doc Res A/70/L.1 (21 October 2015). 
 
1.2.2 European Union 
 
Directorate General Climate Action of the EU Commission, Possible Legal Arrangements to 
Implement a Global Market Based Measure for International Aviation Emissions (2 December 
2015), online: EC 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/transport/aviation/docs/gmbm_legal_study_en.pdf>. 
 
EC, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Integrating maritime 
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transport emissions in the EU’s greenhouse gas reduction policies, COM (2013) 479 final (28 
June 2013). 
 
EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 
on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, 
and amending Directive 2009/16/EC, [2015] OJ, L 123/55. 
 
EC, Communication on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon 
investments, COM(2015)0337 – C8-0190/2015 – 2015/0148(COD)) [2017] OJ, Annex 8-
0003/2017. 
 
1.2.3 International Civil Aviation Organization 
 
ICAO, Resolution A38-18, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices 
related to Environmental Protection — Climate Change,” i-68-i-77, in Assembly Resolutions in 
Force Doc 10022 (ICAO, 4 October 2013), online: ICAO <http://www.icao.int/environmental-
protection/Documents/A38-17_A38-18.pdf>.  
 
Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices related to Environmental 
Protection – Global Market-based Measure (MBM) Scheme, ICAO Res A39-3 (October 2016). In 







Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, Assembly Resolution A.719(17) adopted on 6 November 
1991. 
 
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention: 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code, Resolution A.741(18), Adopted on 4 November 
1993, IMO Doc Res A 18/Res.741 (17 November 1993). 
 
Resolution A.963(23), Adopted on 5 December 2003 (Agenda item 19), IMO Doc A 23/Res.963 
(4 March 2004). 
 
Principles to be Considered when Drafting IMO Instruments, IMO Assembly Resolution 
A.1103(29) (26 November 2015). 
 
Strategic Plan for the Organization (2016 to 2021), Assembly Resolution A.1097(29), adopted 25 
November 2015, IMO Doc A 29/Res.1097 (1 December 2015). 
 
IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code), Resolution A.1070(28), Adopted on 4 
December 2013 (Agenda item 10), IMO Doc A 28/Res.1070 (10 December 2013). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 







Principles to be Considered in the Review of Existing Requirements and the Development of New 
Requirements, Submitted by Jamaica, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Panama, the United Kingdom, 
BIMCO, IACS, ICS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, IMO Doc C/ES.28/9/1 (20 October 
2015). 
 
Further Discussion of the Principles and the Development of a Framework, Submitted by Greece, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, BIMCO, IACS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, IMO Doc C 
117/14 (4 November 2016). 
 
Consideration of the Report of the MEPC, Note by the Secretary-General, IMO Doc C 117/7 (16 
November 2016).  
 
Report of the Working Group on the Development of a New Strategic Framework, IMO Doc C 




 MEPC 42 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 42nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 42/22 (16 November 1998). 
 
 MEPC 44  
 




Report of the MEPC on its 45th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 45/20 (16 October 2000). 
 
Report on the Outcome of the IMO Study on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Submitted 








Report of the MEPC on its 47th session, IMO Doc MEPC 47/20 (18 March 2002). 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 






Report of the Correspondence Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Submitted by 




Report of the MEPC on its 49th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 49/22 (8 August 2003). 
 












Report of the One-day Technical Workshop on GHG Indexing Scheme held at IMO Headquarters 
on Friday, 15 July 2005, IMO Doc MEPC 53/WP.3 (15 July 2005). 
 
 MEPC 54 
 




Report of the MEPC on its 55th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 55/23 (16 October 2006). 
 
 MEPC 56 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 56th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 56/23 (30 July 2007). 
 
Elements of a Possible Market-based CO2 Emission Reduction Scheme, Submitted by Norway, 




Report of the Intersessional Correspondence Group on Greenhouse Gas Related Issues, Submitted 
by Australia and the Netherlands, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/5 (21 December 2007). 
 
Possible Expediting of IMO’s Work on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, Note by the 
Secretary-General, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/7 (21 January 2008). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 





A Cross-industry Goal-based Approach to Reduction of GHG Emissions from New Ships, 
Submitted by the ICS, BIMCO, CESA, IACS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, 
IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/8 (23 January 2008). 
 
Report of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships, IMO Doc MEPC 57/WP.8 (3 April 
2008). 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 57th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (7 April 2008). 
 
Future IMO Regulation regarding Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, 
Submitted by Denmark, Marshall Islands, BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and 




Report of the Outcome of the First Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from Ships, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4 (4 July 2008). 
 
The Feasibility of an International Compensation Fund for GHG Emissions from Ships, Submitted 
by Denmark, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/22 (14 August 2008). 
 
Comments on the Outcome of GHG-WG 1 regarding the Consideration of an Emission Trading 
Scheme for International Shipping, Submitted by France, Germany and Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 
58/4/25 (15 August 2008).  
 




Second IMO GHG Study 2009: Update of the 2000 IMO GHG Study − Status Report from the 
Steering Committee, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/4 (8 April 2009). 
 
An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Submitted by Denmark, IMO 
Doc MEPC 59/4/5 (9 April 2009). 
 
Positive Aspects of a Global Emission Trading Scheme for International Shipping, Submitted by 
France, Germany and Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/25 (8 May 2009). 
 
Cornerstones for an Outline of an Convention of a Global Emission Trading Scheme for 
International Shipping, Submitted by France, Germany and Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/26 (8 
May 2009). 
 
Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism to Improve the Energy Efficiency of Ships based on 
the International GHG Fund, Submitted by Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/34 (8 May 2009). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism to Improve the Energy Efficiency of Ships Based on 
the International GHG Fund, Submitted by Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/35 (8 May 2009).  
 
Comments on MEPC 59/4/2 and MEPC 59/4/4 and an Additional Approach to Addressing 
Maritime GHG Emissions, Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/48 (22 May 
2009). 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Shipping-relevant Ideas 
and Proposals to the UNFCCC Process in 2008, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 
59/INF.29 (22 May 2009). 
 
IMO Must Act Decisively to Reduce GHG Emissions from Shipping if it is to Retain its 
Competence in Technical and Political Matters related to Shipping and GHGs, Submitted by 
Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace International and World Wild Fund for Nature, 
IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/47 (22 May 2009). 
 
Comments on MEPC 59/4/2 and MEPC 59/4/4 and an Additional Approach to Addressing 
Maritime GHG Emissions, Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/48 (22 May 
2009). 
 




Effects on Sea Transport Cost Due to an International Fund for GHG Emission for Ships, 
Submitted by Denmark, IMO Doc MEPC 60/INF.7 (18 December 2009).  
 
An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Submitted by Cyprus, Denmark, 
the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and the International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), IMO Doc 
MEPC 60/4/8 (18 December 2009). 
 
Market-Based Instruments: A Penalty on Trade and Development, Submitted by the Bahamas, 
IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/10 (13 January 2010). 
 
Further Details on the United States Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping, Submitted by the United States of America, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/12 (14 
January 2010). 
 
Mandatory EEDI Requirements – Draft Text for Adding a New Part to MARPOL Annex VI for 
Regulation of the Energy Efficiency of Ships, Submitted by Japan, Norway and the United States, 
IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/35 (15 January 2010). 
 
Alternative Emission Caps for Shipping in 2020 and 2030, Submitted by Norway, IMO Doc 
MEPC 60/4/23 (15 January 2010). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Emission “Caps” and Reduction Targets, Submitted by the World Shipping Council (WSC), IMO 
Doc MEPC 60/4/28 (15 January 2010). 
 
Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism: Leveraged Incentive Scheme to Improve the Energy 
Efficiency of Ships Based on the International GHG Fund, Submitted by Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 
60/4/37 (15 January 2010). 
 
A Further Outline of a Global Emission Trading System (ETS) for International Shipping, 
Submitted by Norway, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/22 (15 January 2010). 
 
A Global Emissions Trading System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, 
Submitted by the United Kingdom, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/26 (15 January 2010). 
 
Further Elements for the Development of an Emissions Trading System for International Shipping, 
Submitted by France, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/41 (15 January 2010). 
 
Achieving Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships through Port State Arrangements 
Utilizing the Ship Traffic, Energy and Environment Model, STEEM, Submitted by Jamaica, IMO 
Doc MEPC 60/4/40 (15 January 2010). 
 
Proposal to Establish a Vessel Efficiency System (VES), Submitted by the World Shipping 
Council, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/39 (15 January 2010). 
 
A Rebate Mechanism for a Market-based Instrument for International Shipping, Submitted by 
IUCN, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/55 (29 January 2010).  
 
Impact Assessment of an Emissions Trading Scheme with a Particular View on Developing 
Countries, Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/54 (29 January 2010). 
 
Consideration of a Market-based Mechanism: Leveraged Incentive Scheme to Improve the Energy 
Efficiency of Ships based on the International GHG Fund (Corrigendum), Submitted by Japan, 
IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/37/Corr.1 (16 March 2010). 
 




Marginal Abatement Costs and Cost-effectiveness of Energy-efficiency Measures, Submitted by 
the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology (IMarEST), IMO Doc MEPC 
61/INF.18 (23 July 2010). 
 
Going Slow to Reduce Emissions – Can the Current Surplus of Maritime Transport Capacity Be 
Turned into an Opportunity to Reduce GHG Emissions? Submitted by the Clean Shipping 
Coalition (CSC), IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.22 (23 July 2010). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Further Details on the US Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International 
Shipping, Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.24 (23 July 2010). 
 
Further Details on the United States Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping, Submitted by the United States, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/16 (23 July 2010). 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 61st Session, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010). 
 
Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 
61/INF.2 (13 August 2010). 
 
Market-Based Measures – Inequitable Burden on Developing Countries, Submitted by India, IMO 
Doc MEPC 61/5/19 (2 August 2010). 
 
Uncertainties and Problems in Market-based Measures, Submitted by China and India, IMO Doc 




Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Ships, Submitted by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011). 
 
Mandatory CO2 Emission Cut Targets through Technical and Operational Measures, Submitted by 
the Bahamas, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/13 (6 May 2011). 
 
Possible Uses of Revenues Generated by an Emissions Trading System, Submitted by Germany, 
IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/15 (6 May 2011). 
 
Possible Incompatibility between WTO Rules and a Market-based Measure for International 
shipping, Submitted by India, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/27 (20 May 2011). 
 
Comment on Document MEPC 62/5/15 on the Possible Use of Revenues Generated by an 
Emissions Trading System, Submitted by France, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/35 (20 May 2011).  
 
The International Greenhouse Gas Fund – Strengths and Weaknesses, Submitted by Cyprus, 
Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Liberia, Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and the International 
Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/33 (20 May 2011).  
 
Report of the Drafting Group on Amendments to Mandatory instruments (Part II), MEPC 
62/WP.11/Add.1 (15 July 2011). 
 
Report of MEPC on its 62nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 62/24, 26 July 2011. 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 62nd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 62/24/Add.1 (26 July 2011). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 






Draft Regulations to be included in MARPOL Annex VI for the Control of CO2 Emissions from 
Ships, Submitted by the Bahamas, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/1 (24 November 2011). 
 
Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), Submitted by Japan and the WSC, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/3 
(25 November 2011).  
 
Cost Analysis on the Application of Efficiency Improvement Measures in the Maritime Fleet, 
Submitted by Japan, IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.13 (22 December 2011). 
 
Market Based Measures – Impact on India’s Shipping Trade, Submitted by India, IMO Doc MEPC 
63/5/8 (23 December 2011). 
 
Design and Implementation of a Worldwide Maritime Emission Trading Scheme: Results of a 
Scientific Study, Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/9 (23 December 2011). 
 
Design and Implementation of a Worldwide Maritime Emission Trading Scheme: Full Report, 
Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.14 (23 December 2011). 
 
Market Based Measures – Impact on India’s Shipping Trade, Submitted by India, IMO Doc MEPC 
63/5/8 (23 December 2011). 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 63rd Session, IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 (14 March 2012). 
 




Draft Legal Text on the Modified Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), Submitted by Japan, IMO 
Doc MEPC 64/5/2 (28 June 2012).  
 
Possible Incompatibility between the WTO rules and Market-based Measures for International 
Shipping, Submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/3, 29 June 2012. 
 
Elaboration on the Port State Levy Proposal, Submitted by Jamaica, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/4 (10 
July 2012). 
 
Schematic Outline of the Modified Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), Submitted by Japan, IMO 
Doc MEPC 64/INF.15 (27 July 2012).  
 
Draft Legal Text on Uses of Financing Generated from a Maritime MBM, Submitted by the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/10 (27 July 2012). 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 64th Session, IMO Doc 64/23 (11 October 2012). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 






World Trade Organization’s Views on Document MEPC 64/5/4 Submitted by India and Saudi 
Arabia, Note by the Secretary-General, IMO Doc MEPC 65/INF.18, 21 February 2013. 
 








Third IMO GHG Study 2014 – Executive Summary, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 




Outcomes of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences held in Lima in December 2014 
and in Geneva in February 2015, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc MEPC 68/5, 18 February 2015. 
 
Development of a Global Data Collection System for Maritime Transport, Submitted by Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the European Commission, IMO Doc MEPC 68/4/1 (3 March 2015). 
 
Environmental Protection in the Polar Code, Submitted by Friends of the Earth International 
(FOEI), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Pacific Environment and Clean Shipping Coalition 
(CSC), IMO Doc MEPC 68/INF.37 (6 March 2015). 
 
Setting a Reduction Target and Agreeing Associated Measures for International Shipping, 
Submitted by the Marshall Islands, IMO Doc 68/5/1 (20 March 2015). 
 
Report of the Working Group, IMO Doc MEPC 68/WP.10 (13 May 2015). 
 




Report of the MEPC on its 69th Session, IMO Doc 69/21 (13 May 2016). 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 






Development of a Road Map to Determine a Possible IMO Fair Share Contribution, Submitted by 
BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and WSC, IMO Doc MEPC 70/7/8 (19 August 
2016). 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18 (11 November 2016). 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 70th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 70/18/Add.1 (11 November 2016). 
 
 MEPC 71 
 
Report of the First Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions 
from Ships (ISWG-GHG 1), IMO Doc MEPC 71/WP.5, 30 June 2017. 
 
Report of the MEPC on its 71st Session, IMO Doc 71/17 (24 July 2017).  
 
Guiding Principles for the IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, Submitted 
by Argentina, Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey, IMO 
Doc MEPC 71/7/6 (28 April 2017). 
 
Methane Emission from LNG Carriers, Submitted by the Republic of Korea, IMO Doc MEPC 
71/INF.23 (28 April 2017). 
 
Resolution MEPC.292(71) – 2017 Guidelines for Administration Verification of Ship Fuel Oil 
Consumption Data, in Report of the MEPC on its 71st Session, IMO Doc MEPC 71/17 (24 July 




Report of the Second Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG 





Revision of Resolution A.720(17), Report of the Drafting Group, IMO Doc MEPC 43/6 (3 
December 1998). 
 
MEPC Circular on the Interim Guidelines for Voluntary Ship CO2 Emission Indexing for Use in 
Trials, IMO Doc MEPC/Circ.471 (29 July 2005). 
 
Guidance for the Development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), IMO 
Doc MEPC.1/Circ.683 (17 August 2009). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International 
Maritime Organization, Study by the Secretariat of the IMO, IMO Doc LEG/MISC.7 (19 January 
2012). 
 
Rules and Guidelines for Consultative Status of Non-governmental Organizations with the 
International Maritime Organization, Relations with Non-governmental Organizations, Note by 
the Secretary-General, IMO Doc A 28/21(d) (28 August 2013), Annex. 
 
2013 Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas under MARPOL, IMO Doc A28/Res.1087 
(21 February 2014). 
 
2013 Interim Guidelines for Determining Minimum Propulsion Power to Maintain the 
Manoeuvrability of Ships in Adverse Conditions, IMO Doc MEPC.1/Circ.850/Rev.1 (15 July 
2015). 
 
2014 Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Design Index (EEDI), IMO Doc 
MEPC.1/Circ.855/Rev.1 (8 October 2015).  
 
Guidelines on the Organization and Method of Work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the 
Marine Environment Committee and their Subsidiary Bodies, IMO Doc MSC-
MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.4 (10 June 2015). 
 
List of Codes, Recommendations, Guidelines and other Environment-related Non-mandatory 
Instruments, Note by the Secretariat, IMO Doc 70/INF.7 (10 August 2016). 
 
 
1.2.5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First 
Session, Doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (7 April 1995). 
 
Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth 
Session, Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008). 
 
Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 1/CP.21, Report of the Conference 
of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, 
Addendum, Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016). 
 
1.2.6 World Trade Organization 
 
Decision on Maritime Transport Services, GATS Council for Trade in Services Decision S/L/24 
(3 July 1996). 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




2. SECONDARY MATERIALS 
 
Jamshid Aghaei & Mohammad-Iman Alizadeh, “Demand Response in Smart Electricity Grids 
Equipped with Renewable Energy Sources: A Review” (2013) 18 Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 64. 
 
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, “Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment.” (1991) 
16(3) Law & Social Inquiry 435. 
 
James Bacchus, The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver Centre for International Governance 
Innovation Report (CIGI, 2017). 
 
Patrick Bayer, Lindsay Dolan & Johannes Urpelainen, “Global Patterns of Renewable Energy 
Innovation, 1990-2009” (2013) 17:3 Energy for Sustainable Development 288. 
 
Abbe E L Brown, ed, Environmental Technologies, Intellectual Property and Climate Change 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013). 
 
Jutta Brunnee, Meinhard Doelle & Lavanya Rajamani, Promoting Compliance in an Evolving 
Climate Change Regime, (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 
Jane Bulmer, Meinhard Doelle & Daniel Klein, “Chapter 3: Negotiating History of the Paris 
Agreement” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), 50. 
 
Uwe Büsgen & Wolfhart Dürrschmidt, “The Expansion of Electricity Generation from Renewable 
Energies in Germany: A Review Based on the Renewable Energy Sources Act Progress Report 
2007 and the New German Feed-in Legislation” (2009) 37:7 Energy Policy 2536. 
 
Martin Cames et al, How Additional is the Clean Development Mechanism? (Institute for Applied 
Ecology, 2016) online: IAE 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/docs/clean_dev_mechanism_en.pdf>.   
 
María Pía Carazo & Daniel Klein, “Chapter 23 Implications for Public International Law Initial 
Considerations,” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis 
and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), at 383. 
 
Aldo Chircop, “The International Maritime Law Response to Climate Change: The Quest for the 
Shipping Industry’s ‘Fair Share’ of GHG Emissions Reduction,” in J. Guifang Xue & Jie Zheng, 
eds, The Law of the Sea and Emerging Issues (China Democracy and Legal System Publishing 
House, forthcoming in 2018).  
 
Aldo Chircop, “The International Maritime Organization” in Donald R Rothwell et al, eds, The 
Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2015) 416. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Aldo Chircop, William Moreira, Hugh Kindred & Edgar Gold, eds, Canadian Maritime Law, 2nd 
ed (Irwin Law, 2016). 
 
Maria Vittoria Corazza et al, “A European Vision for More Environmentally Friendly Buses” 
(2016) 45:4 Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 48. 
 
Yamide Dagnet & Eliza Northrop, “Chapter 20: Facilitating Implementation and Promoting 
Compliance (Article 15)” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 
Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), 338. 
 
Yamide Dagnet & Kelly Levin, “Chapter 18: Transparency (Article 13)” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, 
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 
2017), 301. 
 
Joanna Depledge, “Chapter 2A: The Legal and Policy Framework of the United Nations Climate 
Change Regime” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis 
and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017) 27. 
 
Meinhard Doelle, “Toward a Principled Design of Provincial Cap & Trade Systems: Lessons from 
Nova Scotia’s Proposal to Meet the Carbon Pricing Requirement in the Pan-Canadian Framework 
for Climate Change” (2018) J Env L & Prac [forthcoming]. 
 
Meinhard Doelle, “Chapter 22: Assessment of Strength and Weaknesses” in Daniel Klein et al, 
eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 375. 
 
Meinhard Doelle, “Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons for 
MEA Compliance System Design” (2010) 1 Climate Law 237. 
 
Meinhard Doelle, From Hot Air to Action? Climate Change, Compliance and the Future of 
International Environmental Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2005). 
 
David M Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2003). 
 
David M Driesen, “Emissions Trading Versus Pollution Taxes: Playing “Nice” With Other 
Instruments” (2017) Environmental Law [forthcoming]. 
 
Jasper Faber, Dagmar Nelissen, Galen Hon, Haifeng Wang & Mikis Tsimplis, Regulated Slow 
Steaming in Maritime Transport: An Assessment of Options, Costs and Benefits (CE Delft, 2012), 




FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2014 (Rome: FAO, 2014) at 32–33. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Daniel J Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 
 
Jürgen Friedrich, “Chapter 19: Global Stocktake (Article 14)” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), 319. 
 
Jorge Gastelumendi & Inka Gnittke, “Chapter 14: Climate Finance (Article 9)” in Daniel Klein et 
al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 239. 
 
Markus Gehring & Freedom Kai-Phillips, “Intersections of the Paris Agreement and Carbon 
Offsetting: Legal and Functional Considerations” (September 2016) 88 CIGI Policy Brief at 6. 
 
Thilo Grau, Molin Huo & Karsten Neulhoff, “Survey of Photovoltaic Industry and Policy in 
Germany and China” (2012) 51 Energy Policy 20. 
 
Wolfgang Gruel & Frank Piller, “A New Vision for Personal Transportation” (2016) 57:2 MIT 
Sloan Management Rev 20.  
 
Melissa Harris, Marisa Beck & Ivetta Gerasimchuk, The End of Coal: Ontario’s coal phase-out 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015).  
 
Stuart Hetherington, “The Elusive Panacea of Uniformity: Is It Worth Pursuing?” Paper presented 
at the AMTAC Annual Address 2013 Sydney (18 September 2013), online: AMTAC 
<https://amtac.org.au/publications-papers/>. 
 
Michael K Hidrue et al, “Willingness to Pay for Electric Vehicles and their Attributes” (2011) 33:1 
Resource & Energy Economics 686. 
 
Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, Sustainable Energy Policies for Europe: Towards 100% Renewable 
Energy (CRC Press, 2013). 
 
David Houle, Carbon Pricing in Canadian Provinces: from Early Experiments to Adoption (1995-
2014) (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2015). 
 
Andrew Howard, “Chapter 11: Voluntary Cooperation (Article 6)” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), 
178. 
 
Thanh Hua et al, “Status of Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric Buses Worldwide” (2014) 269:1 J Power 
Sources 975. 
 
Llewelyn Hughes & Jonas Meckling, “The Politics of Renewable Energy Trade: The US-China 
solar dispute” (2017) 105 Energy Policy 256. 
 
David B Hunter & Nuno Lacasta, “Lessons Learned from the European Union’s Climate Policy” 
(2009) 27 WIS Int L J 575. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 





INTERTANKO and OCIMF, Virtual Arrival: Optimising Voyage Management and Reducing 




IPCC, “Aviation and the Global Atmosphere: Summary for Policymakers” IPCC Special Report 
(IPCC, 1999). 
 
Anastasia Kharina & Daniel Rutherford, “Fuel Efficiency Trends for New Commercial Jet 
Aircraft: 1960 to 2014” (August 2015) White Paper, International Council on Clean 
Transportation.  
 
Zachary D Liscow & Quentin C Karpilow, “Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law” (4 May 
2017), online: Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No 571 <ssrn.com/abstract=2927441>. 
 
A. V. Lowe, “The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law” (1977) 14 San Diego 
L  Rev 597. 
 
Allan Mazur, Energy and Electricity in Industrial Nations: The Sociology and Technology of 
Energy (Routledge, 2013). 
 
Atle Midttun, “The Greening of European Electricity Industry: A Battle of Modernities” (2012) 
48 Energy Policy 22. 
 
James F Muir, Fuel and Energy Use in the Fisheries Sector: Approaches, Inventories and Strategic 
Implications (FAO, 2015). 
 
Aoife O’Leary, David Holyoake and Marta Ballesteros, Legal implications of EU action on GHG 




Sebastian Oberthür, “Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol” (2003) 3:3 Climate Policy 191. 
 
David Ockwell &Alexandra Mallett, eds, Low-Carbon Technology Transfer: From Rhetoric to 
Reality (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
 
Naya Olmer, Bryan Comer, Biswajoy Roy, Xiaoli Mao and Dan Rutherford, Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Global Shipping, 2013-2015 (International Council on Clean Transportation, 
2017). 
 
Martin Olszynski et al, “From Smokes to Smokestack: Lessons from Tobacco for the Future of 
Climate Change Liability” Georgetown Env L R (forthcoming). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Alfred Popp, “The Treaty-Making Work of the Legal Committee of the International Maritime 
Organization,” in A Chircop et al (eds) The Regulation of International Shipping: International 
and Comparative Perspectives (Nijhoff Leiden, 2012) 209. 
 
Harilaos N Psaraftis, “Market-based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships: A 
Review” (2012) 11:2 WMU J Maritime Affairs 211. 
 
Lavanya Rajamani & Emmanuel Guérin, “Chapter 4: Central Concepts in the Paris Agreement 
and How They Evolved” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 
Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), 74. 
 
Nicholas Rivers & Mark Jaccard, “Intensity-Based Climate Change Policies in Canada” (2010) 
36:4 Can Pub Policy 409. 
 
Melissa Rorie, “Responsive Regulation,” (Oxford Handbooks Online, 2015), online: Oxford 
Handbooks Online <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.013.109>. 
 
Miranda Schreurs, “Breaking the Impasse in the International Climate Negotiations: The Potential 
of Green Technologies” (2012) 48 Energy Policy 5. 
 
Yubing Shi, Climate Change and International Shipping: The Regulatory Framework for the 
Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Brill, 2017). 
 
Noel Smith, Donald Hirsch & Abigail Davis, “Accessibility and Capability: The Minimum 
Transport Needs and Costs of Rural Households” (2012) 21:1 J Transport Geography 93. 
 
Yan Song, Yanping Chen & Xiaohong Pan, “Polycentric Spatial Structure and Travel Mode 
Choice: The Case of Shenzhen, China” (2012) 4:4 Regional Science Policy & Practice 479. 
 
Irene Suárez Pérez & Angela Churie Kallhauge, “Chapter 12: Adaptation” in Daniel Klein et al, 
eds, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 196. 
 
Halldór Thorgeirsson, “Chapter 7: Objective (Article 2.1)” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), 123. 
 
MN Tsimplis, “Shipping and the Marine Environment in the 21st Century,” in M Clarke (ed) 
Maritime Law Evolving: Thirty Years at Southampton (Hart Publishing, 2013) 95 
 
UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, “‘Competent or 
relevant international organizations’ under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” 
in Law of the Sea Bulletin No 31 (1996), 79-95. 
 
Andreas Wiesmann, “Slow Steaming:A Viable Long-term Option?” (2010) Wärtsilä Technical J 
49. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 




Harald Winkler, “Chapter 9: Mitigation (Article 4)” in Daniel Klein et al, eds, The Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017), 141. 
 
 
3. WORLD WIDE WEB MATERIALS 
 
European Commission, “Reducing Emissions from Aviation” (21 November 2017), online: EC 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation_en>. 
 
Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, “Marine Shipping” (March 2010), online: Centre for 
Climate and Energy Solutions <https://www.c2es.org/docUploads/MarineShipping.pdf>. 
 
Jonathan Frænkel-Eidse, “Will the Aviation Sector’s Planned Carbon Offset Scheme Help Curb 
Emissions from Air Travel?” Earth Island Journal (28 September 2016), online: EIJ 
<www.earthisland.org>. 
 
Johannes Friedrich, Mengpin Ge & Andrew Pickens, “This Interactive Chart Explains World’s 
Top 10 Emitters, and How They’ve Changed”, World Resources Institute (11 April 2017), online: 
WRI <www.wri.org>.  
 
Gobal Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnerships, online: GloMEEP <http://glomeep.imo.org/>. 
 
Alex Gray, “These Are the World’s Fastest-growing Economies in 2017” (9 June 2017), World 
Economic Forum, online: WEF <www.weforum.org>. 
 
ICAO, “Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)” 
(undated), online: ICAO <https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/market-based-
measures.aspx>. 
 
ICS, Press Release, “EU must align Shipping CO2 Rules with International Community, says ICS” 
(6 June 2016), online: ICS <www.ics-shipping.org>. 
 
IMO, “IMO Secretary-General Speaks Out against Regional Emission Trading System” IMO 
Briefing (9 January 2017), online: IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/3-SG-emissions.aspx>. 
 
IMO, “IMO Member State Audit Scheme” (13 September 2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org>. 
 
IMO, “New Requirements for International Shipping as UN Body Continues to Address 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” IMO Briefing (28 October 2016), online: IMO 
<www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings>. 
 
IMO, “Port State Control” (13 September 2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org>. 
 
IMO, Press Briefing, “IMO sets 2020 date for ships to comply with low sulphur fuel oil 
requirement” (28 October 2016), online: IMO <http://www.imo.org>.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 





IMO, Status of Treaties (13 September 2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org>. 
 
IMO, “Technical Cooperation” (13 September 2017), online: IMO <www.imo.org >. 
 





International Standards Organization, online: ISO < https://www.iso.org/home.html>. 
 
International Standards Organization, TC 8: Ships and Marine Technology, online: ISO 
<https://www.iso.org/committee/45776.html>. 
 
“LNG Bunkering to Grow at CAGR of 62.5% to reach USD 24.684 bln in 2023”, Marine Link (3 
November 2017), online: Marine Link <https://www.marinelink.com/news/bunkering-reach-
grow430960>. 
 
MTCC Network (GMN): Capacity Building for Climate Mitigation in the Maritime Shipping 
Industry, online: GMN <http://gmn.imo.org/about-gmn/>. 
 
OECD Council Working Party on Shipbuilding (WP6), Report on Ship Financing (OECD, June 
2007), online: OECD <www.oecd.org>. 
 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, 2016 Annual Report, online: Paris 
MOU < https://www.parismou.org/>. 
 
Jonathan Saul, “Shipping faces threat from EU of unilateral levy on carbon emissions”, Reuters 
(21 December 2016), online: Reuters <www.reuters.com>. 
 
International Association of Classification Societies ‘Requirements Concerning Polar Class’ IACS 
Req. 2016, online: IACS   < file:///C:/Users/aechirco/Downloads/ur_i_pdf410.pdf >. 
 
Andrew Spurrier, “European Parliament votes to bring shipping into EU emissions trading 
scheme”, Fairplay (15 February 2017), online: Fairplay <www.fairplay.ihs.com>. 
 
Jon Strand, “Fuel Charges in International Aviation and Shipping: How High; How; and Why?”  World Bank 
(17 April 2013), online: <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/fuel-charges-in-international-aviation-
and-shipping-how-high-how-and-why>. 
 
UN Climate Change, Welcome to the Talanoa Dialogue Portal, online: UNFCCC 
<talanoadialogue.com>. 
 
UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of Ratifications, 
Accessions and Successions (23 May 2017), online: DOALOS <www.un.org>. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 





World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2016” (17 April 2017), World Development Indicators 
database, online: World Bank <www.worldbank.org>.  
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113274 
